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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the impact on stabilization and growth of
policies of institutional and structural change. It has been divided in
five parts in which the topics of monetary reforms, financial repression
and price-wage control stabilization schemes are discussed.
Part one, "Monetary Reforms and Exchange Rate Dynamics", examines the
role of uncertainty in the determination of the exchange rate in economies
in transition from an inconvertible money standard to a fixed exchange
rate regime. Using as a framework a simple monetary model , the essay
reviews experiences of several monetary reforms occurred in Europe and the
Americas between 1850 and 1930. It was found that between the moment when
people realize that a move to convertibility is possible and the actual
introduction of the reform, the connection between monetary aggregates and
the exchange rate breaks down and is replaced by an expectations-driven
process.
Part two, "Foreign Debt Problems, Budget Correction and Inertial
Inflation: The Case of Mexico" highlights some of the crucial factors that
determine the feasibility of stabilization schemes based on prices,
exchange rate and wage controls.
This chapter illustrates the importance of complementing the basic
criterion of feasibility of a shock program which only looks a the
inflation corrected budget deficit, with questions about the consistency
of a fast reduction in the inflation tax with balance of payments and
domestic capacity constraints. The simulations help to show how, in spite
of the deep fiscal corrections Mexico had made at the time, the success of
a program of this kind would be etremely sensitive to external shocks.
Part three, "Financial Repression, Financial Liberalization and the
Interest Rate Elasticity of Savings in Developing Countries", analyses the
old question of financial repression and savings. While the literature
offers no definite answers, this paper starts from the fact that a careful
review shows that the signs and sizes of the interest rate elasticities in
different countries are very sensitive to the sample periods, and conse-
quently to the degree of financial repression in a particular country at
a particular time.
This essay estimates the savings functions for 26 countries distin-
guishing periods of high and low average real interest rates. Using the
results of these regression it is found evidence of a Laffer-curve shaped
savings function, with positive elasticity at very low real rates, zero
elasticity when real interest rates are around zero and negative elas-
ticity for high real returns. An income distribution argument is used to
provide an explanation for this type of response.
Part four focuses on the role of financial repression on capital
flight with a special reference to the Mexican economy. It has two
sections. The first one, "Capital Flight and Incomplete Financial Markets:
Two Mexican Stories", is a note which describes some of the basic charac-
teristics of the Mexican financial system and the effects of the recent
reforms. By comparing the 1981 and 1986 experiences, it is suggested that
the dynamics of capital flight, as well as the connection between capital
flight and private external borrowing in Mexico, can be explained to a
large extent by the specific regulations existing on the financial system.
The second section, "Dollarization and Capital Flight. The Role of
Financial Repression in the Mexican Experience (1981-1982)" examines in
detail capital flight from the perspective of the financial markets.
This paper takes advantage of some features of the Mexican institu-
tional framework such as strong market segmentation and interest rate
regulation to exploit credit market information to generate, with the help
of some econometric techniques of markets in disequilibrium, capital
flight data. Another outcome of this exercise is a balance sheet which
shows, on the one side capital flight decomposed in terms of the users of
foreign exchange (firms, individuals and banks) and on the other side
shows the sources of capital flight financing (external borrowing of
banks, private firms, public external borrowing and reserve losses). The
information generated in this section helps to understand the impact of
financial regulation on the size, dynamics and composition of the most
serious episode of capital flight in Mexico.
Finally, part five, "Domestic Stability and External Shocks. A review
of the Causes of the Mexican Stabilizing Development (1955-1971)", tries
to answer to what degree institutional and policy changes are responsible
for the fifteen years of price stability and rapid growth of the 'desar-
rollo estabilizador', and how much can be explained by changes in external
conditions.
Using a methodology based on an optimal control exercise it is shown
that almost 90% of the stabilization of the fifties and sixties was due to
less variability in external and exogenous conditions, while less than 10%
was due to better policy management. This exercise helps answer questions
by Mexican policy makers who look back at the institutions of the sixties
wonder what should be copied and what is right for today's Mexico. The
answer is very little.
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Part I
MONETARY REFORMS AND EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS
MONETARY REFORMS AND EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS.
Introduction.
This paper tries to assess the importance of people's perception of
future policy actions as a determinant of the exchange rate, by looking at
some episodes of monetary reforms in the Americas and Europe between 1860
and 1930.
The motivation of this empirical exercise comes from the literature
of collapsing currencies, such as Dornbusch (1986), Flood and Garber
(1984) and Lizondo (1983). These papers address the question of what
happens to the interest rate or to the price of the currency in the
futures market when the stochastic nature of moretary shocks affects the
conjectures agents have of the time of collapse of a fixed exchange rate
regime.
Here we will look at how uncertainty influences the exchange rate in
the opposite case of a collapse, that is, during the transition from an
inconvertible money standard to a fixed parity.
This paper has two sections. Secticn 1 shows a simple monetary model
of exchange rate determination which includes some of the elements of
uncertainty usually present in economies in transition to a fully conver-
tible currency.
Section 2 uses this framework to review the role of people's expecra-
tions of a return to a fixed parity as it was recorded in the cases of the
United States (1862-1865), Argentina (1876-1894), Brazil (1870-1899),
Spain (1870-1899), England (1922-1925), France (1926-1929), Puerto Rico
(1898-1900) and Mexico (1903-1905).
31. A model.
Before getting in the details of a model it would be convenient to
have in mind the sequence of events during the transition to a fixed
exchange rate regime.
We start with a country which for some exogenous reason such as a
war, decides to abandon a convertible money standard and rely on domestic
credit creation to finance the extraordinary events imposed by the
external shock. This stage is characterized by inflation and the cor-
responding depreciation of the inconvertible paper with respect to gold.
Some time after the cause to Leave a fixed exchange rate regime
disappears, the government decides to begin a stabilization program which
will end with the return to convertible money standard. In many instances
the first sign is a significant reduction in the rate of money printing.
This first move coincides with some institutional changes such as the
creation of a special commission to study the advantages of the return to
full convertibility or the appointment of a new economic cabinet.
Between the moment when authorities decide to start the conversion
process (announcement) and the time when they finally intervene, there is
a period during which people do not know for sure the exact time when tle
exchange rate is to be pegged or about the final parity.
Thus, uncertainty takes place in two dimensions. First, people would
not be sure if the government will try to stabilize at par (at the
pre-collapse price) inducing a deflation, or if it will resume conver-
tibility at a price consistent with the current stock of inconvertible
money (or something in between). A second dimension has to do with the
fact that is a matter of discretion for the central bank to decide the
right time to start the intervention in the currency market.
Now, lets see what we can expect to happen to the exchange rate
during this transition.
Begin with a very simple monetary model. Equation (1) is a portfolio
equilibrium condition where the relative demand of local currency (pesos)
to the standard currency (gold, dollars, etc.) depends on their expected
relative rates of return.
etDt t et ) 
Coefficient $ has to do with the degree of risk aversion of the
representative individual. The larger the more risk averse is the
agent. M(t) is the quantity demanded of home currency and Dd(t) is the
demand for foreign currency at time t. E(t) is the expectation operator
conditional to information available at time t. In equilibrium both,
domestic and foreign currency demand have to be equal to the exogenously
determined supplies of both currencies.
To solve for the equilibrium exchange rate it will be useful to
rewrite equation (1) as
et - k(t) + k E - 1 ;
ko (t) - (M/D), km - ko > 0 kE(O,l) (2)+ y + 
Take as a benchmark case the solution when agents have perfect
foresight, meaning that they know at any time the sequence of future
relative money supply (M/D). Here, the equilibrium exchange is given by
the solution of the certainty equivalent of difference equation (2).
et - k ko(t + i) (3)
i=O
5In what follows expression (3) will be referred as the "fundamental"
or "no-reform" exchange rate.
The reason for these names has to do with the way in which we model a
monetary reform. Think of the government as being able to choose one
among many possible sequences of money supply. People know all the
alternatives and can distinguish at any point in time which one the
government is using. If the government is not planning a reform then the
equilibrium is the same as in the perfect foresight case because the
authorities have the intention to keep moving the money supply along the
current and already identified path.
On the other hand, when the government makes a reform it moves money
from the current path to a different one. It is precisely how people
think this change will occur what we want to capture.
Assume initially that during the transition to a new standard people
have a conjecture on what the final price of the currency will be but do
not have an exact idea of when the reform will take place. Instead, they
see the decision making of the government as a Markov process in which the
transition probability to a fixed parity from time t to time t+l is (t).
To obtain the equilibrium exchange rate for any time we proceed in
two steps. First, one starts from an arbitrary period T+l when the market
clearing exchange rate (if the reform has not occurred by then) is assumed
to be known and equal to , and from there solve (2) backwards. Second,
to get the final solution we will need to make T arbitrarily large.
At time T people perceive two possible values of the exchange rate at
time T+l: the market solution or the new parity e. Then, at time T the
6market equilibrium is given by
et k(T) + k[a(T)e + 1 - a(T))e]
at time T-l, the expected price of foreign currency at time T is:
ET-,e - (T-1) e + (1 - a(T))[k(T) + kl[a(T)e +(1 - (T))e3]
and
e: l - k(T-l) + ka(T-l)e + k (1l-a(T-l))[k(T) + k[a(T)e + (l-a(T))1]
which implies that
ETz2etl - a(T-2)e + (1 - a(T-2)) [ko(T-l) + k (1 - (T-1)) [ko(T) +
kl[a(T )e + (1 - a(T))6]]
Repeating the same process until time t gives us an exchange rate
equation of the form
et - ko + kla(T)e + kl (l - (T))[ko(T+l) + k a(t+l)e] +
k2(l - (T))(1 - a(T+2))[kl(T+2) + kla(t+2)e] + ... +
kT ( - a(T)) ... (1 - a(T-l)) [ko(T) + k[a(T)e + (1 - a(T))]]
As T is made to go arbitrarily far into the future, the dynamics of
the exchange rate can be represented by
et - 7.j(t)[ko(t+i) + kla(t+i)e]
i-O
1 i-O
£ 1k II n (1 - (t+j)) i>0
1
(4)
Which can also be rewritten as
et - iei (t)kO (t+i) + G8i (t)kla(t+i)e (4a)irO i-O
Expression (4a) helps to think of the exchange rate dynamics as
having two components: one which depends on the nature of the current path
of money supplies and other which has to do with expectations about the
post reform parity. The relative weight of each component depends on the
profile of one-step transition probabilities, by the degree of risk
aversion and by the anticipated final parity e.
Some examples can help getting a better sense of how these factors
interact.
Take the simplest case of a flat money supply (M/D) path and a
constant one-step probability profile.
Here, the market "fundamental" (no-reform exchange rate) is given by
. kn (5)
1 - k 1
whereas the exchange rate in the case of an anticipated monetary reform.
obtained from substituting constant values of k, k1 and in equation (4)
is
k, + k,ae (6)
t -1 kl(1-a)
Equation (6) can be rearranged in a very insightful way.
kn + k,al + k,a(e-e)
et ' 1 - kl ( 1-a)
1-k, ka(e-A)+ kt 1-1 + k,(-e)1 - k (1-a) - k(l-a)
e I + kla(e-) (7)t =+ 1 k(1-a)
7
8Equation (7) defines the equilibrium exchange rate equal to the "no-
reform fundamental" plus a term given by the difference between the
fundamental and the final parity.
From this simple expression we can more easily distinguish some of
the determinants of the exchange rate dynamics during the transition to a
fixed parity.
For instance, if agents are risk neutral meaning k - 0 and k - 1,
the exchange rate will immediately jump to the level people anticipate for
the final parity, independently of the transition probability and the
current monetary conditions.
Also, take the situation in which, after a period of money supply
increases the authority decides to stop printing. This is understood as a
signal to the public of the intention of the government to fix the
exchange rate some time in the future. Now, if they think that the
government will fix the parity at the level consistent with the current
money supply, that is e-e, then the exchange rate will immediately jump to
its fundamental. If people interpret the change in the money supply path
as an announcement of a future movement to a fixed parity e, the equi-
librium exchange rate will over or undershoot the market fundamental if
their conjecture about the final parity is above or below it respectively,
and remain constant at this new level.
It is interesting to see what happens if we relax the assumption of a
constant one-step transition probability, keeping k and k fixed.
14
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(t)
Figure 1.
Once again we start from equation (4) which can be rewritten as
et - 8 j(t)[k 0 + kl(t+i)e] + kl8(ti at)(t+i)(e-e) (8)i-o i-O
looking in more detail at the first term of equation (8)
. k
X8j(t)[ko + kl(t+i)a] - 8i (t)[ko + kla(t+i) k] i-0 i-a
k E ii (t)[l + k(1-a (T+i))]
l-k i-
but
- Xi(t)[l + k1(l-a(t+i)) - 1 + kL(l-a(t)) Ji-O
k, (1-a(t)) [1 + kf[l-a(t+l)j +
k2 (l-a(t)) (1-a(t+l))[1 + k (-1-a(t+2))]+...
-1 + k, (l-a( t )) - k, l1-a (t )) + k2l(1-a(t))(l-a(t+l)) - k2(1-a(t))
(l-(t+l)) +...+ k"+ (l-a(t)... (l-(t+N)) +...+ - 1
et - e + kl(e-6) 8jl (t)a(t+i)
i-0
a
eac
10
It is interesting to notice that:
Xi (t)a(t+i) - kip(t+i)1-0 i-O
where p(t+i) is the probability, evaluated at time t of a reform taking
place precisely at time t+i, which in terms of the reliability theory is
the law of failure of the system. The fact that p(t+i)-l gives again
i-O
the property that with risk neutral agents the exchange rate will jump
immediately to the expected final parity regardless of the time profile.
To get a sense of how the shape of the transition probability profile
affects the exchange rate dynamics we could try an example in which the
transition probability grows linearly, say with a - t/T for t T and
a - 1 T > t and t. The implied exchange rate equation is:
et - ko + k e + Tkl(T-t)(ko + k T e) +...+
kT -t
Trt (T-t)(T - (t+l)) ... (l)(k0 + kle) tT
et - ko + k1e t>T
Figure 2 shows the case where e - 10 and T - 10. Other time increas-
ing transition probability profiles give basically the same result.
Figure 2 also compares the linear case with one in which a(t) - 1-exp(-gt)
with e - 10.
It can be seen how the size of the initial undershooting depends on
the entire probability profile: when the subjective probability profile
rises faster the initial exchange rate jump will go farther below fun-
damentals.
s. o10
e
11
Figure 2.
In the beginning of this discussion it was mentioned that monetary
reforms convey two kinds of uncertainty: one with respect to the time of
reform and the other relative to the value of the final parity. So far,
we have said nothing about the case when the representative agent has more
than one conjecture about the final parity.
To see how this works imagine the situation where the representative
agent thinks of two possible final prices, giving a probability a(t) to
the event of no reform, a(t)6(t) to a return to convertibility at parity e
and a(1-6) to parity e. The exchange rate equation is given by:
et i 6i(t) [ko+k1 a(t+i) [6(t+i)e + (1-6(t+i))e] (13)i-o
i-1
80 -1 i - kli n R (1-(t+j)) i > Oj -1
substituting on it the result of (5) one gets:
et - e + k E Oi(t)a(t+i)6(t+i)(e-e) (14)
i-O
+ k i 8i(t)a(t+i)(l-6(t+i))(e-e)
i-O
Expression (14) carries again the same idea of a difference between
the observed exchange rate and its fundamental, explained by a function of
the expected final parity, which will be larger the steeper the probabili-
12
ty profile, the less risk averse the representative agent and the less
likely are people's conjectures about an stabilization at the "current
price".
A natural extension to what has been said would be to introduce more
than one agent. One reason for this is that in times preceding a movement
by the authorities one can expect people disagreeing about the time and
terms of the correction.
It is possible to imagine several ways in which these differences of
opinion can have an impact on the exchange rate dynamics before the
reform.
For example, if agents have strong (and different) beliefs with
respect to the conditions of the policy switch, small changes in money
supply can produce large exchange rate fluctuations in a range bounded by
the conjectures of individuals about the final exchange rate. This would
make reasonable to expect that after the "announcement" of the intention
to return to a fixed rate, the exchange rate will be very volatile to the
extent that people do not coincide in their points of view. Following the
same idea, we could see this variability reduced with time if we think
that differences in opinion are less spread as time passes.
Another closely related aspect has to do with the fact that to
determine the market equilibrium it is important not only what people
think about the actions of the government but what each individual agent
knows about the others. This opens the issue of learning to considera-
tion. The details of the role of heterogeneity among agents are treated
in more detail in the appendix.
13
The view of the exchange rate determination process that we get from
this section is of a process which results from the combination of
currently observed monetary policy and a second part which depends on
people's conjectures about the terminal conditions, degree of risk
aversion, unanimity in their opinions and the profile of transition
probabilities.
The idea of the next section is to see how the explicit inclusion of
an expectation component in a monetary model of the exchange rate helps to
better explain the experience recorded in the sample of reforms chosen.
2. Empirical Analysis.
The intention of this section is to review some monetary reforms
happened in Europe and the Americas between 1850 and 1930, from the
perspective of the results obtained in the first part of the essay.
Figure 3 in the end of the essay shows a series of note circulation
and premium of gold (or convertible currency) during the process of
monetary reform in the United States, Argentina, Spain, Brazil, England
and France.
In the first four cases, the beginning of the transition is charac-
terized by a sudden stop in note printing. In the last three there is in
fact, a reduction in the stock of inconvertible money. The first response
in all cases is a sharp appreciation caused by the change in the profile
of money supply: the very fact of a reduction in anticipated inflation
increases money demand. Using the ideas of section 1, we have a change in
the "no-reform" fundamental which is reflected in a jump of the market
exchange rate.
14
The second part of the dynamics is given by the probability people
assigned to the event of a "final move" by the government to sustain an
even more appreciated exchange rate.
The experiences of the United States, Argentina, Spain, Brazil and
England show how the market exchange rate can deviate consistently from
its fundamental in anticipation of further appreciation.
The example of the United States follows very closely the model where
we have a country anticipating a return to par with gradually increasing
probability between periods where it remains constant. This is what can
be interpreted from the plateaus in the exchange rate path between 1866
and 1868 and between 1870 and 1877. A similar situation seems to have
occurred in Spain from 1900 to 1905.
From an econometric standpoint, an exchange rate determination
regression in an inconvertible money standard (flexible exchange rate
regime) will look different when no reform is anticipated compared to
times when people perceive a return to a fixed parity regime in the near
future.
A correct specification for an exchange rate equation in a pure
flexible regime is given by equation (3). Under the "no-reform" assump-
tion its counterpart for estimation purposes is
n
et - 6 + E Pi Mt- + t (15)i-O
In contrast, when a reform is anticipated, we have to include a
component which takes into account the role of expectations and the
declining importance of the "no-reform" fundamental as the people feel the
"final move" of the authorities becomes more likely
1j
n n
et - 6 + : iMt- + I pi M,-i + yt + Et (16)
i-O i-O
With this idea in mind, we can take a look at our sample of currency
reforms to see if there is any evidence of a structural change after the
'announcement time'.
Here we will look at six stabilizations. For the first four, listed
in table 1, we have relatively few degrees of freedom which limits the
range of conclusions we can get from them, but are enough to test for the
presence of an expectations-driven exchange rate. We will be able to get
a better look at the French and British experiences.
Table 1 looks for evidence of a structural change in the coefficients
of money supply between pre and post-announcement periods and to check if
some time dependent component (reflecting a changing probability profile
(t) or a learning process) appears in the post-announcement time.
In all equations a measure of exchange rate (United States, Argentina
and Spain: premium of gold in terms of inconvertible currency (percent);
Brazil: pence per reis) is regressed on total inconvertible note circula-
tion (United States: millions of greenback dollars; Spain: millions of
pesetas; Argentina: millions of pesos and Brazil: millions of reis),
current and lagged one and two periods.
The basic regression equation is given by expression (17)
e(t) - Bo +B1 MONEY + B2 MONEY(-1) + B3 MONEY*DUMMY+ (17)
B4 MONEY(-1)*DUMMY + B5 TIME + B6 TIME*DUMMY + u(t)
where the dummy variable takes a value of one whenever the reform is an-
ticipated. Column (1) shows the starting date in the sample, and column
(2) the announcement date. The second lag in note circulation as was
Table 1.
C MONEY MONEY(-1) TIME TIMED MONEYD(-1) R2 DW
United States. Announcement: 1862 Enactment:
-106.8 .392(1.62) (2.38)
-98.69 .388
(1.48) (2.15)
-95.61 .375
(1.18) (2.49)
.72 2.46.0019(0.61)
.0025(0.52)
.0020
(0.47)
.79 2.28-2.32(2.56)
.0108 -2.27
(.474) (3e31)
Argentina Announcement: 1876 Enactment: 1894 N = 25
63.72 -.311
(2.78) (0.24)
52.09 -.201(2.40) (0.11)
.79 1.691.314
(2.57)
1.176
(2.63)
-18.44(4.41) .0211(2.18) .92 1.88
54.41 -.188
(2.35) (0.10)
1.199
(2.45)
-1.568 -15.36(0.102) (3.58) .0204(2.19)
Brazil
47.62 .0716(8.61) (1.85)
37.57 .0481
(3.22) (1.75)
Announcement: 1870 Enactment: 1899 N = 40
.85 1.71
-.0442
(1.62)
-.0352(1.48)
.91 1.92-1.632
(2.17)
2.53 .0623 -.0514(2.91) (2.12) (1.57)
Spain
-18.8
(4.5)
-19.7(4.3)
-18.1(4.4)
.92 1.932.038 -4.045(1.66) (2.31)
Announcement: 1870
.0806(3.87)
Enactment: 1899
-.0481(2.40)
.0752 -.0513
(2.76) (1.51)
.0885(4.12)
-.0212(.009) .1052(.412)
-.0577(2.78)
N = 40
.83 1.63
.83 1.64
DUMMY
5.588
(1.26)
.85 1.79
1865 N = 17
.80 2.28
.92 1.89
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rejected to be different from zero at a 0l significance in all four
cases. The coefficient of money*Dummy current and lagged is reported only
when it is significantly different from zero at a 5Z significance level.
There will be evidence of structural change when the coefficients of
Money*Dummy (MONEYD) and/or Time*Dummy (TIMED) are significantly different
from zero.
With respect to the United States we have a significant trend
component although there is no evidence of a change in the coefficients of
money supply after the announcement" dated in 1862. The coefficient of
TIMED is clearly significantly different from zero at a 5X percent
significance level, while the coefficient of TIME cannot be rejected to be
equal to zero.
The Argentine regression shows clearly a significant trend component
after the Baring crisis of 1894 which marks the beginning of the return to
a gold-exchange standard and the same happened in Brazil after 1899 when
the law for the building of a 'Caixa de Conversao' was passed.
In Spain the reform starts with the passing of the 'Law of 1899'
promoted by minister Villaverde. Figure 3d. shows how there is a sudden
stop in note printing and an immediate appreciation of the peseta. After
the first decline in premium it rises a little and remains fluctuating
above the final parity for a couple of years. This is reflected by the
significantly different from zero (at a 10% significance) coefficient of
the dummy variable. This behavior is consistent with a period where there
is uncertainty between a return to a final parity at a more appreciated
value and a remonetization of the economy with a constant probability
profile. This sounds plausible in a period when Banco de Espana and the
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Ministerio de Hacienda had strong differences of opinion about increasing
note circulation again or to continue the deflation. In 1909, both Banco
and Hacienda agreed on keeping the monetary aggregates at the current
level and complete the stabilization 'at current prices'. This process is
completed 'de jure' in 1912.
We will be able to tell more about the French and British stabiliza-
tions of the 1920's as more and information becomes available. Tables 2
and 3 summarize the results.
The British return to par starts after the inflation of 1920. The
beginning of the deflation can be dated in 1921 when the Bank of England
starts the liquidation of assets through extensive open market operations.
As a result, by the first months of 1922 wholesale prices had returned to
the level prevailing before the inflation and a decision had to be made
about stabilizing at the current price or to continue the return to par.
In the meanwhile the United States continued an inflationary process. The
period between July 1922 and October 1924 is known as the "British waiting
policy" (Brown, 1940. vol 1, pp.301). In the second semester of 1922
wholesale prices in both sides of the Atlantic put the British pound in a
position to make a final movement to the pre-war par with the United
States dollar. This happens in April 1925 by means of the Gold Standard
Act.
Table 2 shows the exchange rate dynamics in England between January
1920 and April 1925. Regressions are run breaking the sample in two
halves trying as announcement date July 1922 (when par was consistent with
the price levels in the United States and England according to Brown) and
July 1921 when the deflation starts.
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Table 2. England
C EXRATE(-1) MONEY(-1) MONEY(-2) TIME R2 Rho
Sample 1920.01 - 1925.04
130.03 .54319 -.18191 .00600 .965 .678
(3.06) (3.41) (-3.03) (0.625) (4.0)
122.93 .52251 -.16457 .00765 .0548 .965 .698
(2.87) (2.56) (-2.66) (0.756) (.434) (3.3)
Sample 1920.01 - 1922.07
103.17 .5328 -.13797 .0164 .0087 .927 .550
(2.11) (1.89) (-2.11) (0.651) (.613) (1.8)
142.55 .5171 -.20483 .0074 .926 .608
(2.13) (1.87) (-2.18) (0.532) (1.9)
Sample 1922.07 - 1925.04
34.90 .8765 -.06561 .0186 .864 .120
(0.50) (5.48) (-.554) (0.168) (0.5)
-41.33 .9310 -.01388 .0124 .077 .875 .120
(-.80) (9.96) (-.116) (1.154) (1.93) (0.5)
Sample 1920.01 - 1921.07
115.9 .553 -.14803 .0484 .580 .578
(2.66) (3.16) (-1.88) (.208) (1.2)
Sample 1921.08 - 1925.04
-39.9 .9421 -.0911 .0591 .864 .123
(-1.16) (9.77) (-1.52) (-1.747) (0.5)
Dependent variable: dollars per pound . Index 1922.01=100.0.
Money: Total Note Circulation in million pounds.
Source: Brown (1940)
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It is interesting to notice that the first half of the sample can be
adjusted very well with a regression of the form :
et - 0 + 1 et- + B2Mt- + 3Mt-2 + t
which is equivalent to
et - 70 + (1-Pl) i (2Mt -1l-i+ ) + ot 3t - 1 L et 70 1-
But, in the second half, the exchange rate behaves basically as a random
walk with a positively sloped trend. (The dependent variable is dollars
per pound). Applying the Chow test for parameter stability on :
EXRATE - C + B1 EXRATE(-1) + B2 MONEY(-1) + B3 TIME + w(t) (18)
the result is F,5 1 - 4.32 when the announcement time is 1922.07. On the
other hand if the sample is cut t the beginning of the deflation we
obtain that F5,51-1.89. The critical F5,5 1 is 2.37 (for a 5% signifi-
cance), 3.51 (1%) and 1.95 (10%). Consequently one cannot reject the null
hypothesis of structural change and the role of expectations in the final
phase of the stabilization.
The French experiment, also known as the Poincare stabilization, took
only a couple of months to be completed, but even in such a brief period
the exchange rate showed some of the distinctive characteristics of
monetary reforms. The first part of the adjustment takes place during the
last week of July 1926 when R. Poincare takes office as prime minister,
with the idea of imposing strict monetary and fiscal discipline. As
expectations of further depreciation disappear, the exchange rate fun-
damental jumps appreciating substantially. In the following months the
appreciation process continues gradually and it accelerates as the event
of widespread intervention of monetary authorities in the foreign currency
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market becomes more likely. This is particularly evident during the last
weeks of 1926.
Table 3 shows the regression equations for France using weekly data
of exchange rates on total note circulation. The lag structure is
specified as an exponential distributed lag to save degrees of freedom.
Once again there is strong evidence model of structural change
between the pre-announcement and post-announcement periods. The Chow test
statistic run for regression equation specified as (18) is F, 10 5 - 4.59
where the critical value at the 1X significance level is 3.17 which allows
us to reject the null hypothesis of stable parameters in both subsamples.
After July 1926 the process looks, the same as in the case of
England, as a random walk with a drift component, whereas the monetary
component (fundamental) helps explaining the exchange rate movements
mostly in the months previous to the stabilization.
All six examples, but specially the English and French help to make a
point on the way we should think about the exchange rate determination
process. Esselitially one could say that in normal times the exchange rate
can safely thought in terms of the monetary approach determination: the
relative price of two currencies which respective demands have a very
stable velocity and consequently any appreciation or depreciation depends
on the relative growth of both monetary aggregates. But when agents are
forward looking and there are good chances for some important event in the
forseable but uncertain future, the exchange rate will respond, some times
in such a way that it moves driven almost exclusively by people's inter-
pretation of future events.
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Table 3. France
C EXRATE(-1) MONEY(-1) MONEY(-2) TIME R2 DW
Sample 1924.11 - 1927.01
.9564
(33.3)
1.182 .9640
(0.76) (25.1)
-6.363 .932
(-1.31) (19.7)
N = 115 Method : OLS
0.024
(1.56)
0.022
(1.51)
0.016
(1.68)
Sample 1924.11 - 1926.07
.9405
(31.1)
1.214 .9105
(1.45) (17.1)
0.916 .8980
(1.12) (16.3)
Sample
.0035
(0.23)
N = 89
-.001
(-.30)
.925 1.76
.966 1.77
-.0236 .967 1.77
(-1.M19)
Method : OLS
0.039
(2.03)
0.051
(1.58)
0.054
(1.50)
1926.07 - 1927.01
.987
(11.2)
5.435 .803
(0.33) (6.30)
19.05 .778
(1.55) (4.61)
0.0161
(1.16)
-.007
(-.27)
0.0123
(1.13)
N = 26
.976 1.94
.977 1.94
.978 1.94
Method : WLS
0.028
(1.11)
0.019
(0.80)
0.381
(0.62)
-.1001
(-2.03)
-.360
(-.658)
-.1949
(-2.65)
.822 1.79
.847 1.79
.853 1.81
Periodicity: weekly
Dependent Variable: francs
millions of francs
Source: Dulles (1926)
per dollar. Money: Note circulation in
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Concluding Remarks.
One of the distinctive characteristics of the exchange rate dynamics
before the return to a convertible money standard is that, even if
monetary aggregates are held constant it keeps moving towards some
expected final parity.
It was found that once people realize the possibility of a reform,
historically measured relations between money supply and exchange rate
break and are substituted by an expectations-driven process.
This separation between "fundamentals" and observed exchange rate is
attributed to people's the anticipation of a future open market operation
which will sustain a further appreciated value of the home currency. It
was suggested that the shape of the path and the variability of the price
of the currency depends on the degree of risk aversion, the profile of
transition probabilities as well as on the differences among agents and
the way they learn about each other in a market where conditions are
changing fast.
The data sources used in the commentaries of section 2 and in the
appendix are: Mexico and Puerto Rico, Kemmerer (1907); United States,
Mitchell (1903); France, Dulles (1929); England, Brown (1940); Argentina
and Brazil, Subercaseaux (1912) and Spain, Sarda (1986).
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Appendix. The model in an economy with several agents
1) Case of two risk averse agents.
Consider an economy with two agents, a and a*. Each one has a
portfolio equilibrium equation
, D c -b E (, ) e c b E (e 
e D 11 e EL) e D* Pe e, D, t et t t
D + D -D M + M* - M
their own probability distribution of the moment when the government will
peg the exchange rate and their own perception of what the final parity
will be e and e*.
Assume for the moment that they have rational expectations, in the
sense that everybody knows how the other agent think and formulates his
expectations of future exchange rates calculating the market clearing
price, for those instances when the authorities do not intervene in the
currency market.
The equilibrium condition is given by
R. M; + D* M,(Al)
eD Dt et Dt Dt et D t
- pc + (l-p)c* - pbE (e#.+, -, (l-p) b* E* (e'+' - e,)
t et t et
-~~)e 
P - D/- pc + (lp)c* - pb - (l-p)b*p t/D't - PC -p)c* ~-pb ~'-(1-
reordering terms in condition (A2)
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e t ko + k E e+l + k*1 E* et+l
t t
To solve the model we proceed in exactly the same way as in the case
of a single individual. Let us start at an arbitrary time T.
E e+l - a(T)e + (1-a(T)),
T
E* e+l - a* (T)e + (1-a (T))e
T
Consequently the market clearing condition at time T is
eT - ko + k [(T)e + (l-a(T))j] + k*l [a*(T)e + (l-a*(T))e]
at time T-1
E eT
T- 1
- a(T-l)e + (1-a(T-l))[ko+kl [(T)e + (1-a(T))A]] +
(A3)
k*1 [(T)e + (1-a(T))e]
E* eT
T- 1
- a*(T-l)e* + (l-a(T-l))[ko+kl[a(T)e + (l-a(T))e]] +
k* [ (T)e* + (l-a*(T))e]
eT.- - ko+kj[(T-l)e + (l-a(T-l))[ko+k [a(T)e + (l-a(T))] +
kl* [c(T)e*] l-(T))] + a(T-l)e+ lfa*(Tj) I+k[a(T)e +
(1-a(T))6] + kl* [*(T)e* + (l-c*(T))6]
kk - Y++A
ko-M/D
.Y+P+Oki -B
28
repeating the same procedure down to time t, and making T arbitrarily
large the resulting exchange rate equation is:
et - E ei(t) [ko + kl' a(t+i)e' + k(tri)e ] (A4)
8o - 1
--
Bi tt) - II [kl(l-a(t+j)) + k(l1-Qa*(t+j))] i > jo-
If we substitute in (A4) the value of the "fundamental" now given by:
k,
1-kl -kl
the resulting expression is
et - + k(e-e) I 8j(t)a(t+i) + k(e*'-) ei (t)a*(t+i) (A5)
iIO 1i0
Equation (A5) looks by now very familiar, with an over(under)shooting
component defined by a weighted average of people beliefs about the final
parity. These weights depend on their degree of risk aversion and the
particular shape of their probability distribution. In that sense, the
distance between the fundamental and the market exchange rate will be
biased towards the expected final parity of those agents who are less risk
averse and assign large probability to a reform taking place in the close
future. Now, the assumption of everybody knowing what the other knows,
may be not a very accurate description of what really happens. Instead,
we could imagine people trying to infer other's expectation from market
clearing prices observed in the past. It can be seen that the particular
specification of the learning process opens some room for oscillation in
the exchange rate path.
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The first case is when each agent looks at the market equilibrium in
the near past and solves (AS) for the parameter corresponding to the other
agent. The implied result is:
n + e k, e+ k,* a e et - (A6)1 - (kl(l-a) + k>(l-a*))
^. k + k,a(e,.-.) +e,. e (lk- -k, 
a- k1 (et- le*) (A7)
& . k + ka*(e e*) + e. (l -k k*) (A8)
kl (et 1 -e*)
As a result the exchange rate equation will look like
et - k+klae + kla*e* + k(l-a)et.l + kl1 (1-a)el.1 (A9)
This means that, even if all members of this economy have constant
probability profiles, the exchange rate will approach smoothly the
solution value (A6) as agents learn about current conditions. The
magnitude of the undershooting (with respect to fundamentals) will depend
on the initial conjectures each agent has about each other's probability,
and consequently the exchange rate could approach the solution (A6) from
above or bellow.
Ott)
I
,/
I tot'~~
e
&.4 k@ i .4k, i.t '
- , 0",) - ImJ , -fq)
Figure Al.
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Another, slightly more complete story on how learning takes place
could affect the exchange rate dynamics in a very interesting way.
Take the situation where agents, knowing the market equilibrium,
their own previous conjectures and the parameters k(O) k(l) and k(l)*
compute at time t+l, the right hand side of expression (AlO) (here shown
only for the case of agent 'a')
E A*) k, + ke k'&'eet - k - k t et1 - kl [&'e + (l-&) k *(-a*)-k + -A ] (AlO)
Then solves (A10) for &. Implicitly we have assumed each agent
presuming that the other agent really knows the parameters determining the
market equilibrium. It happens that the left hand side of (AlO) depends
on the true parameters and past conjectures that agent 'a*' had on 'a''s
probability profile. As a result one arrives to a solution of the form
&-&(&* l), &* a a *(-l). In other words the solution of &* is in equation
(Alla) and for a in (Allb).
aA k1 e+k s *& e)+ * km+k& e+K,1 a e -*+k,ae+k, -&) (Alla)
a e + (l- ) k1.k & (1- -1) e -1-k (1-ct*1-k( -1- (1-k1
ae + (l-a) l k1*(1 a') k(1 a) - ae+(l- _) k(l a)'(1a) (Allb)
Assuming e-e*-O the conjecture formation equations are:
(l-ae') (1-k (1-a))a -1 - (Al2a)
1-k1 (la-&l)
(l-a) (l-k1(-))
a - 1 - (Al2b)
1-kl (1- l)
It is interesting to see that equations (A12a) and (A12b) imply
exchange rate fluctuations. First, we could see that with the help of
figure A2.
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Figure A2.
The &(&*-) schedule represents the dynamics of agent 'a*' conjecture
about agent 'a' probability distribution function. The converse is true
for a&'(&). Solving simultaneously (A12a) and (A12b) it can be proved
that both schedules cross at the true values of a and a'. This is also a
unique solution. Consequently, as long as the system of difference equa-
tions is stable, the exchange rate path in this learning exercise will
coincide with the perfect foresight solution. To prove stability and get
the paths of a and a* we start from some initial value for each one which
is determined by the prior beliefs of each agent &o and &a. After one
period agent 'a' conjecture moves to &a which is precisely &*(&) evaluated
at a0 (point 1* in schedule). Agent 'a*' conjecture corresponds to point
1 in a&(&'1) schedule. For the following periods we repeat the operation
to complete the sequence of probability paramenter conjectures. It does
not matter which is the initial point we choose in fig. A2, one will
always converge to the equilibrium (a,a*).
The problem has two nice properties. On the one hand all conjectures
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converge to the actual paramenter values, which means that market informa-
tion can be enough to reveal the characteristics of all agents. On the
other hand, the solution shows alternating over and under-shootings with
respect to the rational expectations solution. These oscillations will
make the exchange rate fluctuate in a way consistent with the experience
of several monetary reforms, where the first months after the beginning of
the transition are characterized by large, but decreasing exchange rate
variability.
An exercise can help to make the point clearer and to perceive the
sensibility of these fluctuations to the specification of the money demand
equation. Imagine the situation where a - a - .50, '* - .25, & .75.
Table Ala contains the sequences for the cases where k(l) - k(l)* - .25
and k(l) - k(l)* - .10. Table la.
Table Ala.
k(l)-.25 k(1)-.10
Time * A* ATime a & a a
0 .25 .75 .25 .75
1 .533 .4615 .512 .486
2 .4944 .5046 .4992 .5006
3 .5057 .4999 .50 .50
4 .4999 .5008 .50 .50
5 .50 .50 .50 .50
When k(0)-l the perfect foresight equilibrium exchange rate is 1.333
for k(l)-.25 and 1.111 when k(l)-l.111. The market exchange rate in this
simulation exercise is given in table lb.
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Table Alb.
Time k(l)-.25 k(l)-.10
0 1.415 1.1119
1 1.332 1.1113
2 1.3337 1.1112
3 1.3331 1.1111
4 1.3333 1.1111
It can be seen that the more risk averse the agents the faster
conjectures will converge to their actual values, and consequently, the
faster the convergence of the exchange rate to its rational expectations
solution.
2) Case of an economy with several risk neutral agents.
When dealing with several agents we have considered only the case
where all are risk averse to some extent. When we allow people to be risk
neutral and hold strong beliefs about post-reform conditions and the time
of reform, the first periods after the announcement will be characterized
by sharp portfolio adjustments as they move to corner solutions.
The purpose of this section is to try to asses the implications of
including risk averse together with risk neutral agents in our model.
Consider first the example of two agents who are risk neutral or that
because of their strong beliefs of a reform happening in the immediate
future behave as if they were maximizing the expected value of their
portfolios.
Their initial endowments can be described by the Edgeworth box in
figure A3. These initial allocations could correspond to the pre-an-
nouncement interior solution of a risk averse agent facing no subjective
uncertainty.
34
pD 
M
MW
Figure A3.
After the announcement, agent a* will demand all his wealth in
dollars whenever the exchange rate is bellow e* and agent a** will have
all his wealth in pesos whenever the exchange rate is above e**. The
equilibrium of this economy happens at the exchange rate e* where both
agents will move to a corner solution, here represented by point A. Agent
a* will have all his wealth in dollars and agent a** everything in pesos.
An interesting property of this result is that small open market
operations could imply huge changes in the equilibrium exchange rate,
being this variability determined by the extent to which agents disagree
about post-reform conditions.
For instance, assume that we start at a corner like A. At that point
the equilibrium price of the exchange rate is e*. Imagine that the
government wants to increase the money supply through buying some dollars,
and assume that this increase is arbitrarily small. This operation can
only be completed at the exchange rate e** or higher. For we have assumes
that the operation is sall the final price would be e**. Agent a** will
move to a point A' and agent a* will stay at his corner A. Consequently
W
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in an economy where agent behave as if they were risk neutral i could be
possible to see huge responses to small changes in the relative abundances
of dollars and pesos, and the amplitude of this variability will be
bounded by the extent to which agents disagree.
We could imagine that as these differences of opinion would tend to
disappear as agents gather information and update their conjectures on
post reform conditions and a tentative enactment time. As unanimity is
achieved one can expect to see less exchange rate variability.
t4
figure A.
It is not very realistic to assume that all agents are risk neutral.
One extension of the problem is to explore what happens when we combine
risk averse and risk neutral people. A simple example will suggest the
conclusion that after a period , when everybody adjusts his portfolio and
risk neutral agents have moved to their corners, the model can be solved
exactly in the same way as in the case where the exchange rate dynamics is
determined by a single risk averse agent.
Take for example a three agent economy. Agent 'a' is a risk averse
person with a portfolio equilibrium equation
M - -- E (!e-.±e'.) (A13)
etDe t
Ht'
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Again agents 'a*' and 'a**' will be risk neutral. 'a*' will put all his
wealth in dollars whenever the exchange rate is less than e* and 'a**'
will do the
same when e is less than e**. Lets assume that e** > k+klae > e
1-kl(1-a)
Use one more time figure A4 to describe the initial endowments of the
neutral agents.
Finally, assume that agent 'a' is small enough so as to allow the
market equilibrium happen between e* and e**.
Some inspection of the problem reveals two kinds of mutually ex-
clusive equilibria.
The first one occurs when the equilibrium exchange rate is e*. Here
it has to be true that
ae + (-a)k 0 k - e* (A)
l-kl(l-a) k1
Agents 'a*' and 'a**' trade at time t-l moving to a corner solution
The risk averse agent keeps his initial money and dollar holdings. The
exchange rate will remain at e* as long as agent 'a' holds a constant
probability profile. Otherwise , if the solution remains between e* and
e** agents 'a' and 'a*' will not engage in further trading and the problem
will look, after t-l the same as in the one risk averse agent economy.
A second kind of solution is when the equilibrium is between e* and
e** (e** included). Once again agents a* and a** will move to a corner
solution. The difference with the case above is that 'a' also par-
ticipates in trade in the first period. For the case of constant proba-
bility the solution will be identical to the case of one risk averse agent
where we allow some correction to the initial endowments of this agent.
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- + kae kn + ke (A15)
1-kl(l-a) l-kl(l-a)
Once again, exchange rate variability becomes an issue: at this level
the relative sizes of agents begin to matter as long as the exchange rate
stays between e* and e** agents a* and a** will not be trading, and all
portfolio adjustments has to be carried on by the risk averse agent. This
means that an open market operation of, say .1X increase in total money
supply means a 10% increase of total money holdings of the risk averse
agent if he happens to hold only 1X of total money balances of society.
As long as the exchange rate remains between e* and e** these small
changes in the money supply path will affect his fundamental largely.
Consequently, the exchange rate will move a lot, not because non-
strict convexities in the preferences of the trading agent , but because
agents with flat indifference schedule preferences , stay out of the
market for a wide range of exchange rate values making a small number of
risk averse agents to absorb all money supply changes.
As a matter of fact, the coincidence of monetary discipline and
increased exchange rate variability after the "announcement" of a return
to a fixed exchange rate regimes seems to be a common place in the
historical descriptions of monetary reforms (Williams, 1971; Subercaseaux,
1912; Dulles, 1929;
Kemmerer, 1907).
An explanation for this could be found in heterogeneous beliefs,
specially when people have little information about the precise intentions
of the authorities. It is also reasonable to think that volatility could
decrease as time passes as result of convergence of opinions as people
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know more about the government plans and /or as agents learn more about
each other perception sand, consequently about the market. Next, we could
review a couple of cases to see to what extent this impression can be
supported by the evidence.
Table A2 shows the regressions of a measure of exchange rate varia-
bility for countries for which there was information available on maximum,
minimum and average exchange rates at least on a monthly basis. Defining
v as the difference between the maximum and minimum exchange rate in a
given period of time, one runs a regression of v2 on time, a dummy
variable and an interaction term between time and the dummy
v
2
- co + cD + c2 t + C3 Dt + t
D - 1 after the announcement
Table A2.
Periodicity
Weekly
t-statistic
Daily
t-statistic
Announcement
26/07/1926
01/09/1864
Mexico
Puerto Rico
Monthly
t-statistic
Monthly
t-statistic
It is apparent that in all cases the exchange rate
volatile and that this variability declines with time.
has become more
Country
France
U.S.A.
N c(0)
46 7.33
1.62
227 1.12
.92
c(1)
71.23
4.997
37.75
4.54
c(2)
.19
0.99
.108
1.23
c(3)
-2.56
-4.44
- .215
-2.03
R
.78
.29
01/1903
01/1898
60 0.11
1.27
53 2.95
2.02
8.995
2.45
5.282
5.98
0.03
0.00
.071
1.76
-.121
-2.05
-.240
1.86
.40
.52
39
The question to answer now is to what extent these fluctuations obey
to increased variability in note circulation.
In the case of France it is possible to give a concrete answer as we
have information on note circulation on weekly basis. The idea is to try
a heteoskedasticity test on the residuals of a regression of exchange rate
on note circulation and time for the second subsample.
t EXRATE-C-BEXRATE(-l)-B 2MONEY(-l)-B 3TIME
where B1 ,B2 and B3 are computed by OLS. The results of the regression of
the absolute value of these residuals on time (which is in fact the
Park-Glesjer heteroskedasticity test) are:
It. - 4.74 - 0.0360 TIME
t-ratio (1.72) (1.82) d.f.-24
The fact that the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected the 10%
significance level means that, even having taken into account the money
supply variability there is additional exchange rate volatility which is
negatively correlated with time.
In the other three cases it is difficult to use conventional hetero-
skedasticity tests, as there are not available series of note circulation
in of at least monthly periodicity. Then we will have to rely on some
less formal evidence at least to get an idea of the problem.
Mitchell (1903) gives some insight for the case of the United States.
On the one hand he mentions that if anything, the second half of 1864 and
the first half of 1865 were characterized by a careful process of conten-
tion of further greenback printing and the start of a very gradual process
of reduction in note circulation beginning the second semester of 1865
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which accelerated in 1866. Curiously, at this time is when the premium
has sharper short term fluctuations. He stresses the point saying that
"... Statistical attempts to demonstrate or disprove the validity of the
quantity theory of money must always be inconclusive so long as there is
no accurate data... A rigorous comparison between the quantity of gold and
the value of the currency is therefore out of the question. But at least
this can be said with confidence: the fluctuations of the gold premium
cannot be accounted for by actual issues and redemptions of government
notes..." (pp.208).
With respect to Mexico it is useful to remember that the kind of
reform undertaken was a switch from a silver standard to a gold standard.
Consequently the relevant concept of money base for the effects of the
determination of the premium is given by the amount of notes convertible
in silver and silver coins. According to Estadisticas Historicas de
Mexico (SPP, 1985) during 1903 and 1904 the total of notes and coins in
circulation changed much less than in previous years . Using values at
the end of the year total notes and coins in circulation increased only 1%
in 1904 compared to the 7.5% average increase in the interval 1897-1902.
In 1905 growth resumes but very slowly (2.5%). From 1906 until the
beginning of the Revolution the average growth stayed around 4 a year.
Once again, the information available so far suggests that the period of
larger exchange rate variability coincides precisely with times where the
stock of inconvertible currency showed more stability.
After 1895, the official Puerto Rican currency was the 'peso regula-
dor' which was a unit of fiduciary money created by the Spanish authori-
ties to substitute the Mexican peso which had been the official money
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during colonial times. This unit will be again substituted by the
American dollar by the end of 1899. The transition period starts with the
Spanish-American War . During the first months of 1898 the value of the
peso regulador depreciates substantially without any noticeable increase
in its supply, mostly attributed to its decreasing demand due to the
uncertainty about its convertibility to the dollar after the end of the
hostilities. The recovery starts in the summer of 1898 with the occupa-
tion of Ponce where American troops start accepting pesos at a rate of two
per dollar. Although the magnitude of the operations was small (Kemmerer,
1907, pp.171-172) the exchange rate returned almost immediately to its
fundamental (.60 dollars per peso) as there was the prospect for a general
conversion operation at the end of the hostilities. Host fluctuations
during 1898 seem to have had more an expectations component rather than a
change in fundamental. To stress this idea Kemmerer quotes the Subgover-
nor of the Spanish Bank of Puerto Rico who commenting on the exchange rate
behavior between April and September 1898 said: "...(they were) merely
nominal and at the same time capricious and arbitrary..." (pp. 170).
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FOREIGN DEBT PROBLEMS, BUDGET CORRECTION AND INERTIAL
INFLATION: THE CASE OF MEXICO 1982-19861
Introduction.
After 1982's budget and balance of payments crisis, the Mexican
economy has been struggling to regain economic stability and a solid basis
for future economic progress.
The magnitude of the fiscal effort has been fantastic, real wages
have dropped to unbelievable low levels and non-oil exports are booming
after a very substantial real exchange rate depreciation.
In spite of all these steps in the 'right direction' the macro-
economic performance has been very poor: inflation remains high and
per-capita GDP could decrease anywhere between 7% and 10% in the present
'sexenio'.
Among both, official and public opinion circles there are worries and
questions brought about by the persistence of the current situation, for
instance: Have not been spending cuts and devaluations deep enough to
return to a healthy economy?; Is it possible that exogenous shocks such
as the decline of international oil prices in 1986 be accounted for the
failure of the stabilization program ?, if that is the case, Is there
something that could have been done? or Is there something to be done
now?... and what if the balance of payments and primary budget corrections
are substantial to withstand external shocks, then how much of the
observed inflation is purely inertial?, Is a shock program the answer?,
1This essay was finished in January of 1988. At that time Mexico had
just taken the first steps of an heterodox stabilization and the phase of
generalized price and wage freeze had not started yet.
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Could an heterodox program be sustained if it had been implemented in 1985
or 1986?, if not , What would have been the magnitude of the additional
budget adjustment necessary to keep the domestic deficit and the balance
of payments in line with price stability?
It is obviously very difficult to find definite answers to all these
questions, specially in a country where social and institutional condi-
tions are changing very fast as they are in Mexico. Nevertheless, with
the help of some basic economic relations it is possible to better
evaluate the seriousness of the current situation and the feasibility of
alternative courses of action, which constitutes the main purpose of this
essay.
Section 1 is a brief description of the evolution of the Mexican
Economy between 1980 and 1987. Section 2 presents a simple model which
helps to present some definitions which will be used to review current and
potential macroeconomic scenarios. Finally, in section 3 we use an
estimation of an econometric version of the model to give some answers to
the questions presented above.
1. The Mexican Economy 1982-1986.
After almost five years to rapid growth and moderate inflation the
Mexican economy experienced in 1982 his worst crisis since the Great
Depression. The combination of fundamental disequilibria in the budget
and current account with the sudden stop in flows of foreign savings
marked, with a huge exchange rate collapse, the beginning of a period of
high inflation and very poor economic growth.
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TABLE 1
INFLATION (X) GDP ( X)
1978-1981 23.6 8.4
1982 98.8 -0.5
1983 80.8 -5.3
1984 59.2 3.6
1985 63.7 2.8
1986 105.7 -3.8
1987 159.2 1.0
Source: Indicadores Economicos, Banco de Mexico.
Beginning in 1983, the De la Madrid Administration put into effect
the PIRE (Immediate Program of Economic Reordering) which implied impor-
tant spending cuts and substantial increments in prices and fares of
public sector goods and services as well as a fiscal reform. Due to the
wide support it received from almost every sector, the actions of the PIRE
permitted to see an impressive improvement in the primary and operational
deficits, although the total public sector borrowing requirements remained
a high fraction of GDP.
Between 1983 and 1985 the government continued with a policy of
public spending austerity and continuous updating of his sources of
revenue to keep up with inflation. In 1986 as a result of the decline in
oil prices the economic cabinet considered necessary to put in effect a
new program of spending cuts (ironically named PAC which stands for
program of incentives and growth). In contrast with the PIRE which looked
at both, current and capital spending, the PAC affected mainly investment
projects.
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TABLE 2
Government Outlays Budget Deficit
Increase(%) Capital Spending/ PSBR Operational Primary
(Real) Current Spending (as a proportion of GDP
1982 5.3 51.2 17.7 5.2 7.8
1983 -24.9 56.8 8.9 1.9 -4.4
1984 0.1 51.2 8.7 0.6 -4.7
1985 2.2 43.4 10.0 0.0 -3.6
1986 -13.5 38.7 16.3 1.7 -1.6
1987 2.0 35.0 17.4 -0.9 -5.0
Source: Cuenta de la Hacienda Publica Federal, SHCP.
The balance of payments also improved after 1982. As a result of the
maxi-devaluation and nominal wage contention policies the trade account
surplus grew large enough to cover debt servicing and even some reserve
accumulation.
TABLE 3
Balance of Payments
Current Capital Errors and Change in
Account Account Omissions Reserves
(Millions of Dollars of the U.S.)
1980 -7 223 11 948 - 3 647 1 078
1981 -12 554 21 859 - 8 372 933
1982 -4 878 8 753 - 8 361 - 4 286
1983 5 418 - 852 - 1 432 3 134
1984 4 238 389 - 924 3 703
1985 1 236 -1 526 - 2 133 -2 123
1986 -1 270 2 270 - 210 790
1987(a) 3980 3740 211 7931
(a) January to September
Source: Indicadores de Comercio Exterior, Banco de Mexico.
Starting in 1984 and as part of the anti-inflationary strategy of the
government, the real exchange rate began to appreciate. This had a strong
negative impact on manufacturing exports which started to decline very
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fast, particularly during the first semester of 1985. Aware of the fact
that this policy could not be sustained for long without creating condi-
tions for a more serious crisis the crawling peg was speeded up again in
the second semester of 1985 and first part of 1986.
TABLE 4
Real Exchange Rate
(1970-100.0)
1982 124.2
1983 133.3
1984 110.5
1985 106.2
1986 156.4
1987 170.7
Source: Indicadores Economicos, Banco de Mexico.
The decline in oil prices of 1986 turned the current account to the
deficit side once again, but in this case a combination of a surplus in
the capital account an increasing manufacturing exports, which by the way,
were a consequence of the real exchange rate adjustment of 1985, and
government import reductions allowed to cope with the potential crisis
without reserve loses and an exchange rate collapse.
A variable which has played a central role in the stabilization
attempts of 1983 and 1986 is the real wage. It has played a double role
allowing higher competitivity of Mexican traditional exports and fostering
the development of the maquiladoras (assembly plants) in the border with
the U.S., as well as keeping aggregate demand down through income dis-
tribution. In the course of the last five years the national average of
the general minimum wage has fallen more than 40% in real terms and 33.5%
in dollars.
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TABLE 5
Trade Balance
(Millions of dollars of the U.S.)
Exports Imports
Oil Non-Oil Private Public
1982 16 447 4 752 9 036 5 400
1983 16 017 6 249 4 244 4 306
1984 16 601 7 594 6 464 4 789
1985 14 776 6 897 8 825 4 386
1986 6 307 9 723 8 808 3 343
1987 8 629 12 026 9 442 2 780
Source: Indicadores de Comercio Exterior. Banco de Mexico.
TABLE 6
National Average Minimum Wage
Real Wage Daily Wage in $U.S.
(1982-100.0)
1982 100.0 $4.47
1983 71.3 $3.58
1984 67.6 $3.96
1985 66.0 $4.03
1986 59.0 $2.94
Real Wage computed using the CPI.
Source: Comision Nacional de Salarios Minimos.
In the last quarter of 1987, a foreign exchange panic triggered by
the Mexican stock exchange crash and the decision of the authorities of
not using reserves to accommodate the run caused a new maxi-devaluation in
November. The impact of this new cost shock put the economy right into
the path of hyperinflation , being the increase in the consumer price
index above 12% .
The response is a new stabilization program called PASE (Pact of
Economic Solidarity) which contemplates further budget adjustments (taking
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the primary surplus to 8.4% of GDP) as well as introducing some heterodox
measures intended to control the rates of growth (rather than a total
freezing) of prices and wages. The results of this new effort are yet to
be seen as not only economic forces but political factors put Mexico in
one of the most critical moments of his post-revolutionary life.
2. A Model for the Mexican Economy.
Any attempt to describe the Mexican economy in a simple system of
macroeconomic relations, has to take into account at least the following
four issues to have any practical relevance:
-The foreign debt problem.
-The sensitivity of the federal budget to external shocks.
-The role of real wages and income distribution in macroeconomic
performance.
-The presence of institutions which create price inertia.
The first point implies that any sensible story shall be able to
describe how the decline in foreign lending and the burden of debt
servicing could impose a constraint on feasible employment and inflation
combinations.
With respect to the budget one has to be aware of the basic channels
of transmission between public finances and external variables: on the one
hand, most of Mexican foreign debt is held by the government and conse-
quently changes in both, the availability of foreign credit and interest
rates should affect the need for domestic borrowing or seignoriage
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2.1 The Framework.
We could use a variation of a Taylor-type model (1983,1986), ag-
gregating the economy into three sectors: nontradeables, exportables and
importables. On the demand side of nontradeables we assume that they are
used basically in consumption or in current consumption by the government.
Profits and part of the wage income are saved under the form of real
balances and accumulation of public debt. Total income derives from
production in the non-tradeable and exportable good sectors where the
production functions are assumed to be Leontief in labor and imported
inputs.
PX - PC + PG (1)
PC - =(w x -lw *E -p (P))(1 - s) (2)
where X means total production in the home goods sector, E is total
manufacturing exports, and * the unit labor requirements in each sector
respectively and s the marginal propensity to save.
Total exports have two main components: oil and non-oil
E (in dollars) - P°O + P*Em(c) eP (3)
where imports can be capital goods and intermediates.
IM (in dollars) - P*I + aP*x + a*P*Em (4)
here a and a* are the unit intermediate-input requirements. The interest
rate paid on foreign debt, r*, is taken as exogenously given leaving the
balance of payments equation as in equation (5).
D - r*D + P*I + aP*X - P°O - P*(l - a*)Em (5)
On the budget side, the inflation tax covers the difference between
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outlays, domestic and foreign indebtedness and revenues as shown in (6)
M (P) + eD + B - er*D + PB + PG + PI (6)
The price equation for the home goods sectors is given by (7). We
assume a Kalecki-Taylor economy where prices incorporate two elements:
costs and a mark-up 't' which can be rationalized by the presence of
imperfect competition.
P - (1 + t)(wb + aeP*) (7)
the implied inflation equation is
P - w+ (1- @)& (8)
where:
e- wp
wp + aeP
To keep the solution of the model bounded we normalize them in terms
of a numeraire. For our specific interest it will prove to be very useful
to use a measure of capacity given by the stock of capital in the non-
tradeable goods sector k.
W
- [fbz + zb*AfE - cP]( - s) + g, z- p (1')
P - 9W + (1 + )e, P _ 2 z + ')
CP - e(r' - 7) d + g + P°oh - b (3')
d - (r - 7)d + + ap* - P°oh - (1 - a*)Afe (4')
The inertial component given by the Kalecki-Taylor equation, rather
than restricting the specific form of the inflation persistence, suggests
that inertia is present when relative prices take some time before
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returning to their long term levels once a shock has moved them to a
different value.
Z - f + 6(z* - z) (5')
e - A (6')
corresponds to the normalized difference of production with respect to its
trend, f the relative sizes of the export to the non-traded good sector, b
and d normalized domestic and foreign debt, besides it was assumed that
m/p 1/k-c E(e) - Ae, I/K-7, z the real wage and z* the long term
"desired" wage level. Substituting (5') in (2') gives us an inflation
condition which can be drawn as an upward sloping schedule in the in-
flation-production space, reason why it will sometimes be also referred as
supply curve.
A 9
P 1 [ & + 6(z* + z)] (7')
2.2 Balance of Payments crisis and Domestic Borrowing constraints.
When an economy faces unlimited access to external borrowing and also
has a public finance situation which keeps domestic borrowing in line with
GDP and capacity growth, equations (1') to (6') can be seen as a closed
recursive system of equations where the demand and price equations solve
P, , z and , and the balance of payments and domestic borrowing equa-
tions solve for b and d. Besides, along this system the relative price
variables z and e never jump as they move smoothly along their paths
described by (5') and (6'). When, in contrast, foreign credit is scarce
and the budget faces a fundamental disequilibrium threatening to make
domestic debt accumulation far above the rate of economic growth, then it
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will be the case for at least some time and for some range of values of
foreign interest rates, real exchange rate and government spending that b
and d will have to be taken as exogenous rather than endogenous variables.
Namely, when we have a combination of external strangulation and domestic
borrowing constraints equations (3') and (4') should be treated as
inequalities
cP e(r* - )d + g + e - P°oh (3'')
O > (r* - )d + + aP* - P°ah - (1 - a*)Afc (4'')
As a consequence, both budget and balance of payments conditions
impose a lower bound to inflation and an upper bound to production respec-
tively.
The impact of these constraints can be better understood with the
help of figure (1). The DD schedule represents the aggregate demand given
by equation (1'). The SS' schedule is the price equation (7').
Before the debt crisis the economy could be in a point like Eo where
there is a current account deficit financed by foreign lending which also
helps in covering the budget deficit.
hn
Figure 1
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When foreign lending stops, the government no longer has the option
of financing its deficit borrowing abroad; when it is also necessary to
keep the debt/GDP ratio (or debt/capacity) constant, then appears a con-
straint, which as we mentioned puts a lower bound to inflation here shown
by the b - 0 schedule. The balance of payments restriction d - 0 shows
that, when foreign exchange becomes scarce, then imports have to be
reduced which also means a lower level of activity.
After the debt shock any point in area A represents a feasible equi-
librium. For instance, an equilibrium like E 1 can be reached letting
relative price variables jump, which in practice happens when the nominal
exchange rate jumps and nominal wages and other cost components move slug-
gishly. The fall in real wages is consistent with an increase in infla-
tion by means of the dynamics described by equation (5'). The downward
movement of the aggregate demand corresponds to the Diaz-Alejandro (1963)
contractionary effect of the devaluation.
For E1l being a steady state solution, the comparative statics of
employment, inflation, real wage and real exchange rate can be illustrated
by figure (2), which consists on taking (3'') and (4'') as equalities and
f-Z=o.
Starting on the first orthant, the upward sloping schedule cor-
responds to the balance of payments constraint, and the downward sloping
curve results from the substitution of the steady state conditions on
(3' '):
- (1 - S)(fb(z* + ~ [) - E[(r - 7)d + 7 - Pooh]) (8')
68
d'-0 d-O e B'io
:0
z
The second orthant plots equation (5') for - 0 and the fourth has
the government budget constraint. Figure 2 shows the impact of a worsen-
ing in the external strangulation as a result of, say a drop in oil
prices. This moves the b - 0 schedule to the left, the DD schedule moves
downward as the inflation tax requirements increase, and the - 0
schedule upwards as a the exchange rate has to depreciate to cover the
reduction in foreign exchange revenues. A sufficient condition for a real
exchange rate depreciation l-(l-s); bz*-aeP>O. This is guaranteed by a
positive mark up rate. What is clear, and very consistent with our
intuition is that inflation will go up as the foreign exchange problems
aggravate and output and real wages will decline.
A
P
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2.3. Stabilization Alternatives.
After the initial phase of the adjustment, that is, the jump in
relative price variables is completed, there is the problem of taking
inflation down again.
As it should be clear by now, it was the combination of external and
internal strangulation what caused the contraction in output and high
inflation, but it will not take a lot to see that the very presence of
mechanism of propagation for the initial shock means that breaking the
strangulation will not necessarily translate into a substantial improve-
ment.
2.3.1. Budget Correction and Manufacturing Export Targets.
With the newly depreciated real exchange rate, the months following
the collapse are times of increasing manufacturing production (exchange
rate sensitive, non-traditional exports). In many occasions the memory of
the problems caused by the appreciation which preceded the crisis make the
authorities to set, at least for some time, the crawling peg such as to
the real exchange rate at its new low levels. In the meantime there is a
process of budget correction taking place either trimming down current
spending or shooting down investment projects.
In spite of the effort, inflation remains high and income remains
very depressed when both, the budget and the current account improve very
much. This seems to have been the case in Mexico between 1983 and 1984.
This phenomenon can be illustrated with the help of the model. What
an export target means is to keep the real exchange rate fixed which
implies to set - P. In terms of the real wage dynamics this makes e -
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- 0, and consequently stays constant at the level 6/0(z*-z), indepen-
dently of the fiscal adjustment, unless one of the constrains becomes
binding again and a new crises forces relative price variables to jump.
In terms of figure 3, what we see are the consequences of setting an
export target and at the same time the government cuts down in investment
projects.
A
Po
A*
p0
o
0
0o - -X/(Z*-z)
Figure 3
Lets take Eo as the initial equilibrium. The budget change moves the
b - 0 and d - 0 schedules down and to the right respectively. Inflation
and output remain at the same levels but the balance of payments and the
budget improve. Thus, the export promotion policy keeps inflation too
high compared to the levels compatible with the new domestic and balance
of payments constraints.
In this example point A represents the minimum inflation that could
be reached in an heterodox stabilization program where nominal wages and
nominal exchange rate are controlled to grow at the rate P*. If P* is
greater than 0 means that a plan of total price and wage freezing (repre-
sented by point C) is inconsistent with the balance of payments (and the
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budget) and can not be sustained for long before a new exchange rate
collapse happens.
Another point worth noticing in this particular example is that the
domestic borrowing constraint is not binding. This shows that the usual
criterion of looking at the operational deficit to see if a shock program
of the 'austral-cruzado' type is sustainable turns out to be a necessary
but not a sufficient condition.
Consider now the example where the largest part of the budget
adjustment comes from a reduction of spending in home goods and services,
and we still keep the assumption of an export target.
,J
P
Figure 4
The very fact that the government spending multiplier makes the
contraction of aggregate demand (in terms of inflation at a given level of
output) bigger than the reduction in potential inflation on the borrowing
constraint side makes it binding. At the initial real exchange rate and
real wages and new government spending level, the steady state solution is
given by point A'. Obviously, at this level inflation is too small in the
sense that debt would be rising too fast and consequently, this is again a
solution which can not be sustained in the long run.
A 
.
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Once again, being one constraint binding, the adjustment would
require a jump, in the price level to take real wages down. This means an
equilibrium like El, where income distribution is even worse, would be the
feasible steady state solution.
This case is the most 'monetarist' in the sense that budget correc-
tion gets immediately reflected in lower inflation and reduced output,
such that equation (3'') is always satisfied.
As we will comment in more detail in paragraph 2.3.2., what we see in
practice is a combination of these two exercises together with some real
exchange rate appreciation, as some attempts for soft-landing are put in
effect for some time, before deciding that the balance of payments is
worsening too fast and going back to a fixed real exchange rate. This
situation is summarized in figure 5.
Figure 5
The economy moves from EO to El, but still inflation is too high. The
minimum inflation consistent with both constraints is represented by A'
and is again reachable by means of an heterodox program like PASE. At
this level of inflation , seignoriage revenues allow a reduction of real
domestic debt.
A
P
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2.3.2. Soft-Landing.
After having explored the two polar cases: export targets and shock
programs, the natural question to ask is if there is another way of taking
inflation down after the fiscal correction is completed.
If, as we saw in paragraph 2.3.1., inflation is too high because the
real exchange rate is too depreciated and real wages too low, this should
mean that any attempt directed to take it down has to imply at least a
period of appreciation, unless one is willing to continue through a path
of output contraction as in the example of figure (4).
The problem with the appreciation issue is that it affects
competitiveness, and with it worsens the problem of external strangula-
tion. At the end of the process, when the constraint is finally binding
the steady state inflation of the soft-landing will be way above the
inflation level that could have been reached through a shock program
Figure 6 shows three basic concepts of inflation.
P.
P6
I' - I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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Figure 6
Eo represents the equilibrium reached immediately after the debt
crisis. In an economy with export targets this would also be the steady
state solution. Now, if we adopt a soft-landing solution by allowing an
exchange rate appreciation by means of a 'crawling peg' rate equal to Ps
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the new steady state solution would be given by A, which will be the
closer to E the more inertia in the system and the higher the real
exchange rate elasticity of manufacturing exports. A' is the solution of
a shock program and A''' is the solution of a simple monetary model with
no inertia. Notice how a real appreciation improves the budget, pointing
to the fact that a soft-landing solution could give better results that a
shock program in the cases where the first constraint to become binding is
the domestic balance and (r - )d + - Poh > 0.
Starting from pair of initial conditions for the real exchange rate
and real wages (zi) we can develop a simple expression for the soft-land-
ing inflation and output compared to a shock program. Leaving all the
details in appendix A, it can be shown that the minimum steady state
inflation for the class of crawling peg rules which fix the rate of
depreciation to their long-term values from the beginning of the soft-
landing is given by
A A e'(z - z) e' (9)
PL. P + (1l - /6)
-(l-s)c
-t -1z 0(l-s) + (l-s)cO'O
Expression (9) is very appealing to common sense: a soft landing
program will be less effective the more serious the initial crisis ( given
by the distance between the steady state real wages in the model where no
constraint is binding at before the crisis and the solution after the
economy adjusts to the domestic and external strangulation zo, the higher
the real exchange rate elasticity of exports and the larger the inertia in
the system, given by the /6 ratio. With respect to this last point we
say that a system has no inertia when the price equation is totally
75
vertical at the 'natural, level of output -O which happens, either if '
grows arbitrarily large or 6 tends to zero.
We can derive a similar expression for the level of activity achiev-
able with soft-landing compared with an heterodox shock program.
_ O, ( z -Zo) , (
s - ' 1 - 09'ro 1 - /6 1-(o1 g
Once again, the more inertia there is in the system, the less
favorable it appears the alternative of a gradual program versus wage and
price controls
2.4. Oil policy and Long-Term policy.
Mexico is the fourth largest oil producer and is also fourth in the
world in term or proved oil reserves. This fact rises questions about its
role in the stabilization.
As it was seen in paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 there are substantial
differences between a policy of reduction of government spending and
increased oil exports (or stopping projects, which in the short run is
equivalent). More oil exports relax both, domestic and external con-
straints whereas government spending reduction depresses more the economy
and the standard of living, which is not longer a feasible option in
Mexico.
In the long run, export promotion provides also a valid answer. As
we see in Appendix B, where treat our model in a context of economic
growth it can be seen that keeping a 'correct' level of real exchange rate
does contradict growth targets when inertia dominates the system. On the
other hand the combination of measures to break inertia with strong export
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promotion would mean even lower sustainable inflation and faster overall
economic activity.
This exercise is for the case in which the balance of payments is the
first binding constraint. Another possible case is when the balance of
payments is the first binding constraint independently of the stabiliza-
tion strategy chosen. In this situation the difference between soft-
landing and shock inflation is given by
^ SL(1 [[(r-y)d + -Poa-h] + g] (11)
sL - Ps' (1-6. 0eB)e
Not surprisingly, the steady state inflation could be less than the
shock inflation depending on the sign of the external balance of the
public sector.
3. Simulating a shock program.
The model in section 4 provides a simple framework to see the macro-
economic constraints to a successful shock program. This section presents
a simple macroeconometric model of the Mexican economy which to simulate a
shock program and to highlight the importance of the external accounts on
inflation stabilization. Before going in the numbers it is important to
bear in mind the Lucas' critique to macroeconometric policy evaluation.
For this reason the results presented in the section shall be taken as
points of reference rather than definite answers.
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3.1. The Econometric Model.
We will estimate the following system of equations:
lgnp - cl + 1 lgnp(-l) + 2 lgaspu + 83 lrexch + 4 lxpu +
+ inf + el (El)
inf - c2 + a2 inf(-l) + a2 wage + a3 depr(-l) + a 4 lgnp +
+ lgnp(-l) + e2 (E2)
curacp - c3 + p1 lrexch + 2 lrexch(-l) + 3 lrexch(-2) +
+ A4 lgnp + 5 lgnpusa + e3 (E3)
The first equation is the aggregate demand, the second is a price
equation and the third is the balance of payments constraint.
lgnp natural logarithm of the gdp of the industrial sector in
millions of pesos of 1970.
lgaspu natural logarithm of the total government spending in domestic
goods (total spending
-imports of goods and services) in millions of pesos of 1970.
lrexch natural logarithm of the real exchange rate.
1978-100.0
lxpu natural logarithm of exports of the public sector in millions of
dollars.
inf quarterly inflation of the consumer price index.
wage quarterly increase in the index of wages in the manufacturing
sector (in percents/100).
depr quarterly rate of depreciation of the nominal controlled
exchange rate (in percents/100).
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curacp curac-xpu+interest+impu
curac current account balance in millions of dollars
xpu exports of the public sector in millions of dollars
impu imports of the public sector (except interest on the external
debt)
interest interest payments on total(public+private) external debt
gnpusa annual rate of real gnp growth in the United States (in per-
cents).
3.2. The Data.
All information comes from Indicadores Economicos of Banco de Mexico
and the data bank SIE-BANXICO. The GDP of the industrial sector is used
as a proxy for the overall level of activity (quarterly GDP is not
available before 1985.1). The sample used for estimation is 1977.1
1987.2.
3.3. The Estimation.
Equations (El) and (E2) are estimated simultaneously using 2SLS.
Equation (E3) is estimated using instrumental variables to take account
for the possible correlation between lgnp and the error term. In the
estimation of all three equations the instruments used are lgnp(-l)
inf(-l), lgaspu, lrexch current and lagged one and two periods, lxpu, wage
and depr(-l).
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Results of the Estimation
1. Dependent Variable : lgnp
Coefficient t-Statistic
constant 2.22 2.81
lgnp(-l) .811 9.03
lgaspu .037 2.18
lrexch -.026 -1.59
lxpu .0005 1.06
inf -.115 -1.70
R2-.971 DW- 2.04
2. Dependent Variable : inf
constant .001 0.95
inf(-l) .581 5.24
wage .153 2.52
depr(-l) .109 2.95
lgnp .001 1.83
rho -.408 -2.42
R2-.833
3. Dependent Variable : curacp
constant 51522 2.01
lgnp -5615 -2.83
lrexch 720.2 1.21
lrexch(-l) 1435.0 2.30
lrexch(-2) 1680.1 2.83
gnpusa 137.2 2.38
rho 0.530 3.57
R2-.904
Simulations.
There are three questions that one has to answer before knowing if a
heterodox stabilization has a good chance to work:
- Is the rapid desinflation inconsistent with the available unused
capacity in a way that there will be rationing and consequently repressed
inflation ?
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- Is the expansion associated with the reduction of the inflation
tax inconsistent with the constraint imposed on the balance of payments
by the availability of external savings?
- Is the reduction in inflation tax revenues inconsistent with a
stable ratio of domestic public debt to gnp?
The following exercises try to answer this question.
a) Expansionary effects of a desinflation.
To get a sense of how expansionary is the reduction of the inflation
tax we can substitute a zero inflation and the value of the real exchange
rate fixed at the level it has when the stabilization program starts,
while all remaining exogenous variables are kept at their observed values
in the equation of aggregated demand. The following two tables compare
the simulated level of activity with the values actually recorded and
with the industrial GDP reached at the peak of the 1981 expansion
Expansionary Effects of the Desinflation
(percent difference between simulated and observed GDP)(a)
1985.1 3.1 --- --- ---... ... --- --- -.
.2 4.9 5.9 --- ---...
.3 7.2 8.1 7.0 --- --- --- ---
.4 8.6 9.3 8.7 8.3 --- --- --- ---
1986.1 10.7 11.3 10.3 10.5 8.8 --- --- --- --- ---
.2 12.4 12.8 13.1 12.5 10.8 7.5 --- --- ---
.3 13.8 14.1 14.8 14.4 13.0 9.5 11.1 ---
.4 16.4 16.7 16.6 16.2 15.1 11.3 12.5 7.9 --- ---
1987.1 16.9 17.2 17.0 16.5 16.1 14.5 15.0 13.8 13.1 ---
.2 16.2 16.5 16.4 15.9 15.2 12.9 13.2 13.3 13.6 13.6
(a) (simulated-observed) *100/observed
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Expansionary Effects of Desinflation.
(percent difference between simulated and industrial DGP in 1981.4)
1985.1 0.5% --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
.2 2.9 3.9 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
.3 5.1 5.9 5.2 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
.4 5.6 6.2 6.0 5.3 --- --- --- --- --- ---
1986.1 5.2 5.7 5.8 5.1 2.8 --- --- --- --- ---
.2 8.3 8.7 9.0 8.3 6.6 3.6 --- --- --- ---
.3 3.8 4.1 4.7 4.3 2.9 -.5 1.0 ---
.4 5.8 6.2 6.1 5.6 4.5 0.8 2.0 -2.6 --- ---
1987.1 6.3 6.7 6.5 6.0 5.6 4.0 4.5 3.2 2.5 ---
.2 6.9 7.3 7.2 6.6 6.2 4.0 4.3 4.4 4.7 4.7
The tables above simulate the expansion in activity that would be
obtained if a zero inflation program was started anywhere between 1985.1
and 1987.2. It is apparent that the expansion is substantial. This is
specially noted in 1986. But, regardless of the fact that the levels of
activity that would result -cnuld be higher than 10% above the actually
observed levels this does not necessarily means that this would mean that
the expansion is unmanageable. One has to remember that in the last years
the Mexican economy has been in a deep recession, then a more reasonable
comparison is between the simulated GDP and the level of activity reached
in 1981.4. Using this number as benchmark one finds that the elimination
of inflation means an expansion in the order of 4 to 6% above these
levels. This level is clearly obtainable, although some attention has to
be given to the timing of aggregated demand. An expansion 3 above the
1981.4 level can be absorbed in a year or so, but the reduction in
inflation tax can have immediate effects and then it would be necessary to
contain government spending in the first stages and resume spending as
capacity expands. Some adjustment previous to the enactment of the shock
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program can help. For example, say that we are looking at the case of an
heterodox stabilization starting on 1985.1. If one sets as a target the
level of activity reached in 1981.4, a combination of a 10% real exchange
rate depreciation and a 5 reduction in government spending can do it.
b.) Desinflation and the balance of payments.
Another type of capacity constraint is given by the balance of payments.
The expansion brought about by the elimination of the inflation tax could
be consistent with an economy with unemployment of labor and capital but
the problem arises when foreign exchange is scarce. To know if a shock
program is sustainable from the perspective of the balance of payments
we can simulate the level of inflation that would make that constraint
exactly binding. The following computes this level of inflation for a
maximum current account deficit of 600 million dollars per quarter, which
is a reasonable goal.
Minimum Inflation consistent with the Balance of Payments Constraint
(maximum current account deficit of 600 million dollars per quarter).(a)
85.1 -4.9 -- --- --- --- --- --- --- --....
.2 -0.1 2.9 --- --- --- ---
.3 1.2 1.1 -2.0 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
.4 -2.4 -3.7 -12.3 -13.7 --- --- --- ---
86.1 33.7 30.3 8.3 7.5 6.8 --- --- --- --- ---
.2 45.4 43.8 22.1 16.5 11.8 13.7 --- --- --- ---
.3 43.8 42.1 20.8 16.4 13.9 15.5 17.1 --- --- ---
.4 27.4 25.7 3.6 -0.8 5.1 -7.7 -6.5 -11.1 --- ---
87.1 21.2 19.5 -2.4 -7.1 -0.9 -13.0 -12.1 -15.9 -13.8 ---
.2 20.0 17.9 -3.2 -8.1 -2.0 -14.2 -13.3 -16.2 -14.5 -14.6
(a) quarterly rate of inflation
This table highlights the fact that a zero inflation program is very
sensitive to external shocks. The inflation rates reported would be the
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ones one would obtain with perfect indexation. That is, if the disequi-
librium in the current account has to be corrected using the inflation tax
as only element to reduce domestic absorption. Although it is hard to
believe that this is necessarily the case, it points at the fact that it
is possible to go from a low inflation scenario to a three digit yearly
inflation rather easily. For example, for an program starting in 1985.4
it would take the drop in oil exports to put the inflation in the range of
20% per quarter. This inflationary pressure disappears as the effects of
the real exchange rate depreciation of 1985.3 and 1985.4 begin to have a
favorable effect on the balance of payments and the terms of trade
recover. I want to point out, that for computing the inflation rate in
this I assumed that along the exercise the level of activity remains at
the zero inflation level for the effects of computing lgnp(-l) in equation
(El). This means that one should interpret the results above as the
'shadow rates of inflation', which in the case of being positive mean that
there has to be rationing of foreign exchange. A more clear picture of
how the foreign exchange constraint affects the viability of a zero
inflation target we can take the determine the magnitude of the fiscal
adjustment that would be necessary to keep the foreign exchange constraint
binding at a zero inflation (or less) under different scenarios of terms
of trade and availability of foreign resources. We use as benchmark the
values of real exchange rate and public spending in 1987.2 (The values
reported are simulated setting lgnp-lgnp(-l) in equation (El) because the
intention is to see the size of the permanent adjustment needed to sustain
a zero inflation target)
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Percentage Reduction in Real Government Spending for a
Sustainable Zero Inflation Program. (a)
Effective Maximum Current Average Price of Mexican Oil Exports
Interest Rate Account Deficit(b) (dollars per barrel)
$10 $15 $20
8.0 1200 0.7% n.r. n.r.
600 3.7 0.0 n.r.
0 6.7 3.0 n.r.
9.0 1200 1.9 n.r. n.r.
600 4.9 1.2 n.r.
0 7.9 4.2 0.5
10.0 1200 3.1 n.r. n.r.
600 6.1 2.4 n.r.
0 9.1 5.4 1.7
11.0 1200 4.3 0.6 n.r.
600 7.3 3.6 n.r.
0 10.3 6.6 2.9.
(a) includes public imports (b) millions of dollars per quarter. (n.r.) n
correction required.
This table stresses the sensitivity of an heterodox program to terms
of trade shocks or, which is the same, the importance of available
external borrowing to cover these exogenous changes. For example, a
reduction of 2.4 billion dollars in external savings a year requires a 3%
reduction in government spending; a drop of 5 dollars per barrel needs a
3.7% reduction in spending and one point in interest rates has to be
compensated with a 1.7% spending cut to make aggregate demand compatible
with the balance availability of foreign exchange.
0
c.) Zero Inflation and the Government Deficit.
A zero inflation program is consistent with the public sector
borrowing requirements as long as one has an operational deficit close to
zero. In the case of Mexico where the ratio of domestic and external
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public debt to GDP is respectively 57% and 21% and a reasonable long term
rate of GDP growth is 5.0% and a real interest rate of 2 means that a
primary deficit of 2.3% is consistent with a non-inflationary deficit
financing. From the tables in the last section one can see that even in
times of low oil prices that constraint is not violated. In fact there
is a very large primary surplus which leaves a wide margin for action.
Summarizing what we have seen in the simulation exercises above it is
clear that it is not enough to see an operational surplus to be sure that
the budget correction has been enough. There are other considerations to
make, specially with respect to the balance of payments and the extent of
unused capacity with which the economy starts the program. For example,
it can be inferred that starting a stabilization in 1985, would have
failed in 1986 due to the oil shock which would have put too much
pressure on the balance of payments and forced an exchange rate adjust-
ment. The real exchange rate correction undertaken through 1985 and the
recuperation of the oil prices by the end of 1986 and beginning of 1987
put the Mexican economy at a very realistic possibility of going for a
sustainable shock program , perfectly consistent with the budget, with
the balance of payments and levels of unused internal capacity (the
Encuesta de Expectativas Empresariales (survey of entrepreneurial expecta-
tions) generated by Banco de Mexico for the second semester of 1987,
reveals that the percentage of capacity used in the industrial sector is
only 65%). The alternative is a soft-landing. We could simulate what
the potential of a soft-landing experiment. The soft-landing inflation
reported for each quarter is the value that would be reached (keeping the
values of the exogenous variables, lxpu and lgaspu at the levels reported
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for that quarter and allowing for full ex-post wage indexation: wage-
inf(-l)) at the moment when the balance of payments constraint becomes
binding having set the crawling peg of the exchange rate at 9 and 6%
respectively. If we set a balance of payments constraint of 600 million
dollars per quarters, there would be three quarters in 1986 where there is
not even a chance to start the crawling peg. We can give even more
flexibility to the constraint and notice that even in this situations the
gains in inflation reduction are very modest. We could modify the
scenario of the simulation to rationalize the oil shock of 1986 as
temporary by setting in the simulation the price of oil exports at 15
dollars per barrel and defining the current account constraint at a
moderate surplus of 150 million dollars per quarter.
Soft-Landing Inflation
Crawling Peg
9X 6X
1985.1 11.5 12.8
.2 5.5 6.4
.3 8.3 9.5
.4 11.3 12.5
1986.1 13.1 14.5
.2 12.7 13.7
.3 13.8 16.7
.4 16.3 18.2
1987.1 20.4 21.5
.2 22.0 23.3
From this table it can be said that the gains of the soft-landing
strategy are very modest, and that setting a lower crawling peg rates can
leave one with a higher steady state inflation because the real exchange
rate appreciates very fast making the balance of payments constraint to be
reached too soon.
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Concluding Remarks.
Coming back to some of the questions suggested at the beginning of
this essay after our brief review of some basic features of the Mexican
economy lead us to the following remarks:
-The sluggish response of real and nominal endogenous variables to
exchange rate, wages and fiscal variables indicates the presence of a
strong inertial component which reduces significantly the potential of
soft-landing stabilization programs when compared to heterodox strategies.
As a consequence of this inertia and the purpose of avoiding a deep reces-
sion, fiscal policy has not had control over total PSBR, even though basic
indicators such as primary and operational deficit remain very satisfac-
tory.
-The balance of payments crisis of 1986 seem to have been strong
enough to make impossible a total wage and price control program without
further and rather substantial aggregate demand adjustments or a fast
recovery in oil prices. Nevertheless, the recovery of manufacturing
exports was large enough to make feasible an effective program of 'infla-
tion' control at levels substantially lower than those observed.
-Although it was not explicitly considered as such in the empirical
section, the magnitude of the decline in real wages points to the pos-
sibility that income distribution effects have been huge and consequently
make an additional attempt to continue the stabilization through further
reductions in the standard of living highly unlikely and questionable from
the standpoint of social justice.
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APPENDIX A
To obtain the soft-landing solution we start from the following
simplified system:
mr
m ax A, (Al)
e -- P (A2)
- [rbz - cP](l-s) + g (A3)
i - r + 6(z* - z) (A4)
P - 'z + e (A5)
Substituting (A5) and (A4) on (Al) we obtain the equation describing
the relation between output and the 'crawling peg' for a given level of
real wages
- - 0(6(z - ) + e) + rlg (D1)
where
-(1 - s)c 1
o 1 - z0O(l - s) + (1 - s)cO'% S 1 - zo (l - s) + (1 s)c'
1-8
The differential equation for the real wage dynamics is
i - r + (z* - z) (D2)
Substituting (D1) in (D2) it results
i - 6(1 - oPb')(z* - z) - rfo0 e + brlg (D3)
the solution of this equation is given by:
z - (z0 - z) exp(-6(l-o 00')t + z
z - + 6(~1 - roe)
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the stability condition sets
6(1 - foe') > 
Consequently, for a given crawling peg, the steady state solution for
the real wage is :
z +6( oa) (A6)6(1-.b0e)
and the corresponding level of production is
-,r + g 9 fe (A7)
1 - ?pro
to simplify the exposition and without loss of generality it can be
assumed e0o - 0, then
- -~'~ (A8)
and
fmax _A 9X#z*0+(-ro r ) (A9)
(A9) and (A7) have to be the same in the steady state,
hence:
(1 + v xe- ' 'z*6 · 1- o
A A (o, b') Z* (Al)
g+ 1 - 8/6 z
where the heterodox shock solution is (l/fO)g. The dynamics of the
process are described in figure (Al) where the arrowed path describes the
dynamics of the soft-landing process from a given set of initial condi-
tions.
0I,
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Figure Al
The next case is when the first binding constraint is given by the
borrowing requirements of the government. In that case the soft-landing
inflation satisfies
- - L. [(r--y)d + -Poah) + ]
C C
- z + e
r - [z - CP](-S) + g
and the shock inflation is given by
Ps - C ((r--)d + -P0oh) + g/c)
and consequently one gets the relation:
s ^ Ps ( - 7)d + - Poah ] (All)
93
APPENDIX B
To see the impact of alternative policy actions in the long run, we
have to pay more attention to the issue of capacity accumulation. Taking
again our three sector model with some minor changes will allow us to
evaluate the effect of export-promotion and income distribution policies
on long run capacity and shock-sustainable inflation. (This appendix is an
extension of Taylor's (1986) models of distribution and growth).
1. Non-Traded Goods Sector.
1.1. Equation of Material Balances.
PX - PC + PI + PG (Bl)
P Price of Non-traded goods
C Consumption in the Non-traded goods sector
G Public Spending in Non-traded goods.
I Investment spending in Non-traded goods
1.2. Consumption Function
PC - wbx- Pc(P) + wfE (B2)
wbX + wfE * Total wages
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1.3. Investment function
PI PI
(B3)PkK hP + ( - h )eP* - go + g r - g
h fraction of total investment spent in domestic goods.
1.4. Formation of internal prices.
P - (1 + t)(wb + aeP*)
t - mark-up rate
1.5. Definition of rate of return.
t
1 + t h + (1 - h)eP
x/K
KmCapacity in the Non-traded goods sector.
1.6. Equilibrium condition in the Non-traded goods sector
(tz' + (1 + t)aqP* - zfk)+ c.(P) - pg + d
z Real wage (w/P)
q Real exchange rate (e/P)
d-G/K
p (h + (1-h)qP*)
(B5)
(B6)
k-Ke/K
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2. Traded Goods Sector
2.1 Production of exportables.
E- %Ke
Ke = Capacity in the traded goods sector.
2.2 Prices in the Exportable goods sector
Peel
2.3 Prices in the importable goods sector
Pi-P*
2.4. Investment equation in the exportable goods sector
I/K, - d*/k + gr,. (A7)
kuKe/K
d*wG*/K
G*= Public spending in importable goods
r,- profit rate in the exportable goods sector
r,- ((q-zf)/qP')
2.5 Balance of Payments (Net exports)
qk - kd' - (1 - t)aqP^' - qP'k(d + g. q ) - (1 - h)
(g° + gle  qP+ t + (1 - (AS)
(g + 1, t qb1 + t h + (1 - h)qP 
b is exogenously given when there is external strangulation
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3. Capital Stock composition
/k - d*/k + g. - go - gr (A9)
Solution to the model.
If one assumes external strangulation the balance of payments equation
determines the prevailing level of income for each given composition of
the capital stock
f - (l/o)(41 - qb)
00 (1 + t)aqP' + (1 - h)gl1 + t h (1 - h)qP ) (S)+ (1thh ____1 h-
01 - qk - kd' - qP*k(d* + g. (q - zf)-l - h)g0o
qP
The balanced growth condition is reached when k/k is equal to zero
1 (d' - go + g (q-zf))/qp* 
gl (1 + t)(h + (1 - h)P) (S2)
Inflation is obtained solving, at any point in time P in equation (B6)
The rate of capital accumulation in balanced growth is given by
g - d + g, f (S3)qP
Along this model it has been assumed that the balance of payments con-
straint is binding, and consequently the level of aggregated savings is
basically determined by the size of the international obligations. The
price level in the non-tradeable goods sector are determined domestically
while the country is price-taker in the international markets. We finally
assumed that investment in both home sectors has two components: public
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and private. .hiblic investment is treated as an exogenous variable and
private investment is a function of the rates of return.
Solution equations (S1) and (S2) an be analyzed with the help of
several graphs. Figure B1 summarizes the dynamics of capacity accumula-
tion. The k-O diagram corresponds to equation (S2).
A .^
P,p
A
Figure B1
For example, an increase of d* (public spending in exportables) moves
the S1 schedule up and to the left. In the very short run the economy
moves from A to A' which represents a drop in the production of home goods
(c), the exportable goods sector increases its output. As the spillover
effect begins to be felt in the home goods sector production increases.
At the end, production in both sectors has risen (S3). With respect to
inflation, the higher level of () in the long run means that inflation
will be lower as the export-led growth has reduced the external strangula-
tion. In the short run, though, the balance of payment problems could get
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worse as capital formation is import-intensive.
As we know further real exchange rate depreciation has different
impact on observed inflation and the minimum inflation sustainable by a
shock program, it can be also seen that using the real exchange rate as
the main instrument for export promotion could not be the best alternative
if compared with direct investment in exportables, because, as it comes
from (S1) to (S3) real exchange rate depreciation and real wage reduction
depress aggregate demand and the dynamics of domestic production and,
whereas the export sector grows it does it more slowly because the real
depreciation also elevates the cost of imports and with it the rate of
return on capacity expansion. In any case the real exchange rate depreci-
ation reduces the level of sustainable inflation which would also be the
case if real wages decline keeping the real exchange rate fixed.
The basic message of this model is that in an economy with debt
problems there are two main things to do: break inertia and once it is
done move toward exports using the instrument which affects them more
directly taking direct investment and subsidies to the export sector as
first best, and real exchange rate depreciation and real wage reduction as
second best.
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Part III
FINANCIAL REPRESSION, FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND THE
INTEREST RATE ELASTICITY OF SAVINGS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
100
FINANCIAL REPRESSION, FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND THE INTEREST
RATE ELASTICITY OF SAVINGS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
Introduction.
As a result of the world inflation of the 1970's that affected many
developing countries the literature began to reflect the worries about the
inconveniences of very negative real returns on financial instruments.
Unfortunately, the debt crisis got in the way and diverted the attention
of economists from this topic, vital for the policy making of the recovery
and resumption of growth in the next decades.
The initial motivation for the study of the role of financial
structure in overall economic performance can be found in Goldsmith (1966,
1969). His work points to the fact that credit institutions play a
crucial role in the development process, and seems to carry the message
that some degree of repression on interest rates is always present in
successful experiences.
On the other side of the table we have the responses of McKinnon
(1973) and Shaw (1973) who put much emphasis on the evils of regulating
credit market variables. For example we have Shaw's (1973) statement in
this direction:"... distortions of financial prices including interest
rates and foreign exchange ...[is] in all cases [an] strategy [which has
stopped or gravely retarded the development process."
This debate gave place to some empirical work directed at finding the
relation between financial repression, financial liberalization and
growth. First we have Fry (1982) who got regression results going against
the argument of those in favor of liberalization. What he found is that
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the interest rate elasticity of saving in LDCs was not large enough to
justify moving real interest rates up to boost the flow of real resources
from consumption to productive activities.
The response comes from Giovannini (1983) who revises Fry's results
to discover that, specially in the case of Korea, they were very sensitive
to the sample chosen for the regressions. Then he pools cross section and
time series data for LDC's to find from Modigliani (life-cycle) type of
regressions for savings that the interest rate elasticity was unstable
through time.
In spite of the ambiguity of the results and the previous debate,
they may be pointing to some important regularities with some strong
policy implications. It may be possible to find some testable reasons for
which it is valid to say that too much repression is bad and that too much
liberalization can be also damaging. In fact, the instability of the
interest rate elasticity of savings through time could reveal something
about the conditions and ranges within which negative interest rates are
convenient and the reasons why liberalization should be implemented
carefully.
This paper revises the experience of 26 countries, looking for some
regular pattern behind the results obtained in previous empirical work.
Section 2 contains a model which looks at income distribution reasons
for an aggregate savings function with interest rate elasticity which also
depends on the interest rate level, leading to a Laffer-curve shaped
savings function and consequently to a criterion for an optimal regulated
interest rate in the presence of other rigidities in factor and/or goods
markets.
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Section 3 presents the regression results of savings functions for 26
LDC's, putting special care to the sample partition in each case according
the level of the real interest rate prevailing in each sub-period for each
country. In the end of this section we look for some connection between
the hypotheses of the model in section 2 and the available evidence.
Section 4 concludes on the results giving some comments on their
policy implications in matters of financial reform.
2. A Model.
Here we will present a very simple model which stresses the role of
income distribution and credit market rigidities as determinants of
private savings.
Consider an economy with a very large number of price-taking agents,
which can be classified in entrepreneurs (e) and workers (o). All of them
are identical, and have the same utility function. Workers and entrepre-
neurs take their current consumption decisions trying to maximize their
welfare which depends on present and future consumption. To simplify the
analysis we can think of a utility function like (1) where Ct is current
U - U(CT,Ytl) (1)
consumption, and YPt+1 is the permanent income each agent will obtain from
their decisions at time 't'.
Workers can sell only one unit of labor for which they receive w
units of consumption goods per period. Besides, at the current time t,
they are endowed with WO of goods which they have lent to productive units
in return for r units of goods per period.
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For the Cobb-Douglas case, the optimization problem for workers is:
Max U - ACT&YTr+ l (2)
ST. YP,.+l ' .7 W+l + W
Wt1 - + TWO + W - C
Solving (2) we obtain a savings function (3).
SI - (a - r - ar)W + (1 - a(l +/r))W (3)
For this sector of the population, the sign of the elasticity depends
on their initial W0 and the interest rate itself. From (4) we can see
that for a strictly positive Wo the interest rate elasticity declines
monotonically and can become negative for a sufficiently large real
interest rate.
ar - -(1 + d)W0 + w (4)
Expression (5) gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a
positive interest rate elasticity of savings.
w r(l + a)> (5)
rWI. a
This means, that as long as wage income is a relatively large
proportion of total income (either because financial wealth of workers is
small or because the interest rate is low) the interest rate elasticity of
current savings will be positive. On the other hand, if financial wealth
is high, increasing interest rates will boost permanent income in such a
way that people will smooth the consumption path reducing current savings.
Consider now the case of entrepreneurs. They own productive units
with a constant returns to scale technology.
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YT - P(WT + UT) (6)
Their optimization problem is given by (7).
Max U -A C.. Yp;+l. (7)
S.T. YPT +1,.. PWT 1 + (P - r)WO+l - w
w+1 - PWT + (p - r)WIT - CT. + T
and the resulting saving function is given by (8).
SE (( -a) ( -P)) -W. + 2(l (( -r)Wg - w) - 1 + (8)
2(1 - a) - r)S
p (p - r)S.
Before saying anything about the shape of this function, it is
important to assume that entrepreneurs have rational expectations. For
this we try to say that by seeing prices, firms will be able to know not
only how much they will pay per unit borrowed but also how much workers
will lend.
From the way in which problem (7) is formulated, we have that an
increase in interest rates could mean either an increase or decline in
revenues for entrepreneurs. This is because, on the one hand, a higher
interest rate means that firms will have to pay more for what they are
borrowing; but on the other hand, this means that they could borrow more
and earn more as long as (p-r)>O. For high interest rates, the effect is
a reduction in permanent income which is met by lower savings today.
8r r p
2(1 p a) (p - r)i w - (1+ a)Wo)
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It is important to remember that in this economy neither interest
rates nor wages are fully flexible which means we consider some form of
disequilibrium. The interest rate can be taken as regulated by the
government and wages rigid in an economy with surplus labor.
To simplify the algebra and see how this model works. Lets consider
for the moment the case where W0 is small. This would be the case of a
country which starts from low financial deepening. Here, the derivative
of aggregate savings with respect to interest rate is given by (10).
Figure 2.1 plots this derivative and the derivative of its components.
The empirical counterpart of savings in the non-capitalist sector
would be banking (financial) intermediation. The exercise predicts that
it is reasonable to expect a positive elasticity for a very wide range of
interest rates.
The difference between total domestic savings and banking intermedi-
ation is self-financing of firms. Its derivative is positive for low
interest rates and will turn negative as the interest rate increases.
Appendix A looks at the response of financial intermediation to
changes in interest rates in some detail for our sample of countries. The
result is a downward slop Ing relation of the elasticity similar to the
one implied in this section.
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Figure 2.1.
A natural implication for the change in sign of the elasticity of
aggregated savings and interest rates is the existence of a rate that
maximizes total savings (and permanent GNP) for p-r>O.
r _Ja(l + )p e 2(1 - a) (10)
An interesting question is what would happen if the interest rate is
freed and let the credit market forces decide.
In that case the credit market would clear where r-p due to the
constant returns to scale technology. But it is possible for this rate to
be too high, and have, instead some degree of financial repression as an
optimal solution.
In this Cobb-Douglass economy, a sufficient condition for having some
degree of financial repression dominate the free market solution is:
-i
dl~
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a 1
2(1 - a) + < 1
This result indicates that the lower the individual discount rate of
future consumption (the lower alpha) and the larger p, the better will be
to have some form of repression.
The next section looks at the savings functions of 26 countries
paying special attention to the effects of changes in the average real
interest rate levels on aggregate savings.
3. Some Empirical Evidence on the Response of Savings to Interest
Rate changes in LDC's.
The intention of this section is to take a look at the experiences of
26 developing countries and try to assess the impact of financial liberal-
ization in aggregate savings and consequently on potential growth.
3.1. The Sample.
For all countries selected the period considered goes from 1955 to
1986 using annual data.
As the basic idea of the exercise is to see what happens when real
interest rates in the domestic credit market goes from negative to
positive, the sample tries to include countries which either, have had
long periods of very negative or very positive real rates or countries
which have experienced financial reforms at some point in the period
taken. To get a global view at what happened to the interest rate in each
case one could take a look at table 3.1.
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Table 3.1. Ex-post Real Interest Rate(a)
Country 1955-1986 1955-1972 1975-1986
Malaysia 0.90 3.54 0.55
Korea 0.98 4.81 -2.16
Jamaica 3.67 1.78 7.50
Nepal 2.17 1.82 3.93
India -0.45 -0.06 2.63
Singapore 1.15 1.20 3.50
Philippines -1.38 1.22 -2.86
Pakistan -0.57 1.64 1.48
Thailand 3.88 5.48 4.14
Morocco -1.25 1.54 -3.86
Colombia -1.87 -2.68 0.53
Greece 0.88 3.48 -1.29
South Africa 0.04 2.18 -2.32
Kenya -0.77 3.22 -4.27
Portugal -3.90 -1.56 -5.83
Zambia -4.70 -1.44 -7.79
Peru -9.77 0.03 -27.45
Turkey -9.63 0.02 -28.86
Mexico -1.45 5.22 -8.27
Ivory Coast -1.73 0.20 -2.72
Costa Rica -1.31 1.81 -4.16
Ecuador -3.78 1.11 -9.88
Spain -2.44 -1.84 -2.45
Guatemala 0.50 3.40 -2.30
Venezuela 0.89 2.89 -1.85
Sri Lanka 1.02 2.03 -0.23
(a) IFS(series 60) minus the rate of inflation of the CPI (real rates in
percent per year).
109
3.2. Estimation of Interest Rate Elasticities.
The next-step is to estimate a savings function for each one of
these countries. The specification used is given by (12)
S/Y - C + cDUMMY + b TIME + b2 DEEP + b3 GNP +
b4 TIRR + b DTIRR + b5 INF + e (12)
where:
S/Y Private real savings as a fraction of GNP
TIME A trend component.
DEEP Measures financial deepening. Is defined as the ratio of
Quasimoney to Nominal GNP.
GNP Logarithm of the Gross National Product in Real terms.
TIRR Ex-post Real interest rate (IFS serie 60)
INF Inflation of the Consumer Price Index.
DTIRR DUMMY*TIRR
The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, and when
first order autocorrelation was found it was corrected using the Cochran-
Orcutt method.
To see what happens to the real interest rate elasticity in times of
financial repression and times of positive real returns it was necessary
to break the samples for each country. To save in degrees of freedom we
apply a Dummy variable and an interaction term between TIRR and this
Dummy. The values reported correspond to the derivative of savings to
real interest rate, adding when necessary, the direct coefficient and the
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one for the interaction term; the t-statistic is computed considering the
sample covariance of this two coefficients.
Table 3.2. Estimates of the Response of Savings changes in the
Ex-Post Real Interest Rate.
Country and Sample (*) Coefficient. R2
(t-statistic)
Malaysia
1955-1986 (**) -0.019 .822
(-2.07)
1975-1986 -0.011
(-0.55)
South Korea
1955-1986 (**) 0.0013 .804
(0.39)
1975-1986 0.016
(1.11)
Sri-Lanka
1955-1985 (a) 0.0270 .637
(1.72)
1955-1977 (b) (**) 0.0085 .783
(0.98)
1978-1985 (**) 0.0199
(1.77)
Singapore
1955-1986 (**) -.0071 .983
(-1.79)
1976-1986 -.0075
(-1.94)
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Table 3.2. Continued.
Philippines
1955-1985 (c)
1955-1972 (b) (**)
1975-1985 (**)
Pakistan
1955-1985 (**)
Thailand
1955-1986 (d) (**)
-.006
(1.24)
-.002
(-0.78)
.691
.721
0.008
(1.61)
0.009
(1.38)
-0.014
(-2.06)
.689
.861
Morocco
1955-1979 (**)
1980-1985 (**)
Greece
1955-1974 (**)
1975-1984 (**)
Colombia
1955-1973 (**)
1974-1986 (**)
-0.013
(-1.68)
.776
0.002
(1.08)
-.003
(0.99)
.902
0.012
(2.10)
.6250.001
(0.89)
-0.001
(0.39)
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Table 3.2. Continued.
South Africa
1960-1978 (**)
1978-1985 (**)
Kenya
1957-1972 (**)
1973-1984 (**)
Portugal
1960-1979 (**)
1980-1985 (**)
Zambia
1957-1985 (**)
India
1955-1986 (e)
1955-1973 (**)
1975-1986 (**)
Costa Rica
1955-1986 (f) (**)
-0.0109
(-2.31)
.842
-0.003
(-0.05)
-.002
(- .330)
.545
0.009
0.513)
.695.0007
(0.88)
0.009
(2.54)
.5120.008
(1.768)
0.011
(1.855)
.921
.9620.099
(1.722)
-0.021
(-2.754)
.640
-0.006
(-1.70)
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Table 3.2. Continued.
Guatemala
1955-1972 (**)
1973-1985 (**)
Ecuador
1955-1970 (**)
1970-1984 (**)
Spain
1955-1986 (g) (**)
-.012
(-2.78)
.829
-.003
(0.45)
-.010
(-1.11)
.903
0.022
(2.88)
0.0006
(0.84)
.713
Peru
1955-1973 (**)
1974-1985 (**)
Turkey
1960-1985 (a)
1960-1975 (b) (**)
1976-1985 (**)
Jamaica
1955-1986 (e)(**)
-0.002
(-0.828)
.681
0.005
(2.22)
0.006
(1.69)
-0.003
(-1.28)
.546
.588
0.0187
(1.93)
.633-0.0128
(-1.85)
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Table 3.2. Continued.
Mexico
1955-1971 (**) -0.0100 .900
(0.46)
1972-1986 (**) .0172
(1.823)
Venezuela
1955-1986 (a) -0.015 .801
(-1.74)
1955-1972 (b)(**) -0.0248 .850
(-4.49)
1973-1986 (**) 0.0086
(1.05)
Ivory Coast
1957-1985 (**) -.0089 .881
(-1.18)
Notes. (a) The result corresponds to the regression ran for the entire
sample space without a dummy term.
(b) The following two results come from a single regression with
a dummy interaction term.
(c) The 1974 observation was excluded.
(d) The 1975 observation is excluded.
(e) 1974 and 1975 excluded.
(f) 1973 and 1982 excluded.
(g) 1977 excluded.
(h) 1980 excluded.
Data Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, 1987.
(i) Sometimes the partition of subsamples skips some data in the middle
when the observations are considered atypical (i.e. short episodes of real
return swings of more that 2.5 standard deviations from the mean). When a
datum is deleted and it is necessary to make a correction first order
autocorrelation it is substituted by the corresponding geometric inter-
polation only for the effects of the autocorrelation correction, in which
case, the persistence (rho) coefficient is computed using the residuals
of the longest uninterrupted interval and the reported estimation obtained
by generalized differences for which the interpolated value is used to
avoid loosing degrees of freedom in end points.
(**) These are the observations used to compute the regression of
slope (and std. slope) against real rates.
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3.2. Interest rate elasticity and financial repression.
The next-step in the exercise is to put together the results of table
3.1 and 3.2, that is, to get a sense of the relation between the average
real interest rate and the elasticity of savings to interest rates.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 in the next page show a plot of two measures of
this elasticity and the real return of domestic financial instruments (the
source is table 3.2; in the cases where the sample for a country was
partitioned, the values plotted include both sub-samples and omit the
result of the complete sample. To indicate which observation was used it
was marked (**)). The variable, called slope, is the reported value of
the interest rate coefficient in equation (12). The other, called stan-
dard, normalizes these coefficients dividing them by their corresponding
standard errors - in other words we are using the t-statistics-.
The null hypothesis of a Laffer-curve shaped savings function (figure
3.3) would not be rejected if the correlation between real interest rate
and its elasticity is negative. This is apparently the conclusion we
would reach by looking at figures 3.1. and 3.2.
We could also run a regression to see if this correlation is signif-
icantly less than zero. Using OLS we obtain the following results for
which we have 35 degrees of freedom (because in some cases there is more
than one observation per country).
SLOPE - -0.0021 - 0.001901 TIRR N-37 (13)
(-1.31) (-4.319) R2 -.354
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STANDARDIZED
SLOPE -.25971 - 0.3038 TIRR N-37 (14)
(-1.08) (-4.79) R2 -.403
Although this could not be expected to provide a general recipe to be
applied to any country, we could get a notion of what we could call
"optimal financial repression": that is, the value of the real interest
rate that maximizes domestic savings to GNP which happens where either the
standardized or plain slopes are equal to zero.
From equation (13) we arrive at an optimal rate of -1.1% and using
(14) to a rate of -0.85X.
In section 2, we have a model which stresses the role of income
distribution and labor market rigidities to arrive to a backward-bending
savings function. It would be interesting here to see if there is some
evidence supporting this causal relation.
The empirical counterpart of the concepts used in the model is
difficult to obtain and we will need to rely on some proxies. Following
the logic of section (2) we could think that the more concentrated is
income the smaller (less positive o more negative) will be the interest
rate elasticity of savings.
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Finally, and in order to avoid the problem of omitted variables, we
could introduce some demographic variables which convey the ideas of the
permanent income hypothesis such as the rate of population growth, and
some indication of.the degree of economic development by per-capita GNP.
For the next equations it was necessary to define some variables.
INCODI Is a proxy for income distribution. It intends to reflect
the proportion of income earned by workers with a perment
income high enough to generate savings. This variable is
the fraction (in percents) of total National Income earned
by the third and
fourth quintils. Source: World Bank.
INTERA Is an interaction term. The result of multiplying INCODI
times the real interest rate.
POPUL Rate of population growth. Source: World Bank.
PERCAP Per-capita GNP in dollars. Source: IMF.
Using these concepts, together with the previously defined SLOPE and
STAND (Standardized Slope) we obtained table 3.3.
What this regressions reveal is that there is an important interac-
tion between income distribution and the response of the interest rate
elasticity to the level of real interest rate.
The Ubraries
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A way of interpreting the sign of the coefficient of INTERA is that
STAND and ELAST will be more likely to decline after an interest rate
increase the larger the participation of these intermediate quintils in
total GNP. A reason for this is that the larger this middle class more
important is the fraction of total investment financed from savings of
non-capitalists, making the cost effect of changes in the interest rate to
have a significant contractionary effect on capitalists income and
savings. On the other hand, if the middle class is small, most capitalist
investment will be of the form of self-financing and the interest rate
will play only a minor role in income distribution.
Table 3.3. Effects of Income Distribution on the Interest Rate
Elasticity of Savings.
C TIRR INCODI INTERA POPUL PERCAP
STAND 6.17 1.03 -.107 -0.040 -.931 -.0003 .570
(1.19) (0.81) (-0.80) (-1.73) (-2.00) (-1.18)
2.14 0.96 -0.038 -.754 -.0003 .550
(1.74) (0.76) (-1.69) (-1.85) (-1.34)
2.02 -.0094 -.808 -.0003 .542
(1.77) (-3.94) (-2.04) (-1.14)
ELAST.010 -6.1D-5 -.003 -1.8D-6 .448
(1.15) (-3.58) (-1.52) (-0.92)
.0002 -7.4D-5 -5.8D-5 -.003 -1.8D-6 .452
(0.75) (-0.04) (-1.49) (-1.49) (-0.52)
* These regressions were run with 26 observations, because information on
income distribution was not available for all countries in the sample.
Remember that there may be more than two observations per country.
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4. Concluding Remarks.
In this essay it was found that there is international evidence sup-
porting the notion of a backward bending saving function.
It was suggested that a reason for this could be found income
distribution: an increase in the interest rate means higher opportunity
cost of present consumption to non-capitalist and an additional cost for
capitalist. Depending on the relative weight of each sector and the level
of the real interest rate is it possible to have aggregate savings to go
down with a financial liberalization.
The fact of a backward bending savings function suggests an optimal
rate to maximize savings as a fraction of GNP. It was found that for the
sample chosen some degree of interest rate repression could bring us to
this optimal level.
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APPENDIX.
The idea of this section is to complement some of the results we have
already obtained.
In terms of the model in section (2), it would be interesting to see
if we can say something about the response of financial deepening to the
increase in real returns.
The idea is that, although financial liberalization is expected to
increase financial intermediation it may not do the same to aggregate
savings.
The testable hypothesis that comes from the model in this respect, is
that the interest rate elasticity of deepening will remain positive for a
much ample of real returns compared to the elasticity of savings; al-
though, the same as the slope of the savings function, will decline with
rising interests.
A.1. The regressions.
We proceed in the same way as in the empirical section of the paper.
First running regressions for each country of the form:
DEEP - B+B 1TIME+B2 GNP+B3TIRR
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Appendix page 2.
Table A.1. Estimates of the Response of Financial
Return on Banking Instruments.
Deepening to the Real
Country and Sample
Malaysia
1955-1986
1975-1986
South Korea
1955-1986
1975-1986
Sri-Lanka
1955-1985 (a)
1955-1977 (b)
1978-1985
Singapore
1955-1986
1976-1986
Coefficient.
(t-statistic)
R2
.000077
(0.447)
.920
0.00031
(0.865)
0.00178
(1.19)
.863
0.0008
(1.369)
0.00173
(1.41)
0.00498
(0.98)
.498
.560
0.0023
(1.54)
0.00223
(1.396)
.979
0.00277
(1.067)
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Appendix Page 3.
Table A.1. Continued.
Philippines
1955-1985 (c)
1955-1972 (b)
1975-1985
Pakistan
1955-1985
0.0013
(2.09)
0.00176
(1.190)
.439
.501
0.00078
(1.68)
0.00163
(1.03)
.538
Thailand
1955-1986 (d)
Morocco
1955-1979
1980-1985
0.000515
(1.451)
0.000794
(0.734)
.889
.878
0.000570
(1.276)
Greece
1955-1974
1975-1984
0.0138
(0.77)
.00309
(1.134)
.965
Colombia
1955-1973
1974-1986
-0.00004
(-.10)
.521
0.000101
(0.438)
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Table A.1. Continued.
South Africa
1960-1978
1978-1985
0.00164
(0.662)
.774
0.00501
(-0.05)
Kenya
1957-1972
1973-1984
0.00154
(0.457)
0.00183
(1.241)
.917
Portugal
1960-1979
1980-1985
0.00049
(0.194)
.875
0.0012
(1.784)
Zambia
1957-1985
India
1955-1986 (e)
1955-1973
1975-1986
Costa Rica
1955-1986 (f)
-0.00031
(-.283)
0.00182
(2.425)
0.00211
(2.814)
0.000781
(1.710)
0.00022
(0.377)
.769
.850
.876
.585
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Table A.1. Continued.
Guatemala
1955-1972
1973-1985
0.00193
(0.668)
.888
0.00389
(2.925)
Ecuador
1955-1970
1970-1984
0.000081
(0.434)
0.000116
(0.285)
.531
Spain
Peru
1955-1986 (g)
1955-1973
1974-1985
0.00058
(0.31)
0.0009
(1.082)
.831
.557
0.0018
(2.19)
Turkey
1960-1985 (a)
1960-1975 (b)
1976-1985
0.00094
(4.73)
0.00005
(0.748)
.700
.763
0.00099
(1.94)
Jamaica
1955-1986 (e) 0.00231
(1.432)
.404
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Table A.1. Continued.
Mexico
1955-1971
1972-1986
Venezuela
1955-1986
0.000488
(0.167)
0.00264
(1.994)
(a)
1955-1972 (b)
1973-1986 (**)
Ivory Coast
1957-1985
0.00035
( 0.19)
-0.00004
(-0.104)
0.00183
(2.12)
(**) 0.00158
(0.972)
.788
.681
.701
.860
Notes same as in table 3.2.
The same as in section (3) we could run a regression of the slope of
financial deepening (SLOPEDEEP) on interest rates and income distribution
variables.
Using the same definitions as in the paper (a):
SLOPEDEEP - .0007213 - .000093 TIRR + .000043 INCODI
(1.23) (-1.79) (1.69)
R2 .372 N - 37
(a) In this exercise INCODI includes people from the second to the
fourth percentile. The coefficient of INCODI gives a t-statis-
tic of only .76.In that case the coefficient for TIRR is
-.000081 with a t of 1.71.
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Part IV.1
CAPITAL FLIGHT AND INCOMPLETE-FINANCIAL MARKETS:
TWO MEXICAN STORIES
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CAPITAL FLIGHT AND INCOMPLETE FINANCIAL MARKETS:
TWO MEXICAN STORIES'
Introduction.
The Mexican financial markets have been closely linked to the United
States in such a way that speculative capital movements and dollarization
have played a prominent part in the recent monetary experience of Mexico.
For many years now, deposits in the U.S. banks and other dollar
denominated saving instruments of the American financial system represent
an easy to reach shelter against fluctuation in the exchange rate of the
peso.
Starting in the early 1970's, as a result of a change in the economic
policy, there have been several episodes of capital flight. In the
beginning they were of short duration and of moderate size. It is not
until 1981 that the problem begins to call the attention of policy makers
when, in a matter of a few months, between 6 and 16 billion dollars flew
from Mexico inducing a huge real exchange rate collapse and left the
economy with an additional burden of foreign debt.
The dollarization and capital flight of 1981 brought up several
questions about the determinants of the size and the speed with which
events took place, but especially from the fact that most capital flight
was financed with private external borrowing. Then, we had at the same
time capital moving out, via portfolio decisions of maximizing agents and
coming in through additional borrowing of presumably maximizing commercial
1This note is intended to serve as an introduction to the next
section. It contains some basic information about the structure and
reforms of the Mexican financial system that is known later on.
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banks and private firms.
This essay looks for an answer to this question in the institutional
characteristics of the Mexican financial system. The hypothesis is that
the coincidence of a very specialized banking sector which saving instru-
ments paid rates of return regulated by the Central Bank and a very
underdeveloped non-banking financial sector limited the capacity of
response of the system to external shocks (i.e. terms of trade shocks),
making possible simultaneous capital flight and private borrowing by means
of a process essentially unstable.
To test this proposition we will benefit from the fact that the 1983-
1984 financial reform allows us to compare the performance of the Mexican
economy when facing external shocks (such as negative oil shocks of 1981
and 1986) under substantially different institutional arrangements, giving
us some sense of the role of financial repression on the dynamics and
repercussions of capital flight.
1. The Mexican Financial System (1970-1986)1
After 1971, the scenario of stability that characterized the Mexican
economy was abandoned in favor of high inflation and rates of growth in
aggregate demand. The financial system was not flexible enough to adapt
to the new circumstances. Between 1970 and 1982 it was very rigid and
specialized. Commercial and Development Banks were just about the only
intermediaries whereas money and capital markets were practically inexis-
tent. The saving instruments offered by the banking sector were peso
denominated and paid a nominal (passive) rate determined by Banco de
Mexico without regard to short term fluctuations in the conditions of
domestic and international credit markets. On the other hand, most
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government borrowing takes place by means of what is known as 'encaje
legal' which imposed on commercial and development banks the obligation to
lend the government a predetermined amount at fixed rate by Banco de
Mexico. There were not such things as Treasury Bills.
After abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime in 1976 it became
apparent that some steps towards an integral reform of the system were
necessary. Some modernization started in the last months of 1977, but the
experience if 1981 proved it to be too little and to have come too late.
The first innovation came in October of 1977 with the creation of the
'petrobono'. It was a Federal government bond whose value is indexed to
the dollar value of a certain quality of crude oil. A secondary market
for this instrument developed but the amounts of successive issues were
very limited. By the end of 1980 petrobonos represented a little less
than one percent of the major money aggregate and this share decreased to
.5 percent in 1982.
In January of 1978, the Federal government issued the first Certifi-
cates of the Federal Treasury (CETES) which had the purpose of giving the
government direct access to the money market and to provide the Central
Bank, for the first time with an instrument that enabled it to perform
open market operations. At first CETES were offered to the public at a
fixed discount rate because of the reluctance on the part of the authori-
ties to allow the market to determine interest rates. Again a secondary
market was permitted but with the central bank intervened it continuously.
By mid 1982 CETES were less than 3 of M5. The first movement towards an
instrument with freely determined returns occurred in October of 1982 when
market oriented auctions for CETES began.
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An authorization for a limited issue of Banker's acceptances was
released in November of 1980. It allowed banks to obtain at market
determined terms and rates for an amount which could not exceed 10% of
their capital (this was less than 300 million dollars in December 1981).
By the end of 1982 this represented less than .5 percent of M5.
After the 1982 crisis, the Mexican economy faced the burden of a huge
debt, the lack of foreign credit resources, insufficiency of domestic
savings and for the first time a three digit inflation. Then the change
in the way markets operated was imperative. The De la Madrid Administr-
ation promoted major reforms to the Central Bank Law, the General Law of
Insurance Companies and the Law of the Stock Market. The most obvious
consequences of these reforms were the diversification in the operations
and instruments of the banking system; the changing role of Banco de
Mexico which ceases to act as an intermediary between the Federal govern-
ment and financial institutions, the creation of bank deposits insurance
institution and, most important of all the development of a more complete
and active money market as the new legislation relaxed most regulations
limiting the issue and trading of non-banking financial assets.
The area where less progress has been achieved has to do with the
return of banking instruments which is still determined exogenously by
monetary authorities.
Among non-banking instruments CETES and bankers acceptances were the
more dynamic. The first explained by the borrowing needs of the public
sector and the second by the combination of a repressed banking sector
which this time can rely on the issue of this new instrument with its
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Diversification of the Mexican Financial System
Instrument
Petrobono
Characteristics
Created in November of 1977. Operated in a
secondary market with freely determined rates
since its creation.
Created in January 1978 as a three month
instrument. Discount rate fixed and limited
issues until 1982. Beginning of the auction
system for market determination of rates in
August 1982 when the 28 day emission starts.
Bankers Acceptances
Commercial Paper
Pagare Empressarial
Bursatil
Pagafe
Pagare Bancario (CD)
Created in April 1981. Issues limited to 10%
of capital of banks (meant a maximum of 300
million dollars). Limits relaxed and first
operated in the stock market in September 1984.
Created in October of 1980. First operated in
the stock market in September 1984.
Created and first operated in the stock market
in April, 1986.
Dollar indexed bond. First operated in the
stock market in August, 1986.
Created and first operated in the stock market
in April 1984.
CETE
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money market determined returns to prevent further erosion of its penetra-
tion. By the end of 1985 bankers acceptances rose from .5 percent to 4
percent of total credit in the system, while total non-banking instruments
passed from 4 percent to 15 percent in less than three years. As we will
see the institutional characteristics of the financial markets determine
decisively the extent of the effects of external shocks on the economy.
For instance, an economy with incomplete credit markets, as it was the
case in Mexico in 1981, will make the banking sector very vulnerable to
capital flight as there is no way to keep the levels of banking penetr-
ation when interest rates are regulated and at the same time an external
disequilibrium makes expected depreciation positive and high. Besides,
when a huge government deficit is mostly financed via 'encajes', then
terms of trade shocks which also affect the budget will force further
external borrowing on the part of commercial banks, and do nothing to stop
capital flight as there is no way in which this increase of total borrow-
ing requirements is translated into changes in the rate of return of
domestic assets. In this kind of world, things tend to happen fast and to
feedback on themselves making the process unstable: the rate of expected
depreciation causes capital flight, which itself is financed with addi-
tional foreign debt which will require of a larger depreciation to be
serviced once the exchange rate is freed, closing with this the vicious
cycle.
On the other hand, when the system has more diversified and less
regulated credit markets, it is more difficult to have capital flight as
response to an external shock, unless the monetary authority intervenes to
peg the 'equilibrium' interest rate. Here, if capital flight occurs it
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will not go accompanied of additional external borrowing, unless it is the
Central Bank which is borrowing abroad.
2. A simple model.
Let us see first the case when there is a missing market for bankers'
acceptances. To do that assume that this economy has banks as the only
financial intermediaries. They lend to the government and to the private
sector. The amount of loans outstanding is assumed given in the exercise.
Banks get their resources from demand deposits of the public 'd' and
borrowing abroad 'f'. Their accounting identity is
c -d + f (1)
c - cO1
Private portfolios have either peso deposits 'd' or dollar assets in the
U.S. market 's'. Peso deposits pay a predetermined (repressed rate i and
s pays i + where is the rate of expected depreciation). Starting
from a fixed exchange rate regime we could normalize the problem setting e
- 1 and total initial wealth (in this case given by initial total credit)
also equal to one.
d + s-l 1 (2)
s/d - h (3)
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The rate of expected depreciation has two components: the size of the
real exchange rate appreciation (e* - e / e) and the probability of
transition to the new exchange rate '' which is the one step transition
probability in a Markov process. In this simple exercise it is assumed
constant, although in an economy where external borrowing is possible it
could be more reasonable to imagine it depending on the size of total
foreign debt relative to a maximum debt that can be serviced by the export
potential of the country. At each
i* (b + f) 2 where
time the equilibrium exchange rate is given by e - ( f) 2 where 
is the inverse of the exchange rate elasticity of net exports and P* is
the price in dollars of national exports. The terms of trade are given by
i*/p* .
i* b+f 1 ] (4)
p 1]
where b is the public foreign debt.
Now we can see the impact of a terms of trade shock. The equilibrium
condition is described in figure 1. If we set the initial condition to be
£* b
r - 1 the equilibrium is given by s - 0 and f - 0. It is though
P 
possible to have another equilibrium if and only if the slope of the D
schedule (which is the result of substituting (3) and (4) in (2)) is
greater than one when f - s - 0.3 This is the situation when the very
expectation of an exchange rate depreciation is self-fulfilling as capital
flight increases external debt and with it the actual depreciation
required to equilibriate the current account. To keep things simple
consider the case when there is only one equilibrium. The 45 degree line
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is given by the balance sheet identity of the banking system. A terms of
trade shock is represented by an increase of i/P* which moves the DD
schedule up and to the left and also the schedule of expected depreciation
in the lower diagram.
f
e'(i*/p*' > i*/p)
Figure 1.
!
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As a result of the external shock capital flight happens. People
take out As' dollars which are financed Af' dollars borrowed by commercial
banks from the rest of the world. We can distinguish two components in
the reaction of capital flight and expected depreciation. The terms of
trade shock 'per se' justifies a portfolio shift from A to s, but this is
financed with additional debt Af which in turn increases expected depreci-
ation provoking more capital flight. After this process is completed
expected depreciation will be given by Ae' instead of AB which corresponds
to the depreciation needed to correct the balance of payments if capital
flight did not take place.
Let us see now what happens if there is a free market for bankers
acceptances. This instrument can be thought to be a close substitute of
dollar denominated assets, from the standpoint of the public. This is
equivalent to assume that they pay a rate equal to the interest on U.S.
deposits plus the rate of epected depreciation. If this is the case
banks will never go for foreign borrowing (which is the cost of the prime
rate rather than the deposit rate plus the rate of expected depreciation).
The Accounting identity of the banks is given by
Co-a+ p 0 . (1')c 0 - 1, -0
The wealth constraint of agents a + d + s - 1 plus the assumption of 'a'
and 's' being perfect substitutes together with (1') makes s - 0 in
equilibrium, which means no capital flight.
s + a/d - a/d - h (3')
a/(1 - a) - fi
and again the rate of expected depreciation depends on the current account
disequilibrium.
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e - 'r b 1 ]
H
e
af=
a'
f
i
e >i*/p*
->ij/p )
Figure 2.
The upper right diagram in figure 2 shows the condition by which
banks will always prefer to issue acceptances to borrow abroad. The upper
left diagram show is the demand for interest non-banking saving instru-
ments as a function of the expected rate of depreciation under the
assumption of them paying i + (perfect capital mobility). The lower
left diagram is the same as in figure 1.
(4')
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A deterioration in the terms of trade increases expected depreciation
moving people away from interest regulated banking instruments and buy
acceptances Aa'. This portfolio operation by its own nature does not
affect external borrowing and consequently does not have an additional
impact on expected depreciation which stays AB.
It is apparent from this simple exercise that missing financial
markets can make a big difference. When banks face a flexible credit
market, even if their rates on their deposits are regulated, there is a
way to make the external shock be felt, and somehow absorbed, via changes
in interest rates stopping then capital flight and the final adjustment
less severe.
These two examples are different not only in terms of the initial
impact of the exogenous shock, which is what figures 1 and 2 illustrate,
but also with respect to the future dynamics. When markets are missing
the newly contracted debt will have to be rolled over (as well as the
fraction of outstanding debt which cannot be serviced any more by exports
because its price fell) until the exchange rate adjusts. If that is the
case then, after the first portfolio adjustment (after the first chunk of
capital flight As' leaves) additional flows will continue which will again
feedback in expectations and additional capital flight. To illustrate the
point take
f - i*f + (1'')
from (3)
e- (i*.P*)f/ (3'')
and s/l-s - he (2)
solving one can see that borrowing will always increase faster than the
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interest rate, especially during-the first phases of dollarization (when s
is small).
f 1- (1 is)h 
P7 p
In contrast, in the case of more diversified financial markets the
current account deficit is financed by what we might call 'capital return'
which is nothing else but additional direct foreign investment. As a
result f remains constant. Interest rates (and the rate of expected
depreciation) will also stay at the levels reached after the initial
shock. Consequently, the introduction of a new market not only reduces
the effects of the initial impact but also eliminates the explosive
behavior of capital flight and external borrowing that follows.
3. Two Mexican Stories.
Since 1978 the most important component of Mexican exports has been
oil. Consequently a great deal of its recent trade and monetary ex-
perience can be linked to the dynamics of international oil prices. In
the last ten years Mexico has been hit by two negative oil shocks. The
first one in 1981 when it was realized that reserve accumulation and
conservation efforts in industrialized countries would effectively mean
stagnant rather than fast increasing prices. The second in 1986 when the
value of Mexican oil sales dropped almost 50 percent as the price of a
barrel went well below 10 dollars and stayed there for most of the year.
In both cases the Mexican monetary authorities do not go for an
immediate maxi-devaluation allowing people perceive, from the time of
shock on, an additional return on dollar denominated assets.
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The Mexican Economy
Inflation GDP Growth Public Deficit/ Current Acc/
GDP GDP
1980 29.8% 8.3X 6.8% -5.3%
1981 28.7 7.9 13.6 -7.1
1982 98.8 -0.5 16.2 -3.7
1983 80.8 -5.3 8.5 4.7
1984 59.2 3.7 7.3 2.7
1985 63.7 2.8 8.4 0.4
1986 105.7 -3.8 15.2 -1.0
Source: Banco de Mexico, Indicadores Economicos.
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Capital Flight, Terms of Trade and Financial Structure
Capital Flight Non-Banking Oil Price Real exchange
(1) (2) Instruments/M4 (1978-100) (1981.01-100)
1979 4 038 3 676 .005 143.1 121.5
1980.3 6 236 3 510 .027 183.1 104.3
.4 7 408 3 550 .026 196.1 102.1
1981.1 7 722 4 390 .046 261.2 98.8
.2 11 741 5 405 .045 252.8 98.4
.3 13 768 6 431 .047 244.3 97.6
.4 16 001 7 279 .039 243.8 95.8
1982.1 16 776 7 831 .050 230.8 157.4
.2 16 982 8 771 .041 222.6 136.7
.3 19 207 9 660 .070 230.8 155.9
.4 23 486 8 207 .087 223.1 188.4
1983 25 941 10 737 .113 209.3 178.5
1984 26 865 12 909 .121 195.0 151.5
1985.3 28 054 14 028 .154 190.5 193.9
.4 28 998 14 091 .156 192.5 205.3
1986.1 28 678 13 500 .190 109.4 186.2
.2 29 408 13 461 .240 103.2 210.1
.3 29 209 13 510 .260 96.2 210.3
.4 28 548 12 980 .285 96.1 206.4
All values are at the end of the period.
(1) Cumulative errors and omissions in millions of U.S. dollar.
1970 - 0.0
(2) Liabilities of U.S. banks to residents of Mexico. Source U.S.
Treasury Bulletin
Non banking Instruments include Cetes, Bankers acceptances, Petro-
bono, Pagafe, Commercial paper, Pagare empressarial bursatil and
Pagare bancario.
Sources. Oil price index SPP. Monetary information and Balance of
Payments. Banco de Mexico.
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It is interesting to see that in spite of the fact that the 1981 and
1986 shocks have the same origin they had very different aftermaths. For
instance, the delay in the exchange rate adjustment of 1981 was followed
by a huge capital flight and heavy public and private external borrowing
ending with a maxi-devaluation. On the other hand, the apparently more
serious terms of trade shock of 1986 was mostly reflected in higher
interest rates; capital flight not only did not occur but there was some
capital return and the exchange rate could happen gradually without the
size and chaotic overtone of a maxi-devaluation.
The reason for this difference could be in the financial system. In
the first scenario the lack of a non-banking financial sector with market
determined interest rates made it impossible to stop capital flight and
translated it into foreign debt. In the second case a more developed
credit market allowed the fiscal disequilibrium and the portfolio shift
out of banking instruments to have an impact on interest rates stopping
capital flight leaving a lighter burden on the banking system.
3.1. The 1981 story.
After two years of fast growing oil prices the first signs of trouble
appeared in early march of 1981 when they had their first small decline.
In spite of this change in the future profile of foreign exchange (and
government) revenues, imports (mostly public) continued increasing at
their previous rates. The result was a rapid deterioration of the balance
of payments. The current account deficit which had been 2.6 billion
dollars in 1981.1 reached 3.6 billion in 1981.2 and 5.2 billion the next
quarter.
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Logically people began to anticipate an exchange rate adjustment.
Nevertheless passive interest rates on instruments of the banking sector
remained practically constant even as the probability of a collapse and
the size of the exchange rate correction necessary to bring the balance of
payments back in order increased.
Interest Rates of Saving Instruments
of the Banking System
Time Deposits Deposits with preset
30 days 90days withdrawal dates (2 days/week)
1980.3 16.81 18.20 14.8
.4 25.20 23.25 19.6
1981.1 25.31 24.56 20.3
.2 25.45 24.00 19.2
.3 25.98 24.19 19.2
.4 25.28 23.33 17.6
1982.1 26.86 24.91 18.5
.2 43.40 41.40 32.3
.3 45.30 42.30 33.8
.4 49.90 27.80 22.8
Annual Rates. Source. Banco de Mexico, Indicadores Economicos.
Capital flight starts in the second quarter and accelerates during
the second half of the year. Although it is difficult to get an exact
figure we could construct an interval where the lower bound is given by
the balances of Mexican citizens in U.S. banks and the upper bound by the
concept of errors and omissions in the balance of payments which includes
all private non-registered capital movements. The fact is that in 1981
and 1982 deposits in U.S banks coming from Mexico increased by 4 billion
dollars whereas cumulative errors and omissions surpassed 16 billion
dollars.
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On the other hand, the increase in the public sector borrowing
requirements put pressure on the banking system. Total resources chan-
neled to the government via 'encaje on commercial banks increased from
2.7 billion dollars in 1980 to 4.6 billion in 1982.1 and 5.5 billion in
1982.1.
The decline in the demand for banking instruments coupled with the
additional 'encaJe' had to be matched with more resources which could not
come from CD's or acceptances because their market simply was not there.
Banks had no alternative, but to stay in business, they had to borrow
abroad. This is clearly seen in the next table which shows the ratio of
domestic liabilities (saving instruments to total non-monetary liabilities
of the consolidated banking system.
Consolidated Banking Sector
Saving Instruments/External Liabilities (non-monetary)
1980 3.23
1981.1 2.74
.2 2.68
.3 2.46
.4 2.22
1982.1 1.54
.2 1.45
.3 1.38
.4 1.06
1983 1.15
1984 1.24
Calculated using balances at the end of the period from Indicadores
Economicos. Banco de Mexico.
Reviewing the capital account for 1981 and 1982 one can perceive that
bank borrowing played a crucial role.
Capital Account
(Net Inflows. Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Banking Sector (a) Non-Banking Sector
Public Private (b)
1980 3 728 2 927 3 749
1981 (total) 13 369 10 560 3 851
.1 1 174 1 317 565
.2 2 578 2 019 1 848
.3 3 738 3 039 501
.4 5 879 4 185 937
1982 (total) - 808 5 889 2 216
.1 - 231 2 017 861
.2 2 656 921 586
.3 -2 993 3 459 285
.4 -240 -508 484
Source: Banco de Mexico. Indicadores Economicos.
(a) Does not include Banco de Mexico.
(b) Direct foreign investment excluded.
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In 1981 the banking sector borrowed more than 13 billion dollars of
which around 7 billion went to development banks and helped to a large
extent, to finance the government deficit. The rest corresponded to
commercial banks and was used to cover the decline in real holdings of
banking instruments by the public and consequently to support the capital
flight.
All this process ended with a series of devaluations of the peso in
February (69%), August (45%) and December (112%) of 1982. Capital flight
which had started in the second quarter of 1981 stopped temporarily after
the first depreciation. But it resumed the next quarter as the current
account did not give clear signals of a clear improvement. The deficit in
the first two quarters of 1982 amounted nearly 7.5 billion dollars.
Errors and omissions turn to a negative sign again. This time financed
with declining reserves of Banco de Mexico: whereas the Central bank had
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accumulated reserves for more than 1 billion dollars during 1981 it lost
the same amount in the second quarter of 1982. Errors and omissions in
the second and third quarters of 1982 reached 3 billion dollars. The
final collapse comes in September when the exchange rate hits 70 pesos per
dollar. The commercial banks (in very bad shape by then due to the heavy
dollar borrowing of the year before) are nationalized and an exchange rate
control is imposed for three months.
The De la Madrid Administration takes office in December of 1982
announcing a new devaluation and a reform of the financial system.
3.2. The 1986 Story.
After three years of current account surpluses, the Mexican economy
is badly hit by a negative terms of trade shock at the beginning of 1986.
Oil prices halved making the economy go from current account surpluses of
the order of 700 million dollars to deficits of 500 million dollars a
quarter. The fall in oil revenues also affected the Federal government
which total revenues were 15% below the budgeted figures for that year.
This new crisis triggered expectations of exchange rate depreciation, but
this time there was no capital flight. Interest rates and the volume of
operation in the markets for the recently created credit instruments
increased very significantly.
The interest rate adjustment was large and fast enough. Disin-
termediation of traditional instruments is immediately compensated by a
higher circulation of bankers acceptances, especially during the first
quarter of 1986. Errors and omissions move to the surplus side in the
third quarter of 1986 (200 million dollars) and keep growing well through
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Interest Rates on Peso Denominated Instruments
Non-Banking Banking
CETES Acceptances Pagare Time Deposit
(28 days) (1 month) (1 month) (1 month)
1984 47.66 49.18 46.35 45.60
1985.3 67.24 67.93 66.12 63.12
.4 71.18 73.03 67.81 65.20
1986.1 75.98 78.36 68.68 66.10
.2 83.36 85.85 72.43 70.30
.3 98.37 98.32 87.57 83.67
.4 99.21 98.96 93.25 90.20
1987.1 92.89 94.99 . 93.25 90.20
Annual rates.
Source: Indicadores Economicos. Banco de Mexico.
Operations in the Money Market
Total Allocation of Non-Banking Instruments (a)
Total CETES Acceptances Other (b)
1984 354.4 338.5 6.9 1.8
1985.3 367.7 265.9 59.6 42.2
.4 333.6 252.9 63.5 17.2
1986.1 375.4 205.6 129.0 40.8
.2 566.8 293.3 220.9 52.6
.3 655.3 366.9 239.1 49.3
.4 609.5 379.6 184.9 45.0
1987.1 724.9 523.6 141.4 59.9
Source: Indicadores Economicos. Banco de Mexico.
(a) Consolidated. Excludes operations among Casas de Bolsa. Allocation
per unit period.
(b) Includes commercial paper, Pagare empressarial bursatil, Pagafe,
Petrobono, bonds of bankers compensation and bonds of urban renov-
ation.
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the first quarter of 1987 (650 million dollars). Dollar deposits of
Mexicans in the U.S. drop more than 1 billion dollars in the year. With
the new rules of the financial system a negative current account shock had
very different consequences. Whereas in 1981 it propelled capital flight
in a sequence of events which ended in a huge collapse, in 1986 it is
followed by non-bank capital flows which prevented the maxi-devaluation.
Concluding Remarks.
We have seen the importance of the financial structure in an economy
with perfect capital mobility. When the system is inflexible, that is,
when it is not diversified and interest rates on saving instruments
controled, terms of trade shocks will immediately translate into capital
flight, rapid reserve losses or, if it is the case, heavy foreign borrow-
ing and a sharper exchange rate collapse when the current account disequi-
librium is finally corrected.
In contrast, when the economy has a financial infrastructure that
allows interest rates to move fast in response to changes in credit
conditions, negative terms of trade shocks are covered by capital return
(as opposed to capital flight). Consequently, here the financial system
works as an absorber rather than as an amplifier of exogenous fluctua-
tions.
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Notes:
1For a good look at origins and evolution of the Mexican Financial System
see Brothers and Solis (1970), Ortiz and Solis (1979), Mancera (1979),
Bazdresch (1982). For a discussion of the most recent developments see
Gil Diaz (1988).
2 What this equation does is to specify the rate of expected depreciation
as a function of the stock of external debt. In Mexico there is some
evidence for the dependence of capital flight on total external debt. It
can be presented in three ways. The first thing to do is to perform a
Granger-Sims causality test. Using as dependent variable Mexican deposits
in the U.S. and the differential of passive rates (r-r) and the real
exchange rate as explanatory variables. The regressions are run on them
plus 4 lags and 4 future values and a contemporary value of total foreign
debt.
Granger-Sims Causality Test
Dependent Variable: Liabilities of U.S. Banks to Mexicans
Total Foreign Debt
Lagged Values Future Values df SSR/df
4 4 50 35185.14
0 4 54 65241.28
4 0 54 77947.41
F(Ho): Debt does not cause capital flight - 1.854
F(Ho): Capital flight does not cause debt - 2.215
Fc(lX) - 1.84
It is possible to reject the null hypothesis of no mutual causation.
The other alternative is to use in the regression a proxy variable
which is caused by expected depreciation but does not feedback in expec-
tation as it is the case with mex-dollar deposits in the banking system.
The 2SLS regressions presented next used the balance of payments
identity and the determinants of the trade account to make the identifi-
cation. The instruments are an index of activity, government investment,
government imports and oil prices. The dummy variable presented in the
following results is intended to capture the impact of the oil shock
having a value of one from March of 1981. Series use monthly data and the
sample goes from January 1977 to February 1982.
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3A necessary and sufficient condition for two equilibria is given by
ds hi* i* b
_ * - - 1m
df s-O q p ' p 
h 0t requires that the component of debt not sensitive to expec-
(b) is small enough.
> 1 <-> h >bdf
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Dependent Variable: CAPT (Total deposits of Mexicans in U.S. Banks)
Constant
(t-statistic)
CAPT (-1)
DEBT
Dummy*DEBT
r-r*
Real Exch.
Dummy*Real Ex.
R-squared
DW
Method
1336
(.95)
.739
(3.56)
.029
(1.65)
-35.63
(-1.62)
-40.53
(-.45)
.96
1.97
OLS
1854
(2.30)
.485
(1.65)
-.026
(-.88)
.0618
(2.15)
-25.50
(-1.19)
-8.27
(.48)
-88.5
(-2.10)
.97
1.91
OLS
859
(.58)
.617
(4.04)
.043
(2.40)
-40.46
(1.83)
2.036
(.02)
.96
1.96
2SLS
1176
(.65)
.437
(1.85)
.015
(.619)
.042
(1.86)
-19.20
(1.89)
-9.40
(1.01)
-59.0
(-1.76)
.97
1.88
2SLS
Dependent Variable: V
Constant
(t-statistic)
V (-1)
DEBT
Dummy*DEBT
r-r*
Real Exch. Rate
Dummy*Real Exch. Rate
R-squared
DW
(Mex-dollars/peso liabilities of the
banking system. Banco de Mexico is
excluded)
.0141
(1.56)
.907
(17.6)
1.0 E-6
(6.48)
-.002
(-4.73)
.0003
(0.12)
.95
1.99
.0512
(1.89)
.961
(17.4)
1.87 E-7
(0.98)
8.97 E-7
(3.87)
-.003
(-5.07)
-.0002
(0.03)
-.0025
(-1.67)
.97
1.99
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Part IV.2
DOLLARIZATION AND CAPITAL FLIGHT:
THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL REPRESSION IN THE MEXICAN EXPERIENCE
(1981-1982)
DOLLARIZATION AND CAPITAL FLIGHT.
A look at the role of financial repression in the Mexican
experience of 1981-1982
Introduction.
In 1981 and 1982 Mexico experienced a very serious episode of
dollarization. In a matter of 18 months an estimated 14 billion dollars
left the country and the dollar liabilities of the banking system to
Mexican nationals increased in more than 5 billion.
Although it has not been carefully studied, it is reasonable to
believe that this huge portfolio shift had a mayor impact on the domestic
credit market, affecting not only total financing but also resource
allocation and the needs for additional foreign borrowing on the side of
the private sector.
Understanding the dynamics of this experience requires yet to answer
some questions about the way in which the banking system reacted to
financial disintermediation, in terms of the amount of credit given as
well as with respect to the allocation of available resources in times of
rising expectation of an exchange rate collapse, in an economy where
borrowing (passive) and lending (active) rates are not fully flexible and
there is high international capital mobility.
The purpose of this paper is to present a look at the at the Mexican
dollarization experience which improves what has been said so far in two
directions: first, viewing not only at the aggregates but trying to learn
about the structural effects of capital flight such as its impact on
credit rationing and credit allocation, examining the portfolio decisions
of banks and assessing the role of mex-dollarization during the crisis.
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Second, this essay tries to present under a unified scheme, the problem of
capital flight and its financing; answering how, why and when private and
public foreign debt were recycled to the international markets.
The essay has 5 sections and several appendices where we leave the
model and all technical details. Section 2 contains the basic set of
identities which we need to estimate to have a complete picture of the
composition of capital flight and its sources of financing. Section 3
starts in these definitions disaggregating capital flight according to its
form: either coming from changes in portfolio composition of individual
agents and firms, or from firms which borrow in pesos and buy dollars or
from banks deviating resources from credit to get dollar instruments.
Section 4 looks at the dynamics and composition of capital flight finan-
cing, determining at each time how much of dollarization came from private
(bank and non-bank) foreign debt and public external borrowing. Section 5
concentrates all the results of sections 3 and 4 to give a global view of
the problem, together with some lessons and conclusions.
2. Capital Flight in Terms of Some Basic Accounting Identities.
2.1. Composition of Capital Flight. (Uses)
2.1.1. Capital Flight of Firms.
One of the most controversial questions on the Mexican case has to do
with the importance of capital flight coming from the treasuries of
private firms. The same as in the case of individuals, it is reasonable
to think that part of their portfolios would move to dollars in the advent
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of a maxidevaluation. The core of the discussion, though, comes from the
version of firms also increasing their demand for domestic credit at
repressed active rates to buy even more dollars.
Speaking in terms of a simplified balance of sources and uses we
could say that firms can employ funds from domestic and foreign credit to
either finance productive activities or for capital flight.
DOLEMP+PRODUS CREDEMP+DEXTEMP (1)
DOLEMP : dollar holdings of firms (all concepts are changes
with respect to the previous period)
PRODUS : productive uses of total resources
CREDEMP: credits from the banking system
DEXTEMP: external borrowing of private firms
To estimate the size of capital flight originated in additional borrowing
we can use a disaggregated version of equation (1) considering some
institutional characteristics of the Mexican credit market.
As active rates do not respond fast to changes in supply and demand
conditions, it is possible to expect some form of disequilibrium (dynamic)
credit rationing in times of dollarization. Consequently, we may have two
kinds of firms: those not rationed (N) for which the definition of capital
flight is:
DOLEMPN CREDEMPN -PRODUSPN (IN)
PRODUSP : Productive use of credits in pesos.
As this firms are not rationed, there is no reason for them to borrow
in dollars for not productive uses. This means that:
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O - DEXTEMP1-PRODUSDN (2)
PRODUSD : Productive uses of credits in dollars
With respect to rationed firms, they could use additional external
borrowing to cover the restrictions in the domestic market.
RESEMP DEXTEMPR-PORDUSDR (1R)
RESEMP : Foreign borrowing used to cover domestic credit rationing
We assume that rationed firms use the scarce credit in activities of
high productivity, which can be rewritten as:
o0 CREDEMPR-PRODUSPR
We finally assume that the initial dollar holdings of rationed firms
are small
DOLEMPR - (3)
Substituting (1N), (1R), (2) and (3) in (1) we obtain:
DOLEMP - DOLEMPN (DEXTEMPR-PRODUSDR) + (CREDEMP - PRODUSP)
2.1.2. Capital Flight and Resource Capturing of Banks.
In times of dollarization and capital flight banks find, on the
assets side, the alternative of lending inside the country or flying their
own funds abroad. On the liabilities side, they face financial disinter-
mediation with credit reduction and foreign borrowing. Besides, mex-dol-
larization implies an additional constraint on their portfolios as dollar
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deposits have a much higher reserve requirement. Summarizing this in
terms of an accounting identity
we have:
EL+DOLBAN+CREDEMP DISPON+DEXTBAN
EL
DOLBAN
DEXTBAN
DISPON
(4)
: Reserve requirement -Encaje Legal-
(once again all following concepts are expressed as change
with respect to the previous period)
: Dollar assets of commercial banks
: External borrowing of banks (flow)
: Liabilities of commercial banks to the public.
2.1.3. Balance Sheet of Individual Agents and the Public Sector
For individual agents, dollarization is simply understood as a change
in portfolio composition. The implied identity is:
DOLFAM - -DISPON (5)
DOLFAM : Dollar assets of individual agents (change with respect to
the previous period)
To close this system of identities we will need the government
budget.
EL+DEXTPUB = PRODUSPG+PRODUSDG (6)
DEXTPUB : Changes in the stock of foreign public debt.
PRODUSPG: Changes in domestic fiscal deficit.
PRODUSDG: Changes in the external fiscal deficit.
2.2. Financing Capital Flight. (Sources)
Identities (1N) and (4) to (6) provide the scaffolding on which we
will build along this essay. Putting them together will allow us to see
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capital flight in terms of its sources and composition (uses).
Substituting (4) to (6) on each other we arrive at an expression
which shows the six concepts we need to compute to get a complete and
integrated picture of the 1981-1982 experience:
DOLFAM+DOLBAN+DOLEMP (DEXTEMPR -PRODUSDR )+
(DEXTPUB-PRODUSD) -PROD USPG (7)
(DEXTBAN-PRODUSP)
The right hand side of (7) shows how the burden of capital flight is
distributed among sectors.
First, take the private sector which may be forced to borrow to
cover for the credit rationing. When they borrow abroad these resources
enter the financial system and are converted into pesos. The central bank
receives these new dollars and issues more pesos covering the decline in
domestic credit. But private firms 'may not compensate in full the credit
reduction. If that is the case both, banks and the government will start
having some pressures.
As disintermediation advances the funds fiscal authorities used to
get from Encaje Legal begin to shrink and the only way to cover them is
either reducing the domestic deficit or borrowing additional funds abroad
(other form of domestic borrowing is not well developed before 1982). The
second row of expression (7) can be interpreted as the fraction of public
foreign debt used to finance capital flight.
Banks could use foreign credit to finance a domestic credit expan-
sion, in which case this extra dollars are reflected in the international
reserves of the central bank. The difference between bank external
borrowing and credits they give and are used in productive activities
represents the fraction of bank borrowing induced by capital flight. In
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fact, the term in the third row of expression (7) which is the expansion
of bank external borrowing not explained by additions to productive uses,
shows the fraction of capital flight financed by banks.
Expression (7), besides giving a global view at the problem, suggests
a more analytical methodology for capital flight measuring, besides the
common approach of taking simply errors and omissions. Here one looks
instead to the credit markets and not only to balance of payments avail-
able information.
In the next two sections we try to get a series for each one of the
three forms of capital flight and each of the three sources of financing,
leaving to the last section the analysis of the results and the comparison
of these estimates with the numbers one would obtain by simply looking at
the balance of payments.
3. Decomposing Capital Flight.
Following section 2 we may consider three forms capital flight
depending on the agent who takes action: firms, individual agents and
commercial banks.
3.1. Credit Allocation, Credit Rationing and Capital Flight of Firms.
As it has been said, firms could support their capital flight by
simply changing the composition of their portfolios or by borrowing at a
low active rate in the domestic market and buying dollars with those
additional resources. In what follows, when we talk about capital flight
of firms we will be referring only to this second form of dollarization,
whereas the first will be considered indistinguishable from capital flight
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of individual agents.
Before getting to the numbers, we should think a little about the
rationale for why it could be possible for firms to get credits to finance
capital flight (or, which is the same, why would banks lend them).
Although we haven yet proved that this actually happened, there are
reasons to consider the possibility. As a matter of fact, at the critical
times of dollarization and capital flight there was the widespread belief
among government officials that important amounts of funds channeled
through the credit system were in fact used for capital flight. Some of
them, including president Lopez Portillo, even accused commercial banks of
inducing their clients to accelerate the capital flight.
A simple model of an optimizing banking system described in appendix
A has some of the elements, I think, could determine credit allocation in
an environment of capital flight and an expected maxi-devaluation.
This model stands on two basic ideas : banks may ration credit
because they can not discriminate completely among credit users; banks do
not engage in a massive capital flight of their own funds for institution-
al and market reasons (The institutional reason I have in mind has to do
with the tensions between the government and commercial banks between 1981
and 1982 which ended up with their expropriation: open capital flight of
banks had to be limited. A hysterisis reason, which has received some
attention in the Mexican debate, has to do with the idea that banks would
prefer to keep domestic credit even if they can fly from pesos, in order
to keep market shares. (See Ize (1980)).
In this model, which basic notions come from the ideas of credit
rationing in Jafee and Modigliani (1969) and Jafee (1971), we imagine a
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representative bank which has a given amount of liabilities for which it
pays a given passive rate. On the other side, the demand it faces is
formed by groups of firms. Each group has a number of firms which
projects have a stochastic outcome depending on the state of nature. Each
group can be indexed by its expected return, whereas all groups have the
same coefficient of variation. Banks can discriminate firms between
groups but not within the group. The active rate is regulated and is
unique, consequently the decision variable of banks is the quantity of
credit they give to each group. A bank gets the regulated active rate in
the good state of nature and the minimum of the active rate and the return
of the project in the bad state. Banks and firms are risk neutral.
The initial equilibrium has credit rationing because of the usual
reasons: as the distribution of returns is truncated at the level of the
active rate, the expected return for banks does depend on the variance of
returns within each group. Given the structure of the problem banks will
lend only to clusters of firms with the highest expected returns and
ration groups which, in spite of having firms with expected returns above
the active rate mean an expected loss for banks (implicit in the model
there is a cost of administering the loan).
The possibility of an exchange rate collapse changes the equilibrium
in different ways. Banking intermediation tends to go down as people
changes liabilities of the banking system for dollars. Banks may not
reduce credit in the same proportion and even borrow or reduce free
reserves, to the extent that they see a cost of a lost market share. As
the rate of expected depreciation increases, they begin rationing credit
and eventually start to fly abroad their own loanable funds.
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With respect to credit allocation there is an incentive to lend to
groups where there are firms which will buy dollars. The reason is that
capital flight is just another project from the standpoint of firms and
banks. As the event of a maxi-devaluation is more imminent, capital
flight is perceived as a project with higher return and less variance.
From the perspective of commercial banks, between two clusters of firms
with the same expected return they will prefer those which will dollarize
because, reducing the variance for firms increases the expected return for
banks. In this way as intermediation happens we can see aggregate
rationing but also an important change in the allocation of credit in
favor of sectors which will use at least part of the funds to buy dollars.
Leaving the rest of the details for the Appendix, we could go ahead
looking at the Mexican experience.
First thing to do is to test, based on information of the credit
market, for this kind of capital flight.
To know how strong was the incentive on the side of firms to borrow
in pesos to buy dollars one needs to know how repressed the active
(lending) rate was. A measure of this is given by the difference between
the active lending rate and the interest rate of dollar instruments plus
the rate of expected depreciation implicit in the futures market.
Figure 3.1 shows the monthly active effective rate and the sum of one
month rate of expected depreciation and the monthly return of one month
U.S. Treasury Bills. It calls the attention how active rates lagged
behind the return of dollars in the second semester of 1981 and the second
and third quarters of 1982, opening wide the possibility of firms devia-
ting credit to buy dollars.
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Passive rates lagged even more causing capital flight and mex-dol-
larization which tended to reduce available funds for credit. As will be
seen latter, the conjunction of banking disintermediation and inflexible
of active rates, provoked intervals of aggregate credit rationing to some
segments of the market, as well as financing the capital flight of others.
To get some a sense of the orders of magnitude on how much credit was
deviated to capital flight and the extent of rationing, we will need to
estimate a model of the credit market. Leaving the details about the
techniques to estimate markets in disequilibrium to Appendix B and on the
particular specification used, we could start looking at some numbers.
Table 3.1. Supply, Simulated Demand and Excess Demand for
Credit to the Private Sector (hundred million of 1978 pesos)
Credit Supplied Credit Demanded Excess Demand
(net rationing)
1981
jan 34 961 35 107 146
feb 34 733 35 060 327
mar 35 403 35 419 16
apr 36 901 36 018 -73
may 36 002 36 120 118
jun 37 046 36 932 -114
jul 37 505 37 434 -71
ago 37 164 37 146 -18
sep 37 196 36 642 -554
oct 37 774 37 079 -661
nov 37 595 36 780 -815
dec 38 740 37 084 -1 656
1982
Jan 37 036 35 818 -1 218
feb 35 089 35 269 180
mar 35 252 36 227 975
apr 33 675 36 521 2 846
may 33 106 36 753 3 647
jun 32 341 37 288 4 947
jul 32 412 36 662 4 250
ago 31 990 36 840 4 850
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A positive excess demand means that, looking at aggregated credit
there is credit rationing which does not necessarily means that all
segments are rationed. On the other hand, finding the negative excess
demand can be interpreted also as the difference between total credit and
productive credit, which is evidence of resources being diverted to
capital flight.
From this exercise we can identify two distinctive periods. The
first starting in, April or May of 1981 to January of 1982 when there is a
sequence of consecutive negative excess demands, suggesting capital flight
of credit in pesos; and the second after the devaluation of February to
the date of nationalization of banks and decree of exchange controls on
September 1st where credit rationing is very severe. The problem with
this aggregate measure is that the numbers for capital flight are under-
estimated because they do not take into account changes in credit composi-
tion.
To get more precise results we have to segment the market based both,
on the concepts and definitions given in section 3.1. and the data
available.
The best way of segmenting the market is getting groups of agents
sharing common characteristics such that it is reasonable to think that
when credit rationing affects that group most agents within it are
rationed. That is, to work with groups as homogeneous as possible.
Constrained by the available information from Banco de Mexico and the
National Commission of Banking and Insurance Institutions, which finest
disaggregation is by region and type of credit we can come up with the
following five subsets of the credit market.
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Table 3.2. Partition of the Mexican Credit Market.
Credit to Enterprises Industry (1) Preferential Zones(a)
(2) Non-preferential
Non-Industry (3) Preferential Zones
(4) Non-Preferential
Credit to Individual Agents (5) Hipotecario and
prendario credit
(a) For a description of the content of each sub-group see Appendix B.
For now we can say that to generate this series it was done working
with data at the finest level of disaggregation available in Mexican
Banking Statistics.
Using the same econometric method employed in computing table 3.1. we
could estimate the excess demands for credit for each one of the segments.
Table 3.2. Excess Demand for Credit in the Private Sector.
S e g m e n t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Total
1981
feb 178.5 -7.8 171.5 7.9 -18.6 331.5
mar -703.8 392.5 -349.7 96.7 158.8 -305.4
apr -156.7 143.2 -164.7 -2.4 51.2 -129.4
may -176.7 140.1 -144.6 55.6 86.7 -38.8
jun -289.9 119.0 -312.1 90.1 184.3 -209.6
jul -476.8 253.4 -441.7 200.1 214.5 -250.5
ago -1456.4 860.7 -1003.2 412.7 497.9 -683.2
sep -1860.9 1125.4 -1800.1 899.2 855.5 -781.9
oct -1865.4 1124.3 -1837.1 997.0 996.1 -585.5
nov -2071.6 1226.2 -1751.6 1044.6 683.2 -869.2
dec -2689.5 1513.5 -2184.7 1238.3 869.8 -1252.8
1982
jan -2249.3 1231.2 -2312.1 928.0 1151.1 -1250.8
feb -695.0 1157.7 -717.6 895.6 232.0 -227.3
mar -754.0 1001.2 -499.5 819.1 847.2 1414.0
apr -410.1 1090.4 -433.2 870.4 912.1 2029.6
may -234.8 1123.5 -412.5 919.2 1212.5 2608.0
jun -197.5 1203.4 -174.9 984.6 1337.0 3153.4
jul -590.3 1623.8 -523.6 1328.6 739.2 3625.5
agu -612.5 1755.7 -598.7 1512.5 1805.6 3862.6
All numbers are in hundreds of millions of pesos of 1978.
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Roughly speaking, these demands are estimated using indicators of
economic activity and the real cost of credit as explanatory variables.
The sample space for the estimation is integrated with monthly data from
1974.01 to 1980.12, excluding periods of dollarization such as the
interval 1976.01 to 1976.10.
In the cases of segments (2), (4) and (5) there is a clear process of
rationing starting in the second semester of 1981. Negative excess
demands appear in the second quarter of 1981 and diminishes substantially
after the February devaluation, to reappear latter on but in a lesser
extent before the new exchange rate correction of September.
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The next approximation to capital flight of firms would be given by
the addition of columns (1) and (3) of table 3.2. This result can be
refined a little more, given the data we have. In terms of figure 3.2.
what has been done so far is to estimate the segment AB, but what we are
looking for is the distance DC, for which we correct the estimates of
excess demand for segments (1) and (3) at the level of the return of
dollar denominated financial instruments (see again Appendix B for
details).
Table 3.3. Capital Flight of Firms.
(1)+(3) Correction Total (a) Total (b)
from table 3.2.
1981
jun 602.0 24.2 626.2 0.485
jul 918.5 26.8 945.3 0.739
ago 2 454.6 37.7 2 492.3 1.974
set 3 661.0 46.1 3 707.1 2.942
oct 3 702.5 159.4 3 861.4 3.106
nov 3 823.2 281.1 4 104.3 3.324
dec 4 873.7 327.0 5 200.8 4.266
1982 (c)
jan 4 561.4 255.8 4 816.8 4.089
may 647.3 325.7 973.0 0.555
jun 372.1 222.9 595.0 0.353
jul 1 113.9 312.6 1 426.5 0.875
ago 1 215.1 257.2 1 472.3 0.787
(a) in hundreds of millions of pesos of 1978.
(b) billion dollars of the U.S.
(c) results from February to April are omitted because the effects of the
maxi-devaluation on the predicted values and the correction are too
large. The model is used again once the foreign exchange market has
stabilized.
3.3. Capital Flight of Individual Agents.
It is a fact that there are not precise measures of aggregate private
capital flight of families and firms because most of these operations are
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not documented. As a result one has to rely on approximations.
The most commonly used consists on taking total errors and omissions
in the balance of payments. Zedillo (1986) has proposed some improved
versions of this particular datum to eliminate some sources of overestima-
tion. For example, it is necessary to subtract imputed interests earned
by Mexican Nationals from their assets abroad because, in the Balance of
Payments accounting, they are considered to enter and then leave the
country as capital flight.
In this section we will present as capital flight of individuals the
difference between corrected errors and omissions and capital flight of
firms (from table 3.3). This is the fraction of capital flight which
comes as a result of a change in composition of an initially given
portfolio.
Table 3.4. Capital Flight of Individual Agents.
Capital Flight Corrected Errors Difference
of Firms and Omissions
1981
jun 0.485 2.798 2.313
jul 0.379 3.868 3.139
ago 1.974 3.630 1.656
sep 2.942 4.367 1.425
oct 3.106 5.104 1.998
nov 3.324 5.816 2.492
dec 4.266 8.421 4.155
1982
Jan 4.089 8.536 4.447
may 0.555 9.516 8.961
jun 0.353 10.025 9.672
jul 0.875 10.561 9.686
ago 0.787 13.368 12.581
In billion dollars of the U.S.
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3.4. Capital Flight of Banks.
Banks also diversified their portfolio moving part of their resources
to buy foreign exchange denominated assets. As it was suggested before,
banks could not engage in open and massive capital flight due both, to
regulation and the willingness of the Lopez Portillo Administration to
impose a close supervision of all bank activities, maybe for political
reasons.
Fortunately we do not need to do econometrics to get exact figures of
capital flight of banks as this type of operations are fully documented.
Table 3.5. Capital Flight of Banks. (a)
1981
jun 0.011 (b)
Jul -0.002
ago 0.041
sep -0.012
oct 0.022
nov 0.110
dec 0.227
1982
Jan 0.279
feb 0.410
mar 0.210
apr 0.165
may 0.078
jun 0.054
jul 0.082
ago 0.002
(a) Differences with respect to bank balances in foreign assets in
December 31, 1980. (Change in "disponibilidades" in foreign urren-
cy). Source:Banco de Mexico
(b) In billions of U.S. dollars.
4. Financing Capital Flight.
There have been few and very simplistic descriptions of what happened
on the financing side of capital flight, even though it plays a crucial
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role in understanding the origins of the debt crisis in Mexico.
Looking at the international reserves one concludes that a great deal
of the financing of the 1981 capital flight was supported with external
borrowing, whereas the 1982 experience was supported by a combination of
borrowing and declining reserves.
Table 4. Cumulative Change in Gross Reserves. (a)
1981
jan 0.096 (b)
feb 0.154
mar 0.884
apr 1.000
may 1.139
jun 0.337
jul 0.662
ago 1.370
sep 0.537
oct 0.388
nov 0.748
dec 1.667
1982
Jan 0.345
feb -0.167
mar 0.209
apr -0.820
may 0.326
jun -1.393
Jul -1.310
ago -1.605
(a) Cumulative Change of Gross Reserves. December 1980-0.0.
(b) Billions of U.S. dollars.
It is not that surprising to see public sector external borrowing
growing in times of capital flight as it can be puzzling to see that the
private sector debt grew very substantially in 1981 and 1982. Then, it
interesting to see, if the paradox of a private sector recycling through a
very distorted financial sector, actually took place.
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The same as in section 3 we will proceed disaggregating the informa-
tion to get a more complete sense of what happened.
4.1. Government Financing of Capital Flight.
Following the definitions in section 2., this series can be obtained
by simply looking at the uses of foreign public borrowing.
Here we will use a little more precise and operative definition:
Public Financing of Capital Flight -
Increase in Flow of External Borrowing of the Government
(includes national banks) Increase in Fiscal Deficit - Increase
in International Reserves (net) -Increase in Foreign Assets of
the Parastate Sector. (8)
Table 4.1. Government Financing of Capital Flight. (a)
1981
jun 0.274
jul 0.894
ago 0.553
sep 1.405
oct 1.027
nov 1.007
dec 1.547
1982
jan 2.034
feb 0.954
mar 3.091
apr 2.361
may 1.971
jun 2.381
jul 4.071
ago 4.581
(a) Cumulative increases of expression (8) starting on December 1980-0.0.
(b) In billion U.S. dollars.
4.2. External Borrowing of Rationed Firms.
Another possible source of capital flight financing could come from
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the private sector itself; either form commercial banks or private
enterprises.
A rationale for private firms borrowing could be found in the
presence of rationing of domestic credit: if they see external borrowing
as substitute for domestic credit they could go outside and get loans to
cover for scarce domestic credit, even if there are prospects for a
devaluation.
Appendix C explains the details on how this component is computed,
but, in general terms what is done consists on defining an equation for
external credit demand in the private non-banking sector, using observa-
tions only in times where there was not credit rationing. The component
to finance capital flight is the difference between the observed flows of
external credit and the demand for foreign credit simulated using the
observed values of the explanatory variables.
Table 4.2. Private Firm Financing of Capital Flight.(a)
1981
jun 0.015
jul -0.145
ago 0.159
sep 0.345
oct 0.945
nov 2.143
dec 2.509
1982
jan 2.614
feb 1.950
mar 0.479
apr 0.432
may 0.618
jun 1.337
jul 1.583
ago 1.713
(a) In billions of U.S. dollars.
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4.3. Commercial Bank Financing of Capital Flight.
Banks could also respond to financial disintermediation borrowing
abroad. A reason for this could be given for the impossibility for them to
adjust their portfolios as fast as other agents do: banks had to face the
reduction in deposits without being able to reduce credit at the same
speed. This meant that, at least for some time free reserves had to go
down and additional foreign credit used to cover this gap.
This last component can be estimated by differences taking total
external borrowing of banks and subtracting from it the amount of produc-
tive credit banks give to firms. The details are also in Appendix C.
Table 4.3. Commercial Bank Financing of Capital Flight (a).
1981
may -0.045
jun 0.450
jul 0.590
ago 0.670
sep 1.638
oct 2.250
nov 3.253
dec 4.453
1982
Jan 4.218
feb 4.338
mar 4.590
apr 4.987
may 5.591
jun 5.617
jul 5.923
ago 6.095
(a) In billion dollars of the U.S.
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5. A Global View at the Capital Flight Experience of Mexico (1981--
1982)
and some concluding remarks.
The intention of this section is to comment in and try to give an
interpretation to the results we got in the last two sections.
As we obtained the financing of capital flight and each one of its
components (uses) independently, it would be interesting to compare both
results.
Table 5.1 and 5.2 show both totals (sources and uses). The sum in
the uses side coincides (net of the capital flight of banks) with the
usual measures of capital flight based on balance of payments information,
whereas the results on the sources side use basically information of the
credit market.
We can see that the difference between these two approaches is not
very large. The cause for this discrepancy could come from measurement
errors as well as from differences in methodologies used in the elabora-
tion of balance of payments statistics versus credit statistics: for
example, the component of errors and omissions has all kinds of measure-
ment errors on it which do may not have a counterpart in the statistics of
the banking sector. Another cause is in the error terms in the regression
used for the simulations.
Focusing our attention on the periods immediately before the maxi-
devaluations (which took place in the third week of February and last week
of August) we get the next two columns, the first is the sum of the three
components computed in section 3. and the second column is the addition of
the three sources of financing calculated in section 4.
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Table 5.1. Capital Flight from the Balance of Payments and the Credit
Market. Period sep. 1981-jan. 1982.- (a)
Uses Sources Difference.
1981
sep 4.367 3.382 0.985
oct 5.126 4.224 0.902
nov 5.926 6.398 -0.472
dec 8.698 8.855 0.157
1982 jan 8.810 8.862 -0.052
Table 5.2. Capital Flight (cont.) -Period may-ago 1982
1982 may 9.039 8.179 0.860
jun 10.070 9.329 0.741
jul 9.762 11.565 -1.803
ago 13.362 12.386 0.976
(a) In billions of dollars of the U.S.
With all this information at hand, we can now tell the Mexican
capital flight experience from the perspective of the credit market.
We could divide the period in two parts, separated by the devaluation
of February 1982.
The 1981 capital flight took off by the end of the first semester.
Half of it is explained by what we called capital flight of individuals,
which was no other thing but portfolio shifts of individual agents and
firms. The other half is the result of the deviation of inexpensive
credit in pesos to buy dollars.
During this first phase, private firm borrowing represented an
important source of dollars. Commercial banks also borrowed heavily, but
not when the capital flight of firms increased (October and November), but
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when the capital flight of individuals strengthened (when disintermedia-
tion started).
The next phase has some clear differences. First, portfolio capital
flight is the main source of dollarization. Second, this disintermedia-
tion causes a credit rationing that affects uniformly all segments of the
market, and consequently there is no further capital flight of firms.
Third, the burden of capital flight goes to the government (loss in
reserves included) and to commercial banks. Fourth, there is no distress
borrowing in a large scale: rationed firms do not borrow large amounts
abroad.
These results help us to put together many of the stories that have
been told about capital flight: from the hypothesis of having capital
flight financed by distress borrowing, to the version that the repression
of active and passive interest rates and missing markets for CD's. The
answer would be that all these phenomena did occur, but, their importance
and dynamics changed with the conditions in the credit and foreign
exchange markets along this very interesting time in the recent Mexican
economic history.
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Appendix A
Appendix A. A Model of Credit Allocation and Capital Flight.
As it is said in the text, this model rests on some of the original
ideas in models of credit rationing by Jafee and Modigliani (1969) and
Jafee (1971).
1. The Model
Consider a continuum of clusters of firms. Each cluster has an index
z in the interval [2r,,z].
Each cluster has two firms. In cluster z one firm has a project
which pays an expected return z and the other pays z/2. Actual returns
are contingent on the state of nature. For simplicity one can take only
two equally likely states of nature.
Banks can identify clusters but can not distinguish the client within
the cluster, then, when a credit is given they do not know exactly to
which project the resources are being channeled.
For each project, a firm needs 1 peso. They obtain 1.25z and .625z
in the good state of nature and .75z and (3/8)z in the bad state depending
if they are the firm with the high expected return or the one with the low
return within the cluster.
The decision of the bank is weather or not lend to a given cluster of
firms 0,.5 or 1 peso. The revenue that comes from each decision in
expected value is:
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R(O,Z) - ER(O,Z) - 0
r. ER (l,z) - r. z >- r.
R(lZ) - 3 8
.5 in (r., z) + .5r ER (l.z) - .75ra + 32-z Z 3
[ 2r,
R(2,Z) - 3
min (r,, Z) ER (2,z) - 2ER
R is the revenue function in both states of nature, with the upper
row referring to the good state. Banks are indifferent between lending
one half or one peso. Then, the marginal revenue function for banks is
given by E R(2,z) (marginal in z). With respect to the cost of lending we
will assume a constant marginal cost c(z)-c.
Each bank takes total resource capturing as given, consequently the
payments they make for interest are given and treated as a fixed cost.
The slution of the equilibrium is illustrated in figure A.1. in the
horizontal axis and reading from left to right we have all clusters in the
interval [2r,,Z]. This means that for an active rate r all agents in the
market will want credit but not all of them will get it, even if there are
enough resources for them.
The marginal revenue function is interpreted moving from right to
left, as banks will start lending to those clusters which have the highest
expected return. For some range this function is flat at the level of the
active rate until reaching cluster z'-3/8 ra From then on the marginal
revenue declines. The solution is given (in the case where total loanable
funds are larger than total demand) by kinks lending to firms in the
interval [z',Z], where z' corresponds to the point where expected marginal
revenue and marginal cost are equalized.
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MC C(z)-C
Figure A.1.
Dollarization changes the setting of the problem to the extent that
buying dollars represents an additional project available to firms. This
implies not only changes in the expected value but also in the average
variance of returns perceived by firms and, consequently the expected
return for banks.
The point we want to remember is that in this kind of models,
variability is important. Here we will think that capital flight takes
place when the expected depreciation is becomes more imminent (less
uncertain) as time pazses. Assuming this ismthe case that the project of
buying dollars has a sure outcome, we now have, from the perspective of
banks the expected return will be (when the return on dollars rd>r.) ra
not only for z>3/8 r, but for z<rd/2.
In terms of figure A.2., with the possibility of dollarization the
marginal revenue schedule presents now a discontinuity. Firms with
expected return less than rd (return on buying dollars) will use their
credit in pesos to buy dollars.
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Figure A.2.
If total loanable funds are enough to satisfy total demand there will
be some rationing, but less than in the case of no-dollarization. Only
firms in clusters (rd/2,z') will not receive funds.
If there is financial disintermediation, and consequently less funds
for bank lending, there will be not only a drop in financing but also a
change in composition. If the initial supply was enough to give resources
to firms in the interval [z*,Z] and goes down to [z**,Z], all firms in the
interval [z*,z'] will be rationed; [z',z**] of them due to disintermedia-
tion and [z**,z'], as banks give preferential treatment to those clusters
where there will be capital flight to those where there are projects with
higher returns but more variability.
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Figure A.3.
To have a complete story we have to tell why, at least for some time,
banks do not engage in capital flight themselves.
The answer is further explored in Appendix C in a dynamic context,
but up to here we could speculate that market structure and lending
technology could so have something to do with the results. Namely, what
we are trying to say here is that banks may want to keep market share, and
if for some reason reduce lending today, they may find that it recovering
that presence is costly. In other words, the marginal benefit that banks
find from buying dollars may look like rd-g where g is the cost of
reducing their presence in the market.
If this is the case, the marginal revenue function for banks will
show another kink, now at the return rd-g. In the equilibrium it is
likely to fin banks lending at the same time for productive uses, to firms
buying dollars and flying dollars themselves.
Figure A.4. shows how this happens. First, as dollarization is
possible the flat portion of the marginal revenue function is extended
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including all firms in clusters in intervals [2r., rd/2 ] and [3/8 r,Z],
then comes the downward sloping segment which will include only firms in
the interval [z',z'''] where z''' is the cluster which offers banks an
expected return rd-g-c (as buying dollar is not assumed to imply a
significant transaction cost). The upper diagram shows the firms that
receive credit, assuming that there are ust enough resources to lend to
all firms [2r,,Z]. The lower diagram shows the allocation of funds by
banks between credit, capital flight financing and direct dollar buying.
Z ' z
Z
Firms that get credit
Firms rationed
Figure A.4.
rd -g+c
rd-g
r,/2
__
_w
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Appendix B
Appendix B. Estimation of Markets i Disequilibrium. An Application
to the Mexican Credit Market.
When we have markets in disequilibrium the usual methods of equation
system estimation fail. To solve this problem there have been different
approaches which are variants of regression methods widely used and
available in most statistical packages.
For instance, Amemiya (1973) interprets the disequilibrium issue in
terms of a regression analysis of truncated normal dependent variables and
suggests the use of Tobit estimation techniques. Hartley (1976) explores
more in detail the situation in which the supply is exogenously determined
and presents a version of WLS to obtain efficient estimators of demand
functions in markets in disequilibrium. Fair and Jafee (1972) and Fair
and Kelejian (1973) explain the basic intuition behind the method used in
this essay to get consistent estimates for the credit demand used for the
simulations in this essay.
1. A Simple Method of Estimation.
The demand equations estimated were obtained using a Maximum Likeli-
hood method.
We started from the idea of a credit market where the active rate is
determined exogenously (by Banco de Mexico). The system is formed by a
supply and demand equations where Xd is a vector of predetermined and
exogenous variables for the credit demand.
_ _D D
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St - et + plr t Et (B2)
XS the corresponding vector for the supply equation. Variable ra is the
active (lending) rate.
As the interest rate is not adjusted instantaneously, supply and
demand are not the same in most of the cases. Being Ct the actual
quantity observed we could write
D D S
Ct- kt(OX + r.t + ) + (l-kt)( OXt + Birat +) (B3)
where
if Ct - St
kt -
1 if Ct - Dt
If we have an idea of where the switching point is, that is, in which
sub-sample there is excess demand and in which other there is excess
supply the method of MLE is reduced to OLS. The reason is simple: lets
suppose that the sample space of T observations can be partitioned in two
subsets. The first with td observations where of excess supply and the
second with t for the case of excess demand. Assuming normality the
likelihoods for supply and demand are respectively:
(2 2,)th/2ex p[_ E St - 4t - Plrat)2] (B4)
(2iro2d)-td/2exp[ - (t - X - 1rt) (B5)
For the entire sample the likelihood function is
L - (2roa2,)'tz/2(2,rzd)'td/2exp[- , (Dt t - 1Xr.) -
1 (t -S S - p1 r.t) 2 ]
2a? Xs~ t-
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For a given sample separation, the derivatives of the log-likelihood
function give the normal equations which correspond to the OLS estimators.
Then, the problem adds up to find the partition which maximizes the
likelihood function evaluated at the OLS estimates at each partition.
This is the same as estimating supply and demand with OLS, using the
observations with excess supply to get the demand and viceversa. Then,
take the logarithm of the standard error of regression of supply and
demand and compute the weighted average of both, using as factors the
number of observations corresponding to each one. The best partition will
be the one which maximizes this weighted average.
As our sample size for estimation (observations for simulation are
not included) uses about 90 data points this makes a total of 1.2x1027
possible partitions. Obviously it is intractable to try all of them and
it makes necessary to find some criterion for the partition.
2. A Criterion for Sample Partition.
A reasonable way of attacking the problem is first to set some
partitions which may sound plausible and select the best one among them.
The method suggested by Fair and Jafee relies on price data, that is,
considers times of excess demand those where the sluggish price rises
above some trend and times of excess supply where it declines. The
problem with this procedure is that is suited more for situations where
the cause for disequilibria comes from adjustment costs. What I prefer
doing was to look at free reserves, and took as periods of excess demand
those where free reserves of the commercial banks decline below some
trend.
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As an exact series for free reserves is not available it was neces-
sary to construct a series for total reserves and required reserves. To
construct this series I first computed total reserves using information on
deposits in current account of commercial banks in Banco de Mexico and
other liquid peso denominated assets under the row of 'disponibilidades'.
To get free reserves one subtracts total and required reserves. The
required reserves information had to be calculates using information on
liabilities of the banking sector and the rates of 'encaje legal' ap-
plicable to each one of them. Figure B.1. shows the series of deviations
of total real seasonally adjusted free reserves from a trend.
Were considered plausible periods of excess demand all intervals
where these deviations were negative. The partition which gave the best
results identified as periods of excess demand: 1974.08-1974.12; 1975.10--
1976.08; 1977.01-1977.06; 1978.02-1978.03; 1979.02-1979.04. The sample
period for estimation was 1974.01-1981.01.
3. The Data. Market Segmentation.
Most, if not all, consistent information on banking statistics, is
contained in Indicadores de Moneda y Banca of Banco de Mexico and Boletin
Estadistico of the National Commission of Banking and Insurance Institu-
tions.
As it is shown in the text, we classified productive sectors in
preferential and non-preferential. This following the available disag-
gregation of total financing.
Information is available for use and geographic region to which it is
assigned. We considered preferential all credit assigned to activities in
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those areas within region IIIA and IIIB in the Global Development Plan
1977-1982, which are basically urban and developed areas (Metropolitan
Mexico City, Jalisco, Nuevo Leon, Puebla and Northern Baja California).
The explanatory variables used in the regression are a smoothed in-
dicator of the index of economic activity, a trend and the real active
effective interest rate.
The activity variable (SIVOL) comes from the Index of Manufacturing
Activity generated by Banco de Mexico. It was seasonally adjusted and
besides, it was passed through a filter consisting of centered moving
averages of amplitude six.
The real interest rate (RTIRA) corresponds to the active effective
interest rate or lending rate. It is expressed in (percent/100 per
month.)
The dependent variable is in hundreds of billions of Mexican pesos of
1978. Finally, specially in the case of credit to individuals, it was
found that there is a significant trend component.
A last thing to consider has to do with the presence of first order
auto-correlation, which could be expected in this exercise.
To solve the problem we could go modifying a little the method
suggested above. The first is that for each sub-interval of excess demand
and excess supply we lose one observation.
Assuming that the coefficient for auto-correlation is stable we
estimate it first for the longest sub-interval and proceed by generalized
differences to estimate the parameters of intercept, slope and the
variance of the error term.
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It is this corrected variance what we use to set the best partition
of the sample.
Table B. Estimation of the Credit Demand Equations.
T SIVOL RTIRA
-36 001
(-2.02)
-28 403 .887
(-1.79)
-52 525
(-1.91)
-17 093 .841
(-1.82)
-38 350
(-3.13)
58 474 -48.12 43.2
(1.87) (-1.79) (1.91)
CSegment
Total 6 194
(1.59)
rho
.934
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
29 046
(0.64)
-14 291
(-6.36)
11 028
(0.22)
-2 778
(0.02)
1 398.7
(5.94)
656.6
(4.72)
1 735.1
(14.8)
2 081.1
(2.50)
4 285.5
(2.16)
.958
.967
.803
.409
.711
.957
(5)
.966
-47 667
(-1.35>
.688 .580
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Appendix C. Estimation of Excess Demand for Foreign Credit and Produc-
tive Uses of Commercial Bank Credit.
This appendix describes some of the details on how excess foreign
borrowing of the private sector and commercial banks was computed indicat-
ing in each case the kind of data used.
1. External Borrowing of Private Firms.
To determine the excess borrowing of private firms during 1981 and
1982 first it was necessary to estimate an equation for foreign borrowing
in times of excess supply of domestic funds and with this simulate the
demand that would have happened if no rationing had taken place in 1981
and 1982. The difference between observed and simulated values is
attributed to the effects of the contraction and allocation of domestic
credit.
1.1. The Data.
In the regression equation we have as dependent variable the stock of
net private external borrowing in the non-banking sector (DEXTEMP) from
SIE-Banxico data bank. Data are in billion dollars.
The explanatory variables are the volume of activity in the economy
(SIVOL) for which we use the Index of Manufacturing Activity (1978-100)
the real active effective interest rate (RTIRA) (units are in per cent per
month -in decimal notation 1%-.01- the same units are used everywhere we
refer to rates such as in RPRIME below), the real exchange rate (REALEX)
all of them from the same SIE-Banxico (1978-100.0). The cost of foreign
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funds (RPRIME) results from subtracting from the prime rate the rate of
domestic inflation, the expected depreciation (from the quoting of the one
month futures of the mexican peso). The prime rate comes from various
numbers of the Survey of Current Business of the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics and the quotations of futures from Indicadores de Sector Externo of
Banco de Mexico.
1.2. The Estimation.
The same as in the estimation of the credit market where the sample
is partitioned in several non-contiguous intervals the problem of auto-
correlation is faced computing the regressions with the method of general-
ized differences estimating the parameter rho in the longest sub-interval.
DEXTPR - -53 125 + 230.75 SIVOL + 74 962 RTIRA + 142.88 REALEX
t-statistic (-3.39) (3.94) (2.67) (2.59)
-44 937 RPRIME
(-1.86)
RHO- .924 R2-. 987
2. Productive Lending of the Banking System.
Banks in Mexico were allowed to lend in pesos and in dollars. The
credit demand equations estimated in Appendix B. refer to financing in
pesos.
To compute productive lending we start from the idea that all
financing in dollars through the financial system does not go to capital
flight.
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Then, to simulate all productive credit we take the estimated demand
for peso financing obtained in Appendix B for each segment, when that
segment is not rationed and actual credit when the segment is rationed.
To the sum of these amounts, one adds financing in dollars. Then to
derive the flow we simply take first differences and compare it with the
flows of external borrowing of commercial banks. (it includes the
corrections of table 3.3).
The gap between this simulated flow and the flows of foreign borrow-
ing are computed and accumulated starting on 1980.12 - 0.0 and reported in
section 4.3.
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DOMESTIC STABILITY AND EXTERNAL SHOCKS
A Review of the Causes of the Mexican Stabilizing
Development (1955-1971)
205
DOMESTIC STABILITY AND EXTERNAL SHOCKS
A Review of the Causes of the Mexican Stabilizing
Development (1955-1971)
Introduction
The Mexican economic history of the first fifty years of post-
Revolutionary experience is usually divided in three stages: economic
reconstruction (1917-1940)), growth with inflation (1940-1954) and the
stabilizing development (1955-1971).
The literature is abundant in descriptions and details of what
happened in each one of these periods (some references which summarize
most of the different views and facts on this part of the Mexican Economic
experience are Fernandez Hurtado, 1976; Gil Diaz, 1983; Solis, 1968, 1980,
1981; Solis and Brothers, 1967; Mancilla, 1978; Vernon 1965; Ibarra, 1970;
Reyna and Pellicer de Brody, 1978 and Urquidi, 1951 among others).
Nevertheless there has been very little discussion on the transition
between one stage and the next which is usually where one can find the
most enriching lessons.
This sense that something important is missing is specially evident
when one tries to explain how Mexico was able to go from inflation to
stability in the mid-fifties while there was so little change in institu-
tions.
The years of fast growth and price stability of the 'desarrollo
estabilizador' leave policy makers with a puzzle and a challenge. On the
one hand one wants to know what were the essential features of the insti-
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tutional arrangements in the labor, financial and goods markets that
collaborated in making it possible as well as to understand to what extent
it was the result of fiscal discipline and to what extent it was simply
the consequence of a more stable world economy and less severe exogenous
shocks. If it is the case that policy and/or institutional changes were
at the center of the transition from inflation to economic stability, then
the challenge for policy makers is to try to adjust current arrangements
following the lessons from the past, and in this way reproduce the
'desarrollo estabilizador'. On the other hand, it may very well be the
case that the 'desarrollo estabilizador' is mainly the result of less
variability of the international business cycle and of other shocks. If
the latter is true one has to put the story of the 'desarrollo estabiliza-
dor' in perspective trying to avoid exaggeration of the stylized facts of
this period, being more aware of the constraints that external shocks
impose on macroeconomic goals and focusing the efforts of policy making in
innovation rather than imitation if the idea is to go back to price and
exchange rate stability with fast income growth. Although, as I mentioned
before, the literature says very little about this transition, there is a
commonly accepted view, held mostly by policy makers and many times
presented as the most logical explanation to students of Mexican Economic
History. It claims that there had to be a significant change in the style
of policy making, going from inflationary finance of growth to fiscal and
monetary conservatisim. The new style is usually identified with the
personalities of Ortiz-Mena and Gomez in Hacienda and Banco de Mexico.
This paper challenges this conventional view as it tries to identify
the role of changes in institutional policy and external conditions in the
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transition to de 'desarrollo establizador'. Section 2 gives a brief
description of the characteristics and performance of the Mexican Economy
after the Revolution, paying special attention to the period from 1940 to
1971 and focusing on institutional and policy aspects of the transition
to the 'desarrollo estabilizador'. Section 3 decomposes, with the help of
optimal control techniques, the sources of stability in what is due to
external and exogenous fluctuations and what is due to changes in the
direction of economic policy. Section 4 has some concluding remarks.
Besides the intention of this piece to contribute to the debate of
Mexican history it also suggests a methodology to the more broader
discussion on the role of external factors in the stability of less
developed countries.
2. A Panoramic View of the Economic History of Post-Revolutionary
Mexico.
After something more than thirty years of modernization and expansion
of the 'Porfirian Peace', Mexico is devastated by a Revolution that cost
more than one million lives, and inflicted heavy losses in infrastructure
affecting very seriously key sectors such as agriculture and mining. By
some accounts (Reynolds, 1973) the opportunity cost of the destructive
phase of the Revolution (1910-1917) was something close to 37% of the
potential income.
The reconstructive period (1917-1940) is marked by the creation of
some basic institutions which role would be to provide a minimal physical
and financial foundation for future economic expansion. Some examples of
this are Banco de Mexico, Nacional Financiera and other Development Banks,
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the National Commission of Roads and the National Commission of Irriga-
tion, the National Commission of the Minimum Wage, the National Commission
of Electricity etc. During this years large fractions of the federal
budgets (between 40 and 60%) were directed to economic promotion in
agriculture, some basic industries, public works, etc. By 1940 all basic
institutions were in place and with the characteristics that were going to
prevail until the mid and late seventies. There are very few reforms in
the fourties and fifties that could justify thinking of them as crucial
factors in the stabilization. The basic shape of the credit and labor
markets was given by pre-1940 legislation.
For example, with respect to the financial system it was constituted
by a Central Bank (Banco de Mexico), National Development Banks and
private institutions (commercial banks in charge of issuing short term
instruments and giving short term credit, and financieras in charge of
long term savings and lending). There is no money market, and there are
no money market operations; the government finances its deficit mainly via
'encaje legal' or direct credits from Banco de Mexico. The interest rate
on deposits, financiera bonds and credits is given by Banco de Mexico and
remains practically constant for thirty years. (General Law of Banking
Institutions and Auxiliary Credit Institutions, 1940).
With respect to the labor market regulation, it followed the basic
principles of article 123 of the Constitution (1917). The amendments of
1929, 1933, 1938 and 1942 create the Social Security system and the Labor
Tribunals (Junta de Conciliacion y Arbitraje), set the procedures and
conditions for the legal use of the right to a strike and institute the
biannual revision of the minimum wages and wages in the so called law
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contracts and collective contracts. No other significant change is
introduced to the labor legislation until the passing of the Federal Law
of Labor in 1970.
The decade of the 1930s is also characterized by important events
such as the nationalization of the oil industry (1938), the rapid
advance of the agrarian reform and the definitive reassumption of service
payments on the external public debt (1941).
From 1940 on Mexico has a period of fast expansion and industrializa-
tion which will continue uninterrupted until 1976. Between 1940 and 1970
the per-capita GDP grows at 3.2% per year, industrial production at 8.0%
per year and while agriculture and services averaged an annual expansion
of 4.4% and 6.4% respectively.
Table 1. Basic Indicators.(a) (annual rates)
GDP Growth Per Capita GDP Inflation
1900-1910 3.0% 2.1% 5.5%
1910-1921 0.5 1.0 4.8
1921-1940 1.7 0.0 1.2
1940-1955 6.0 3.2 11.0
1955-1970 6.7 3.3 3.3
(a) Elaborated from Estadisticas Historicas de Mexico, SPP
The detonator of the Mexican expansion is usually linked to the
growth of exports caused by the war as well as from the additional
liquidity generated by capital flight from economies at war which found
refuge in the country.
The basic difference with the pre-war period is that once the initial
impulse disappeared (with the slowdown of the U.S. economy and the return
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of the European capital flight) the expansion is sustained by a combina-
tion of real exchange rate devaluations and an activist fiscal and
monetary policy. The civilian governments that came after the war, having
realized the benefits of the industrialization of the early forties tried
to continue the process using fiscal and exchange rate policies to
compensate external shocks.
The period of inflation and growth can be described as a sequence of
external shocks, devaluation and inflation and an accommodating aggregate
demand policy. In turn, during the 'desarrollo estabilizador', the same
emphasis for growth prevailed but, the stability of the external condi-
tions made possible to combine growth with low inflation.
Figures 1 and 2 give a good picture of the transition from inflation
to stability. The claim here is that the change is not the result of a
shift in policy preferences in favor of inflation stabilization instead of
growth to the extent that is attributed to the styles of Ortiz-Mena and
Rodrigo Gomez, but rather the consequence of steady growth and low
inflation in the rest of the industrialized world, particularly in the
U.S. Although the next section suggests this same conclusion more
formally, we can motivate this idea by looking at some external events
that constrained the capacity of the government to keep inflation down and
continue the industrialization.
The first of these external shocks is the expansion during the years
of World War II as well as the consequences of the peace which is reflec-
ted in a rapid deterioration of the current account during 1946 and 1947.
In 1948 and 1949 the country is forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate
regime. The second episode is the Korean War. The same as in the previous
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case there were the years of prosperity (1950-1951) and the years of
recession and post-war adjustment (1952-1953) ending with the devaluation
of 1954.
In both cases the expansionary and contractionary effects of the
external shocks have a sizeable impact on the Mexican Economy. Table 2
shows that the changes in exports from one year to the next can be of the
order of 2.5 to 3.5 points of GDP. These fluctuations are explained to a
large extent by the cycle of the US economy.
Table 2. Export Shocks and Economic Performance (1940-1955).
GDP Inflation Exports/GDP
1941 9.7 2.4 9.0
1942 5.6 9.4 9.9
1943 3.7 17.7 9.2
1944 8.2 33.3 5.9
1945 3.1 6.2 6.4
1946 6.6 27.4 7.2
1947 3.4 7.3 7.4
1948 4.1 2.4 8.5
1949 5.5 4.4 10.5
1950 9.9 5.3 10.9
1951 7.7 19.7 10.6
1952 4.0 7.9 8.9
1953 0.3 -0.8 8.4
1954 10.0 10.8 9.9
1955 8.5 12.3 11.1
1956 8.5 7.0 11.0
Source: Estadisticas Historicas de Mexico, SPP.
During the years of the 'desarrollo estabilizador' the situation
looks much different. The year to year variability of the export-output
ratio is significantly smaller.
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Table 3. Export Shocks and Economic Performance (1956-1970)
GDP Inflation Export/GDP
1957 6.8 6.8 7.8
1958 5.3 5.5 7.1
1959 3.0 4.0 6.8
1960 8.1 4.9 6.0
1961 4.1 3.4 6.2
1962 4.7 3.0 6.1
1963 8.0 3.1 5.9
1964 9.0 5.6 6.1
1965 6.5 2.3 5.9
1966 6.9 4.0 5.4
1967 6.3 2.9 5.2
1968 8.1 2.4 4.9
1969 6.3 3.9 5.2
1970 6.9 4.5 4.9
Source: Estadisticas Historicas de Mexico, SPP.
It was also the case that the decade of the forties and fifties had
several episodes of bad agricultural production and sharp terms of trade
shocks which also added to the variability of total production and
exports. Table 3 shows that the frequency and amplitude of agricultural
shocks is much higher in the years of growth with inflation than in the
years of the 'desarrollo estabilizador'. This, added to the fact that
agriculture decreases participation in total production as the moderniza-
tion of the fifties and sixties goes on in the following decades makes
this kind of exogenous shock have much more impact in the years of
inflation and growth.
To have a complete picture of the transition we have to talk about
the preferences of the policy makers, and try to see to what extent a
policy shift is also responsible for the stabilization.
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Table 3. Agricultural Production (annual growth rates).
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
-11.5
23.9
12.2
-9.3
10.3
-4.6
1.6
10.3
10.9
10.3
5.2
-3.9
0.6
22.9
12.5
-5.9
9.4
8.6
-7.2
5.7
2.3
6.9
4.3
10.6
2.6
5.2
0.1
0.9
1.0
3.8
Source: Estadisticas Historicas, SPP.
We start in the 1940's and 1950's with a government with a strong
commitment in favor of growth rather than inflation control. This is
quite apparent when one reviews the 'State of the Union ' addresses of
presidents Avila-Camacho, Aleman-Valdes, and Ruiz-Cortines and by simply
looking at the facts. Negative shocks (external or internal) are met with
expansionary fiscal and credit policies and an exchange rate correction.
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Table 4. Fiscal and Exchange Rate Policies. (1940-1955).
Deficit/GDP (a)
0.19%
0.85
0.52
0.89
1.15
0.60
0.68
1.29
0.71
0.48
-0.73
0.46
0.44
0.76
-0.03
0.53
Exchange Rate (b)
(pesos per dollar)
4.85
4.85
4.85
4.85
4.85
4.85
4.85
5.74
8.01
8.65
8.65
8.65
8.65
11.34
12.50
12.50
(a) Source: Anuario Estadistico, SPP.
(b) Period average.
several issues.
In every case it is clear that the size of the fiscal deficit is
very small and that fiscal expansions have little persistence, which was
determined mostly by the persistence of the external and supply shocks
themselves.
During the years of the 'desarrollo estabilizador', Mexico continues
running small deficits and its variability is clearly less than in the
period of inflation and growth. This does not necessarily mean that there
was a shift in policy direction or of better economics. It may also be
the consequence of external stability. For example, an economy where
policy preferences are biased in favor of GDP stability rather than
inflation stability will accommodate all supply shocks making fiscal
policy look volatile, but the cause of the inflation variability is not
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
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fiscal undiscipline but the exogenous shocks. Once they have lower
frequency and/or amplitude the optimal aggregate demand will also be less
volatile for the same policy preferences.
Table 5. Fiscal Deficit during the 'Desarrollo Estabilizador'
(1956-1970).
Deficit/GDP
1957 0.7
1958 0.7
1959 0.8
1960 0.5
1961 1.0
1962 0.9
1963 0.8
1964 1.1
1965 0.8
1966 1.2
1967 2.2
1968 2.0
1969 2.1
1970 3.6
Source: Anuario Estadistico, SPP, several issues.
The next section looks in more detail at the role of external factors
in the transition to stability, but before doing so it is important to
mention that there are some other factors which may also have contributed
to the good economic performance of the sixties. As stability came about,
productive investment and saving increased, the financial institutions
consolidated and the modernization of the country continued with further
labor mobility, better communications and transport infrastructure, higher
level of education and the strengthening of the middle and entrepreneurial
class.
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3. The Transition to the Desarrollo Estabilizador from the
Perspective of an Optimization Exercise.
This section presents an exercise based on optimal control techniques
to identify the sources of price and growth stability from the mid-fifties
until 1971. The idea here is to start estimating a simple structural
model of the Mexican Economy. This model is the basis to compute an
optimal control solution which is used as a benchmark to evaluate the
economic policy of the inflation and 'desarrollo estabilizador' periods.
The outcome of the control exercise also provides a framework which can
help to get a sense of the constraints that external, and other exogenous
shocks imposed on macroeconomic stability.
3.1. A Simple Model.
To solve the optimization problem one first needs to now the struc-
tural constraints which are given by the institutional arrangements of the
Mexican Economy. A minimal description is given by a simple macro-
econometric model with an aggregate demand. an aggregate supply and a
real exchange rate equation.
GDPt - o + 01 GDPt 1 + 2 Gt + 63 at- + 4 GNPUStl 1 + et (1)
rt - ao + a1 t-1 + a2 DEPRt + a3 GDP t + ut (2)
at at-l + deprt + ust - + us* - t-1 (3)
Where
GDP Natural logarithm of the ratio GDP/trend GDP
G Annual growth rate of real government spending in domesti-
cally produced goods.
a Natural Logarithm of the real exchange rate. 1960-0.0
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Annual rate of inflation of the consumer price index
(December to December)
wus Annual rate of inflation' of the US consumer price index
(expressed as difference from the 1955-1971 average rus*)
GNPUS Annual rate of growth of GNP in the U.S. (deviations from
1955-1971 average)
3.2. The Data.
These three equations are estimated for the sample period 1939-1971
with annual data. All data for the Mexican series comes from Estadisticas
Historicas de Mexico, SPP. For the U.S. all data comes from the Appendix
of Gordon (1981).
3.3'. The Results
The system of simultaneous
being recursive which allows us
methods. The method chosen was
Dependent Variable : GDP
c -.070
GDP(t-1) .440
G .042
GNPUS(t-1) .129
o(t-1) .057
R-squared:.651
Dependent Variable
c .016
K(t-1) .631
GDP 1.364
DEPR .380
R-squared: .508
equations (1) and (2) has the property of
to estimate them using single equation
OLS which gives consistent estimates.
t-statistic
-3.136
3.102
2.077
2.150
2.873
DW: 1.77
1.395
4.412
2.981
2.075
DW: 1.89
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3.4. The Control Exercise
To get an idea of how much of the variability of inflation and growth
can be attributed to external shocks rather than to policy bias in favor
of growth stability versus inflation stability. One begins estimating a
set of optimal combinations of inflation and growth that could be reached
given the variability of external and other exogenous shocks.
Here we will follow closely the methodology presented by Chow (1973)
to solve an optimal control problem for stochastic models. One starts with
a loss function of the form:
T ^ ^
L - E0 D (YYtY)' (4)
where E0 is the expectation conditional to the initial condition vector
Y0 . The Yt vector is defined as
Y - 1
GDPt
Xt
GNPUSt
-fust
and Y is the vector of 'preferred' values of the state variables.
Somewhat arbitrarily we take as reasonable target values a domestic
inflation of 3% per year, a cyclical GDP of zero and the real exchange
rate of 1960 ( - .03, o - 0.0 and GDP - 0.0).
The loss function can be simplified defining Y - 0 and correcting the
intercept of the inflation and real exchange rate equation. In the
inflation equation it is originally given by P0 and now is given by
PO'- 60 + (1-fi1 )f. For the real exchange rate the intercept given ini-
tially by rus* is now us-n. With these changes considered while defining
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the constraints to which the optimization problem will be subject, the
minimization will be on:
T
L - E0 X Y't D Yt (4')
1
Matrix D is assumed constant during the exercise. Each one of the
elements in the diagonal shows the relative preferences of the authorities
with respect to the stabilization of nominal versus real variables. One
simplification that helps to keep the dimensionality of the problem and
still allows to capture the essence of the tradeoff between stability of
nominal versus real variables would be to specify.
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 6/2 0 0 0 0
0 0 1-6 0 0 0
D- 0 0 6/2 0 0
O O O O 0
O O O O 0
Before minimizing (4') using as control variables government spending
and the nominal exchange rate depreciation one has to rewrite the dynamic
system (1) to (3) as
Yt B Yt 1 + c At + t (6)
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where
1
0'
B - o +a3 '80
7rus*+7r
0
0
0
82C - 3 2
0
0
0
0
31
*3 Al
0
0
0OsO
O
0o 0o
O O0 #,
01 03 4
-1 1
0 0
0 0
0
0
a 2
1
0
0O
O
and the vector which i
mean random variables.
demand shocks. For the
the production and price
0
et
a3 et +ut
0
GNPUS t
Irust
0
s3 
0
0
0O
O
0
0
0
1
0
0
At-[ GtDEP~ ]
s treated as a vector of not autocorrelated zero
This is is already proved for the supply and
other exogenous variables what is required is that
processes in the US be random walks with a trend.
At is the vector of policy instruments. For this problem what we
have is a situation with two instruments (fiscal and exchange rate policy)
and three objectives: production, inflation and real exchange rate.
The solution of (4') subject to (6) gives an optimal rule of the form
: (see Chow, 1971 for the proof)
et 
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At - Yt- g (7)
where g is the matrix of coefficient of the optimal response of the
corresponding policy variable to the exogenous shocks. A first order
approximation of the solution for g, (which will be used here) is sug-
gested by Anderson (1971) (see also Chow (1973) and Taylor (1979)).
g - - (c'D c)-l c' D B (8)
3.4.1. The Optimal Policy Response.
The next step is to use the values we already have for the Mexican
Economy to compute the optimal policy matrix 'g' for different values of
6. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the resulting vectors for the fiscal and
exchange rate policies.
Table 6.1. Coefficients of the Optimal Response Rule (Gt )
6 c GDP(t-1) w(-1)- oa(t-l) GNPUS(t-1) rus(t-l)
.01 3.164 -11.730 -18.458 5.354 -3.386 6.936
.10 3.124 -11.709 -17.926 5.149 -3.382 6.737
.25 3.040 -11.667 -16.862 4.754 -3.375 6.338
.50 2.814 -11.566 -14.316 3.810 -3.356 5.380
.75 2.505 -11.389 - 9.851 2.154 -3.323 3.702
.90 2.140 -11.201 - 5.090 0.388 -3.287 1.913
.99 1.790 -11.021 - 0/616 -1.271 -3.254 0.231
Table 6.2. Coefficients of the Optimal Response Rule (DEPRt )
6 c GDP(t-1) r(-1)- ao(-l) GNPUS(t-1) xus(t-1)
.01 .0173 -.00878 .775 -.916 -.00166 -.915
.10 .0161 -.00862 .782 -.919 -.00161 -.918
.25 .0151 -.00811 .794 -.923 -.00152 -.922
.50 .0133 -.00687 .825 -.935 -.00129 -.934
.75 .0091 -.00473 .880 -.955 -.00088 -.955
.90 .0047 -.00244 .938 -.977 -.00046 -.976
.99 .0005 -.00296 .992 -.997 -.00005 -.997
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Tables 6.1 and 6.2 give, for each value of 6 the coefficients in
equations
Gt - gl + g2GDPt-1 + gl(t-l-w) + g3 at-1+ g4GNPUSt-1 + g5 rust-l (9)
DEPR - d1 + d2GDPt_1 + g3(it- 1-w) + dtl + dGNPUSt. 1 + drust 1 (10)
being and DEPR the values of the optimal fiscal and exchange rate policy
rules.
3.4.2.
Knowing
simulate the
The Second Order Phillips Curve.
the values of the optimal response rule it is possible to
optimal inflation and GDP performance. Lets define
s2 (t) - y*(t) y*(t)' (11)
where
1
GDP*
*
GNPUS
rus
The elements in the diagonal of Y*Y*' give us the variability of
inflation, real exchange rate and income that could be achieved at time t
if the optimal response rule had been applied. At each time t, s2 will be
the result of solving
s2 (t)- (B+cg) s2 (t-l) (B+cg)' + p(t) (p(t)(B+cg)t Y0 +
t
+ (B+cg)i t-i)' (12)
0
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It can be seen that the characteristic roots of (B+cg) are less than
one in absolute value, having the elements of not autocorrelated and
from the fact that we will be interested in the elements in the diagonal
to compute what which be called second order Phillips curve (defined
bellow), we can approximate (12) by (13)
s2 (t)- (B+cg) s2(t-l) (B+cg)' + p(t)p(t)' (13)
and
s2 (0)_ Y(O)Y(O)'
Taylor (1979) introduced this concept of a second order Phillips
curve. This function shows the trade-off between the variance of infla-
tion and the variance of income in an optimal control exercise. This
trade-off, for a given period (O,t) can be summarized comparing the
elements the diagonal terms of
t
(l/t) s2 (t) (14)
Using this idea to review the basic performance of the Mexican
Economy during the years of inflation and 'desarrollo estabilizador' can
help to understand the nature of the transition.
3.4.2. The Second Order Phillips Curve.
3.4.2.1. The Mexican Economy during the inflation and growth
period.
Computing equation (14) for the 1942-1954 period gives the results
shown in table 7 and figure 4.
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Table 7. Minimum Average Variability of Income and Inflation (1942- 1954)
6 s2 (GDP) s 2 (Inflation)
.01 .027 .011
.10 .023 .012
.25 .020 .014
.50 .017 .018
.75 .010 .030
.90 .006 .052
.99 .005 .109
Observed .013 .026
Curve PP in figure 4 is the second order Phillips curve. It shows
the combination of the minimum feasible variance of GDP and inflation.
All points to the left and bellow PP cannot be reached. The position of
the curve is determined by the variability of the external and other
exogenous shocks. Comparing actual and optimal performance we see that
the observed data are very close to the PP schedule for a value of 6
between .50 and .75. This fact has two meanings: on the one hand this
helps to discard the possible argument that the variability of inflation
and growth is the result of poor policy making and can be rationalized by
an optimization exercise; on the other hand one could say that the
performance of the economy reveals the preferences of the authorities
with a 6 value between .5 and .75.
Figure 4 also has the combination of variance of income and inflation
for the years of the 'desarrollo estabilizador'. It is clear that the
variability of exogenous and external shocks made it unfeasible. If
there had been a policy more biased against inflation (say, 6-.01), the
recession would have been huge. In other words, any change in the tone of
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policy making would not have been sufficient to reproduce the 'desarrollo
estabilizador'. To complete the study of the role of policy changes and
external factors in the transition from inflation to stability we need to
see the second order Phillips curve for the 1955-1971 period.
3.4.2.2. The Mexican
Here we simply repeat
results are shown in table
Economy during the Desarrollo Estabilizador.
the exercise for the 1955-1971 period. The
8 and figure 5.
Table 8. Minimum Average Variability of Income and Inflation
(1955-1971)
6 s2 (GDP) s2 (Inflation)
.01 .0111 .0138
.10 .0105 .0132
.25 .0097 .0128
.50 .0066 .0098
.75 .0026 .0048
.90 .0011 .0029
.99 .0006 .0014
1.00 .0000 .0009
Observed .0009 .0015
Figure 8 shows the corresponding second order Phillips curve. It is
immediately apparent that it is upward slopping which means that, during
this period, either supply and demand shocks were negatively correlated or
that supply shocks were significantly less important.
Talking about variances has a lot to do with the second order
conditions. If agents realize or learn that there has been a change in
the variance-covariance matrix, that information will also affect the
SECOND ORDER PHILLIPS CURVE
(1942-1954)
O.09 0.017 0.02 0.023
YWR.F NCOME(Acctuol wdes. ebil.)
SECOND ORDER PHILLIPS CURVE
(1 9-1970)
0 0.000C 0.0017 0.0029 0.03E
VAR.F INCOME(g dsrnr. edilimazor).
0.01 0.0108 0.01 16
0.01
0.008
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optimal response. For instance, if agents realize that the second order
Phillips curve is now vertical with the characteristics of PP in figure 5,
it is clear that the only rule that will maximize equation (14') will be
the one corresponding to 6 - 1.00 for any possible preference coefficient
6. Comparing the optimal performance with the observed performance it can
be seen that actual values are proportionally farther from optimal values
during the 'desarrollo estabilizador' years than during the inflation
years. On the other hand it is also clear that the change in the relative
variance of external and exogenous shocks modifies substantially the set
of minimum inflation and exchange rate variability, from a downward
sloping relation to a single point. This shows the role of external
variability in the capacity of the country to reduce inflation.
The following tables based on the numbers of tables 6 and 7 can
summarize some interesting features of the Mexican stabilization.
Table 9. Sources of inflation and growth variability in Mexico.
Inflation and Growth Period (1942-1954)
Variance Proportion
Inflation
External Factors .022 84.6%
Policy Mistakes .004 15.4%
Total .026 100.0%X
GDP
External Factors .011 84.6%
Policy Mistakes .002 15.4%
Total .013 100.0%
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Table 9 (continued)
Desarrollo Estabilizador (1955-1971)
Inflation
External Factors .0009 60.0%
Policy Mistakes .0006 40.0%
Total .0015 100.0%
GDP
External Factors .0000 0.0%
Policy Mistakes .0009 100.0%X
Total .0009 100.0X
Table 10. Transition from Inflation to Stability.
Inflation GDP
(1) Variance (1942-1954) .0260 .0132
(2) Variance (1955-1971) .0015 .0009
(3) Difference (1)-(2) .0245 .0123
Total % Total %
(4) Difference in
External Factors .0210 85.7 .0109 88.6
(5) Difference in Policy .0035 14.2 .0014 11.3
Mistakes
(6) Change in Policy
Preferences n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
(4)+(5)+(6)-(3) .0245 100.0 .0123 100.0
n.s.: non-significant. See text bellow for an interpretation of this
result.
Table 9 views the variability of GDP and of Inflation as having two
components. The first given by the distance from the origin to the second
Order Phillips curve (in the case of period 1942-1954 the point selected
on the PP schedule was the closest to the actual observation). This
distance, for a given loss function, is explained by the variability of
external and other exogenous shocks. The second component corresponds to
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the distance from PP to the observed values. This difference is presented
under the heading of policy mistakes because they represent deviations
from the optimal policy frontier. They can actually be the result of
'honest' policy mistakes or may come from some conscious attempt of the
authorities to depart persistently from the inflation or GDP targets,
which may also be interpreted as the result of a loss function different
from (14').
Table 10 uses the numbers in Table 9 to decompose the transition from
the inflation and growth period to the 'desarrollo estabilizador'.
The change in observed economic performance can be understood as the
result of three factors. First, the lower variability of external and
exogenous shocks, which is represented by the shift of the second order
Phillips curve. A second factor is the change in policy mistakes or
efficiency of the policy makers to optimize the loss function, which means
the change in the distance between the observed and the optimal values of
inflation and growth. A third possible factor is the change in preferen-
ces of the government, namely a change in the weights given to the loss
function.
It is suggested that something like 85 to 90% of the improvement in
inflation and growth performance is due Lo the reduction in external and
other exogenous shocks. A possible change in policy preferences, which
means having authorities placing different emphasis to the state vari-
ables, although possible does not make any difference in the choice of
optimal policy as the second order Phillips curve is now upward sloping
meaning that the second order Phillips curve has degenerated into a point.
The remaining component refers to 'better policy management' in the sense
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of a performance closer to the optimal one. This factor is responsible
for the 10 to 15 improved performance.
4. Concluding Remarks
This piece goes back to the origins of the Mexican Stabilizing
Development looking for the causes for the outstanding performance of the
economy which was often referred to as the Mexican Miracle.
Using a methodology based on an optimal control exercise it is
suggested that almost 901 of the stabilization is due to the stability of
external conditions while little more than 101 was due to better policy
management. This contrasts with the traditional view which claims that
the advent of the management 'styles' of legendary officials such as
Rodrigo Gomez and Ortiz Mena made most of the difference.
This result puts the 'desarrollo estabilizador' and the Mexican
Miracle in a different perspective which, while recognizing the role of
good economics, also suggests that circumstances had a lot to do with it.
The 'desarrollo estabilizador' is then, an even more exceptional period.
Understanding this carries an important policy message to contem-
porary economists, who look back at the institutions of the sixties
wondering what should be copied and what is right for today's Mexico. The
answer is perhaps very little should be copied. Current conditions,
complicated by the external debt problem means that there is no way back
and that any sensible solution will require a combination of imagination
and innovation coupled with the practice of disciplined economics.
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